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the	 consumer	market	 (2016-present),	 the	 thesis	 addresses	 and	examines	 some	of	 the	
more	ambivalent	and	unruly	encounters	that	this	technology	makes	possible.	In	so	doing,	
it	defines	taxonomies	of	the	kinds	of	unruly	experiences	users	might	have	of	digital	media	
more	 broadly,	 including	 compromised	 agency,	 boundaries	 of	 access,	 displacement,	
proximate	 glitches,	 and	 embodied	 horror—experiences	 which	 are	 incredibly	 varied	
despite	the	increasing	appeal	to	a	homogeneous	‘immersion’	in	their	marketing,	and	the	
cultural	and	even	academic	discourses	which	surround	them.		
	 There	 remains	 an	 incapacity	 to	 frame	 experiences	 of	 VR	 in	 a	 way	 not	 yet	
prescribed	through	familiar	experience,	embodied	grammars,	or	sufficient	grammars	of	
discourse.	Offering	a	reconfiguration	of	the	popularisation	of	 ‘framelessness’	 in	the	VR	
space	 as	 being	 synonymous	with	 the	 transparency	 of	 hardware	 interfaces,	 Frameless	
Fictions	instead	speaks	back	to	the	concept	of	frames	and	enframing	in	philosophy	and	
phenomenological	enquiry	(e.g.	Heidegger	1954),	which	describe	the	human	tendency	to	
cognitively	 frame	 things	 for	 an	 ordering	 of	 use	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 (inherently	




The	 work	 evaluates	 and	 interprets	 a	 number	 of	 multimedia	 texts,	 including	
fictional	 representations	 (novels,	 films,	 advertising	 materials,	 VR	 applications,	 and	



























































































- Reconfiguring	Presence/Absence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 40	
- “Silicon	Valley	Success”	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 43	
- Promotion,	Agency,	and	Access	 	 	 	 	 	 	 47	
o Invasion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
o Evasion	
o Departure	
- Humanist	VR:	A	Parody?	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 54	
- Frame	Breaking	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 56	
- The	Humanist	Legacy	of	the	Frame:	‘Enframing'	 	 	 	 	 59	
- Framelessness	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 63	
- Challenging	Givenness	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 73	
- Moving	Beyond	the	Human	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 76
	 	 	 	
	
Chapter	2:	
Presence	and	the	Phenomenology	of	the	Flesh	 	 	 	 	 84	
- The	Girl	Who	Was	Plugged	In	(1973)	 	 	 	 	 	 89	
- Why	Flesh?	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													101	
- Producing	New	Subjectivities	 	 	 	 	 	 													110	
- Presencing	the	(un)Human	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													117	










Glitch/Noise/Immersion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 												141	
- Immersion	–	what	does	it	actually	mean?	 	 						 	 	 													147						
- ‘Insides’	and	‘Outsides’	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													149	
- Weirdness	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													153	
- Immersion	in	a	World	of	Errors	 	 	 	 	 	 													159	
- Perceiving	Error	 	 	 	 	 	 											 	 													166	
- The	Materiality	of	Error	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													170	










the	Horror	Genre	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 												190	
- Feeling	Horror	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													197	
- Horror	and/as	Affect	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													200	
- Breaking	Frames	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 													204	
- Engagement	and	Expectations	of	Horror	 	 	 	 	 													207	
- Expecting	the	frame	to	break?	 	 	 	 	 	 													210	
- Unruly	Horror	and	VR:	A	Chair	in	a	Room	(2016)	 	 	 	 													213	




Conclusion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 												232	
	











This	meant	 that	 an	entire	 “AAA”	videogame,	 from	 the	popular	Resident	Evil	 franchise,	
could	be	experienced	in	its	entirety	through	a	Virtual	Reality	headset.	It	also	meant	new	
encounters	 with	 the	 world	 of	 the	 game	 could	 be	 actualised	 from	 a	 first-person	
perspective;	this	changed	the	way	the	game	world	looked,	the	way	it	felt,	and	the	way	it	
could	 be	 interacted	 with.	 The	 Resident	 Evil	 7	 demo,	 entitled	 ‘Kitchen,’	 teased	 at	 the	











the	 headset	 on.	 You	 can	 see	 cluttered	 kitchen	 countertops,	 open	 drawers,	 a	 litter-
scattered	floor,	and	are	surrounded	by	eerie	looking	pieces	of	furniture	like	old	lamps	
and	a	tabletop	fan.	Straight	in	front	of	you,	amongst	the	rubble	in	the	room,	a	single	bright	
light	 and	 a	 camera	 faces	 you	 –	 behind	which	 a	male	 body	 in	 a	 suit	 lies	 on	 the	 floor	
surrounded	by	a	pool	of	blood.	Looking	straight	down	at	the	floor,	you	can	see	the	body	
of	 your	presumed	male	 avatar	whose	hands	are	 tied	 together.	Movement	of	 the	hand	

















up,	you	hear	 the	ghoul’s	ghastly	 laughing	emerge	 from	somewhere	behind	your	head.	
Two	bloody	hands	appear	and	smear	across	your	field	of	vision,	after	which	the	ghoul	
emerges	from	over	the	top	of	your	head	with	the	knife,	and	the	demo	ends.	
	 The	 felt	proximity	of	 this	 final	encounter	 is	 truly	 frightening.	Your	body	senses	
proximity	when	 the	 hands	 come	 towards	 you,	 and	 the	 unexpectedness	 of	 each	 event	
makes	them	even	more	visceral.	When	trying	out	the	‘Kitchen’	demo	for	the	first	time,	my	
very	first	experience	of	a	horror	game	built	specifically	for	VR,	I	was	shaken	by	a	wholly	
new	 sense	 of	 ambivalence	 and	 slippage	 where	 my	 own	 embodied	 reaction	 to	 this	








ambivalence	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 reversal	 of	 expectation,	 where	 a	 user’s	 experience	 of	 an	
immersive	 environment	 sits	 in	 an	 in-between	 space	 of	 surprise,	 anticipation,	 shock,	
obscurity,	and	revelation.		
My	own	experience	of	 the	 ‘Kitchen’	demo	 illustrated	 to	me	 that	being	between	
these	realms	actually	revealed	the	truly	novel,	and	necessarily	ambivalent,	affects	that	VR	
is	 capable	 of	 producing.	 Indeed,	 as	 the	 ghoul’s	 hands	 swept	 across	my	 line	 of	 sight,	 I	
jumped	back	in	my	seat	in	shock,	and	consequently	disrupted	the	calibration	between	the	
headset	 and	 the	 PlayStation	 camera	which	monitors	 player	movement.5	 Through	 the	
disruption	 caused	by	my	 frantic	 action,	 it	 suddenly	 appeared	 that	my	head	had	 come	
away	from	my	avatar’s	body.	 I	was	 looking	out	towards	the	 lower	half	of	a	male	body	




this	momentum,	 I	 was	 under	 the	 illusion	 that	 I	 had	 been	 decapitated	 by	 the	 ghoul.	








were	 in	 the	 room	 with	 me.	 However,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 the	 decapitation	 was	 not	











disrupted	 the	 calibration	 of	 the	 simulation.	 I	 had	 effected	 a	 representation	 that	 had	
simultaneously	affected	me.		
This	emergent	and	unruly	glitch,7	that	occurred	through	the	co-operative	action	











discordant	 and	 strange.	 Later,	 however,	 this	 experience	 continued	 to	 provoke	 my	
thinking	about	the	disruptive	potentials	of	bodies	and	immersive	environments:	the	VR	
glitch	translated	into	an	odd,	uncomfortable,	yet	strangely	satisfying	affective	encounter.	





embodied	 relations	with	 contemporary	new	media.	 It	will	 examine	 some	of	 the	more	
ambivalent	 slippages	 between	 embodiment	 and	 virtual	 environments,	 and	 define	
taxonomies	of	the	kinds	of	experiences	users	might	have	of	digital	media	more	broadly,	
in	order	to	plead	the	case	for	VR’s	disruptive	potential,	and	the	generative	possibilities	
offered	 by	 experiences	which	 exceed	perceptual	 realism.	 These	 include	 compromised	
agency,	boundaries	of	access	(Chapter	1),	displacement,	proximate	glitches	(Chapters	2	
&	3),	and	embodied	horror	(Chapter	4),	experiences	which	are	incredibly	varied	despite	









environments,	and	 the	cultural	and	academic	discourses	which	surround	 them.	 It	will	
evaluate	and	interpret	a	number	of	multimedia	texts	(novels,	films,	advertising	materials,	
VR	applications,	and	videogames)	to	argue	for	a	critical	approach	to	virtual	environments	
which	 considers	 how	 framelessness	 emerges	 through	 specific	 affective	 experiences.	
Offering	rich,	entangled	and	affective	interactions	that	have	arguably	not	been	possible	
for	 large	audiences	before,	VR,	specifically,	reveals	new	hybridisations	and	unruly	and	
ambivalent	 slippages	 between	 the	 human	 body	 and	 its	 intimate	 technological	
infrastructures.	Such	hybrid	experiences,	I	argue,	can	be	considered	“frameless	fictions,”	
both	in	that	they	are	inspired	by	narratives	of	extended	realities,	but	also	in	the	ways	they	
are	 continually	 formed	 through	 real-time	 experiences	 which	 evade	 certain	 forms	 of	
capture.	 Such	 experiences	 push	 at	 the	 membrane	 of	 their	 intended	 infrastructures,	
pressing	against	the	prescribed	boundaries	of	their	experiential	capacities,	and	produce	
novel,	unruly,	and	unanticipated	encounters	which	deserve	critical	attention.		
Frames,	 and	 the	 act	 of	 enframing,	 are	 considered	 throughout	 this	 work	 as	
reductive	devices	and	acts	that	attempt	to	capture	anthropocentric	conceptions	of	what	
it	 means	 to	 be	 in	 a	 (technologically	 developed)	 world	 so	 permeated	 by	 new	 media	
technologies.	As	will	be	discussed	more	thoroughly	in	the	thesis’	first	chapter,	such	an	
understanding	 of	 framing	 finds	 its	 roots	 in	 Martin	 Heidegger’s	 phenomenological	
accounts	of	enframing,	and	the	framing	function,	as	a	human	dependence	on	technology	
in	 order	 to	make	 the	 world	 accessible	 exclusively	 for	 human	 use.8	 Heidegger’s	 work	
considers	 technology,	 or	 tools,	 as	 being	 a	means	 for	 enframing	 the	world	within	 the	
















of	 the	 frames	 of	 mediation	 (screens	 and	 interfaces),	 VR	 promises	 the	 potential	 to	
experience	wholly	new	realities	where	users	can	leave	the	here	and	now,	and	enter	realms	
that	 other	 media	 have	 thus	 far	 been	 unable	 to	 provide	 access	 to.	 Though	 popular	
representations	 of	 certain	 forms	 of	 framelessness	 in	 the	 VR	 space	 have	 led	 to	 its	
association	with	the	removal	of	the	screen,	I	will	argue	throughout	this	thesis	that	this	
particular	 ‘framing	 of	 framelessness’	 tells	 us	 little	 about	 the	 actual	 experiences	 this	
technology	makes	possible;	 the	allusion	of	non-mediation	 leads	to	an	unnecessary	and	
detrimental	valorisation	of		the	immateriality	of	VR,	rather	than	critically	assessing	and	
















and	 enmeshed	with	 the	 technologies	 they	 interact	 with;	 sometimes	 this	 can	 produce	
unanticipated	 and	 uncomfortable	 sensations,	 posing	 new	 agential	 challenges	 where	
control	 is	 pulled	 away	 from	 the	 user.	 As	 my	 own	 experience	 above	 illustrates,	 the	
porousness	evoked	by	VR	technologies	produces	new,	novel,	and	underexplored	affective	














tendency	 to	 cognitively	 frame	 the	 world,	 objects,	 and	 nonhuman	 others,	 within	 the	
bounds	of	human	cognition	and	understanding.	Framelessness,	here,	refers	to	that	which	
exists	outside	the	bounds	of	immediate	comprehension	and	understanding.	




seamlessly	 correspond	 with	 the	 body,	 an	 experiential	 chasm	 between	 intended	 and	
unanticipated	action	opens	up,	leading	the	user	to	feel	smeared	between	the	physical	and	
virtual	 environment.	 Such	 sensations	 might	 occur	 when,	 for	 example,	 the	 user	 is	
presented	 with	 the	 opportunity	 to	 fulfil	 the	 role	 of	 becoming	 another	 body	 within	 a	
virtual	simulation.	Alternatively,	in	an	instantaneous	simulation	glitch	–	such	as	the	one	




are	challenged,	 and	considers	how	new	media,	 and	VR	 technologies	more	specifically,	
produce	new	subjectivities	 through	unruly	 encounters	which	go	beyond	our	 (human)	
comprehension.	The	approach	 taken	here	 is,	 instead,	 a	 “multiply	 tiered	ontology”11	of	
digital	media,	inspired	by	New	Materialism,	a	philosophical	discourse	which	encourages	













be	 focusing	 on	 Virtual	 Reality	 (VR)	 both	 as	 a	 series	 of	 technological	 objects	 and	 as	 a	
philosophical	conceptualisation	of	mediated	environments	more	broadly,	which	expands	
upon	and	more	truthfully	captures	the	essence	of	what	it	means	to	be	with	new	media.	It	
will	 argue	 that	 frameless	 and	 unruly	 interactions	 enable	 us	 to	 reconceptualise	 the	




readings	 and	 real-time	 use	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 interpret	 representations	 and	 lived	
experiences	of	VR,	maintaining	a	central	focus	on	affect	and	embodiment.	Specific	chapter	
outlines	 are	 provided	 later	 in	 this	 introduction;	 however,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	





limited	 ways,	 maintaining	 an	 unwavering	 focus	 on	 technological	 transparency	 and	
absolute	user	agency.	I	also	employ	discourse	analysis	for	advertising	videos	in	order	to	
illustrate	what	kind	of	language	is	persistently	being	used	to	describe	VR	experiences	for	
new	 audiences,	 which,	 I	 argue,	 is	 insufficient	 for	 capturing	 VR’s	 unique	 affective	 and	
embodied	potentials.	The	second	and	third	chapters	move	somewhat	away	from	VR	into	
close	readings	of	 fictional	texts	which	narrate	unruly	 interactions	between	bodies	and	




argue	 that	 these	 texts	 provide	 some	 of	 the	 grammars	 that	 are	 currently	 missing	 in	
popular	 VR	 discourse.	 The	 applications	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	 analyse	 provide	 some	 key	
examples	which	best	illustrate	the	unique	experiences	VR	enables	for	those	trying	it	for	
the	 first	 time,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 thesis’	 focus	 on	 embodiment	 and	






own	 experiences	 of	 VR	 simulations	 throughout	 the	work	 as	 first-hand	 experiences	 of	
trying	 VR	 for	 the	 first	 time;	 I	 narrate	 some	 particular	 examples	 in	 order	 to	 put	 the	
phenomenological	 frameworks	 I	 employ	 into	 practice,	 analysing	 these	 interactions	 in	
order	 to	 further	 access,	 and	 critically	 assess,	 experiences	 that	 remain	 relatively	
underexplored	in	popular	discourses	of	VR.	Such	interactions	 include	those	where	the	
body	 interacts	 with	 the	 technology	 in	 unruly	 and	 ambivalent	 ways	 (disorientation,	
generative	glitches,	and	error),	where	the	presentness	of	the	body,	and	the	hardware,	is	
particularly	emphasised,	contrary	to	popular	representations	(as	we	see	in	Chapter	1).	
The	well-established	conceptualisations	of	 the	 figure	of	 the	cyborg	 in	 the	early	
1990’s,	further	popularised	by	the	work	of	Donna	Haraway,	heralded	new	formulations	
and	understandings	of	the	complex	and	multifaceted	relationships	between	human	and	
machine.	 Indeed,	 Haraway’s	 cyborg	 figure	 was	 defined	 through	 the	 ontological	
porousness	of	biological	and	machinic	entities,	and	the	ways	they	might	coalesce	and	co-
emerge	with	one	another.	Haraway’s	work	marks	one	 iteration	of	 framelessness	 from	
which	 this	 thesis	 takes	 inspiration,	where	 the	 frames	of	 “human”	 and	 “computer”	 are	
seemingly	broken	to	produce	hybridised,	unruly	ontologies.	Haraway’s	cyborg,	a	complex	
“hybrid	 of	 machine	 and	 organism,”13	 informed	 novel	 understandings	 of	 embodied	
encounters	 with	 digital	 tools	 as	 fluid	 and	 porous.	 Theorisations	 of	 expanding	 digital	
interactions	moved	beyond	the	“body	left	behind”	dual	ontology	seen	in	fictional	texts	
like	 the	 film	Tron	 (1982),14	where	 the	body	remained	on	 the	outside	of	 the	computer	
whilst	a	newly	“freed”	consciousness	moved	through	the	encoded,	grid-like	space	on	the	
other	side	of	the	screen.	In	such	works,	the	frame	of	the	computer	interface	was	relied	
upon	 as	 the	 stable	 object,	 reinforcing	 the	 positioning	 of	 the	 body	 on	 one	 side,	 and	
consciousness	free	floating	on	the	other.	I	argue	that	in	the	current	era	of	consumer	VR	
devices	 (2016-present15),	where	users	 seek	 (or	 are	 told	 they	 should	 seek)	 to	 become	













In	 approaching	VR	 as	 its	 central	 object/concept,	 this	 thesis	 speaks	back	 to	 and	
develops	 similar	 concerns	 about	 embodiment,	 affect,	 and	 immersion	 that	 can	 be	 seen	
from	 its	 development	 in	 the	 early	 1990’s,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 further	 understanding	 the	
technology’s	nuanced	relationship	to	perception	and	the	body.16	In	particular,	Ken	Hillis’	
1999	work	on	Space,	Identity	and	Embodiment	in	Virtual	Reality	provides	a	useful	platform	
for	 thinking	 about	 the	 ways	 Virtual	 Reality	 might	 produce	 new	 kinds	 of	 Digital	
Sensations.17	 His	 research	 provides	 a	 unique	 insight	 into	 the	 mutual	 affection	 of	




informing	 contemporary	 experiences	 and	 our	 expectations	 of	 VR	 today.	 I	 will	
demonstrate	the	validity	of,	and	extend	further,	Hillis’	earlier	claims	that	embodiment	and	
virtual	 environments	 are	 not	 disparate	 ontological	 realms,	 but	 rather	 seep	 into	 one	






























Since	 the	 time	of	Hillis’	writing,	virtual	environments	have	become	 fleshy:	 they	





VR	 is	 “the	most	 humanistic	 approach	 to	 information”	 and	 “suggests	 an	 inner-centred	





smeared	 subjects—flesh	 is	 drawn	 between	 the	 organic	 and	 the	 technological.	
Throughout	this	work,	I	trace	a	trajectory	of	modes	of	being	with	immersive	digital	tools,	






















technological	 innovations.	Evans’	book	 focuses	on	 the	positioning	of	VR	 in	 the	specific	













of	 both	 the	 advertising	 campaigns	 and	 designs	 for	 consumer	 hardware,	 and	 yet	 there	
remains	a	difficultly	to	narrate	our	phenomenological	experiencing	of	the	very	new,	and	
sometimes	 ambivalent,	 embodied	 experiences,	 they	 make	 possible.	 Whether	 we	 see	
billboards	of	faces	photographed	on	the	latest	iPhone,28	or	spend	time	choosing	the	most	


























order	 to	 become	 successful	 in	 the	 consumer	 market.	 Yet,	 as	 Evans	 also	 notes,	 the	




data	 it	 is	 capable	 of	 collecting.30	 Its	 systems	 allow	 for	 the	 collation	 of	 biometric	 and	




can	 “track	and	analyse	eye	movement,	 attention	and	 focus”	 as	 a	means	 for	 “creat[ing]	
more	immersive	virtual	simulations.”32	In	addition,	they	add	that	they	are	able	to	“gain	
insights	about	user	performance	and	interaction”	in	order	to	“open	the	door	to	deeper	
data	 analysis.”33	 Oculus’	 privacy	 policy	 also	 outlines	 that	 the	 company	 (owned	 by	
Facebook)	 can	 collect	 information	 about	 “your	 physical	 features	 and	dimensions”	 and	




throughout	 this	 work,	 and	 I	 use	 the	 analysis	 of	 affect	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 case	 for	





























Users	 seeking	 pleasure	 by	 recourse	 to	 virtual	 worlds	 consent	 to	 engage	 with	 the	
technology	at	a	bodily	level,	and	more	so	than	in	the	case	of	watching	TV	or	listening	
to	the	radio,	users	are	complicit	in,	and	yield	to,	their	disciplining	by	the	machine	[…]	





its	 manufacturers,	 wield	 over	 their	 users.	 The	 dialectical	 relationship	 between	
surveillance	 and	 pleasure	 is	 built	 into	 VR	 infrastructures;	 with	 this	 shift	 comes	 new	






only	 contributes	 further	 to	 the	 unique	 black-boxed	 infrastructures	 of	 VR.	 It	 is	 in	 this	


















Much	 of	 its	 existing	 reliance	 on	 other	 media	 is	 inevitably	 due	 to	 the	 historical	
inaccessibility	of	standalone	VR	devices;	the	affordability	and	compatibility	of	VR	devices	
with	 popular	 games	 consoles	 and	 devices,	 including	 PlayStation	 and	 android	 mobile	
phones,	has	allowed	it	to	reach	large	audiences	in	a	way	that	it	has	never	has	before.	VR	




a	 cultural	 moment	 where	 bodily	 intimacy	 to	 our	 technological	 apparatus,	 and	 the	
consequent	implications	for	bodily	agency	and	access,	are	central	to	our	use	of	them.	Yet,	
it	 is	 VR’s	 specific	 proximity	 to	 the	 body,	 and	 the	 relations	 between	 embodiment	 and	
technology	it	produces,	that	makes	its	affective	potentials	particularly	unique.		
This	 unique	 potential,	 however,	 is	 somewhat	 disguised	 by	 the	 urge	 towards	
seamlessness	 in	 the	 VR	 space.	With	 the	 technology’s	 dependence	 on	 the	 pre-existing	
embodied	 grammars	 and	 discourses	 of	 other	 new	 media	 devices	 has	 also	 come	 the	
prioritisation	 of	 realism	 and	 idealistic	 forms	 of	 immersion.	 Evans’	 articulation	 of	 the	
immersive	assemblage	above	attests	to	the	materiality	of	the	body	and	hardware	in	VR	
experiences,	but	it	also	makes	the	claim	for	a	“perfect	VR	experience”	where	“the	body	
would	 be	 replicated	 in	 VR	 so	 our	 movements	 are	 replicated	 exactly	 in	 the	 virtual.”39	
Though	this	thesis	makes	the	bodily	and	affective	realities	of	VR	its	point	of	focus,	I	argue	














achievable.	 This	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 evolving	 discourses	 around	 the	ways	 “we	might	
debate	the	rhetoric	of	immersive	illusion	that	surrounds	the	VR	apparatus,”40	and	instead	
should	embrace	the	technology’s	unique	capacities	to	produce	experiences	that	embrace	
the	unruly	 interactions	 that	occur	within	 the	VR	assemblage	 (the	body,	 the	hardware,	
software,	and	the	represented	virtual	environment).	Engaging	with	VR	 is	an	embodied	
process,	 and	 this	 process	must	 be	 slowed	down,	 analysed,	 and	 critiqued,	 especially	 in	
those	moments	where	 seamlessness	breaks;	 this	 thesis	 argues	 for	 a	 rigorous	 focus	on	
embodied	 relations	 with	 VR	 in	 process,	 in	 moments	 where	 we	 might	 slow	 down	 the	
immediacy	of	the	interfacing	between	body	and	technology.		
In	 moments	 of	 disruption	 or	 mediated	 error,	 VR	 users	 will	 necessarily	 find	
themselves	 in	 an	 ontological	 in-between,	 a	 critical	 space	 in	 which	 the	 body	 does	 not	
interface	 seamlessly	 with	 VR.	 Instead,	 small	 chasms	 are	 revealed—	 ethical	 chasms,	
affective	 chasms,	 chasms	 of	 strangeness,	 and	 chasms	 of	 the	 unknown.	 Such	 chasms	
emerge	 when	 the	 body	 and	 VR	 resist	 one	 another,	 and	 the	 interruption	 of	 seamless	
experiences	faces	users	with	a	juncture	where	they	are	not	given	total	access	to	a	perfectly	
immersive	world.	Rather,	in	this	moment	of	rupture	and	unexpectedness,	the	VR	user	is	
momentarily	 exposed	 to	 the	 technology’s	 underlying	 contours	 and	 operational	
foundations.	Though	these	chasms	are	not	necessarily	anticipated	by	their	users,	at	this	
point	in	VR’s	development,	where	realism	is	a	perhaps	impossible	feat,	they	are	inevitable.	
I	 argue,	 however,	 that	 these	moments	 of	 error	 actually	 allow	 us	 to	 learn	more	 about	





consideration	 in	 the	promotion	of	VR	as	an	 “empathy	machine,”41	where	access	 to	 the	
experience	of	 “others”	 is	 given	 in	a	bid	 to	encourage	empathy	 in	 its	users.	 In	 a	 recent	
article,	Lisa	Nakamura	explored	the	creation	of	VR’s	“virtuous”	image	and	the	ways	that	











as	 “Big	 Tech’s	 attempt	 to	 rebrand	 VR	 as	 a	 curative	 for	 the	 digital	 industries’	 recently	














and	post-war	 conflict	 zones,46	 as	 two	popular	 examples,	 imply	 that	 users	 can	 embody	
experiences	of	otherness	and	can	feel,	and	have	a	right	to	feel,	wholly	part	of,	and	maintain	
total	access	to,	the	environments	presented.47	Users	are	asked	to	immerse	themselves	in	



























through	 the	 lenses	 of	 affect	 and	 ontology.	 It	 will	 focus	 specifically	 on	 the	 theoretical	
frameworks	of	phenomenology,	affect	theory,	and	New	Materialism,	in	order	to	address	
the	expansion	of	digital	embodied	experiences.	The	move	toward	affect	studies	has	built	
continuously	 over	 the	 last	 two	decades,	 out	 of	 larger	poststructuralist	movements,	 to	
consider	modern	phenomena	beyond	 the	 realm	of	 the	 linguistic	 and	social;	 studies	of	
affect	account	for	an	orientation	towards	the	pre-conscious,	and	non-cognizable	(affect	is	
not	something	we	logically	apprehend	but	something	our	bodies	do).	Gregory	Seigworth	
and	 Melissa	 Gregg	 define	 affect	 as	 the	 name	 given	 to	 forces	 “beneath,	 alongside,	 or	
generally	other	than	conscious	knowing	[…]	beyond	emotion.”48	Sara	Ahmed	argues	that	
affect	 constitutes	 a	 kind	 of	 “surfacing”	whereby	 emotions	 become	more	 than	 private	
matter	within	the	individual,	but	emerge	as	the	“very	effect	of	the	surfaces	or	boundaries	
of	bodies	and	worlds.”49		In	both	cases,	affect	enacts	a	set	of	phenomena	which	seek	to	go	
beyond	 in	different	ways	–	whether	that	 is	 to	 form	new	theoretical	practice,	 to	extend	
philosophical	 thinking	 beyond	 the	 humanist	 subject,	 or	 to	 touch	 the	 surface	 of	 our	
encounters	 with	 world/s.	 Such	 worlds	 are	 ever	 more	 encompassing	 elements	 of	 the	
digital.	Western	culture	is	constantly	pushing	the	world-building	capacities	of	new	media	





networked	 digital	 media	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 “giving	 shape	 to	 online	 connections	 and	
disconnections,	 to	 the	 proximities	 of	 love,	 desire,	 and	 wanting	 between	 and	 among	
different	 bodies.”51	 Ken	Hillis	 contests	 that	 affective	 encounters	 on	 the	 “multisensory	











leaving	 “phenomenological	 affective	 traces	 of	 the	 individuals	 to	 whom	 they	 point;”53	
Hillis	 argues	 that	 users	 rely	 on	 virtual	 experiences	 of	 networked	 affect	 within	 an	
otherwise	“disenchanted,	disaffected,	and	overly	financialized	planet.”54	Mark	Hansen’s	










new	 phenomenological	 intertwinings	 of	 technology	 and	 bodies	 as	 assemblages.	
Inasmuch	as	human-human	relationships	over	the	web	are	an	important	central	facet	of	
digital	affect	studies,	I	would	argue	that	affect	also	functions	as	a	means	of	accessing	the	
complexities	 of	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 relationships	 in	 terms	 of	 our	 embodied	
engagement	with	digital	objects,	VR	included.	These	specific	kinds	of	affect	do	not	just	
constitute	kinds	of	wanting	between	different	 (human)	bodies,	but	 rather	account	 for	























Phenomenology,	 too,	 forms	 an	 integral	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 this	 thesis,	
particularly	 in	 further	 understanding	 the	 lived	 experience	 of	 being	 with	 immersive	
media.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 the	 flesh	 (Merleau	 Ponty,	 1964)	 plays	 a	
particularly	 important	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 embodied	 relations	 we	maintain	 with	
technology.	Crucial	to	the	notion	that	certain	kinds	of	‘fleshy’	experiences	are	embedded	
within	our	use	of	new	media	 technology	 is	 the	novel	 affective	experiences	 they	make	
possible.	Hillis’	work	retains	a	“scepticism	about	the	erosion	of	conceptual	boundaries	
between	 humans	 and	 machines,”59	 in	 his	 theorisation	 of	 the	 relations	 between	
embodiment	and	VR	systems.	 Instead,	he	pays	attention	to	 the	human	and	nonhuman	
elements	which	form	part	of	its	experiences.	In	addition,	Hillis	maintains	a	focus	on	the	





framing,	 instead	 creating	 representations	 that	 surround	 and	 absorb	 its	 users.	 These	
commonly	used	 terms	have,	 ironically,	become	VR’s	predominant	experiential	 frames;	
they	have	become	synonymous	with	what	VR	is,	and	what	it	is	capable	of	achieving.	As	a	






































immersion	 and	presence	 can	be	 considered	 in	 light	 of	 the	ways	 they	 emerge	 through	
specific	 feelings	 and	 embodied	 relations.	 As	 I’ll	 go	 on	 to	 show	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	




experiences	 from	a	critical	 standpoint,	asking	what	 is	 required	 from	users	 in	order	 to	
achieve	 immersion,	and	 if	 this	should	be	 their	constant	aim.	 Immersion	can	no	 longer	
simply	be	 regarded	as	 something	 that	happens	 to	 users,	 but	 rather	 as	 something	 that	
users	participate	in,	contribute	to,	and	co-create.	 
Such	co-creation	is	also	applicable	when	thinking	about	the	affective	intricacies	of	












of	 reaching	 that	 environment	 as	 a	 destination,	 an	 elsewhere.	 Matthew	 Lombard	 and	
Theresa	Ditton	note	that	presence	implies	a	kind	of	transportation:	users	are	transported	
to	another	place,	and	the	environment	and	the	objects	contained	within	it	are	transported	
to	 the	 user.65	 An	 article	 written	 by	 Lombard	 and	 Ditton	 in	 1997	 acknowledged	 the	
importance	of	regarding	the	perceptual	elements	that	factor	into	experiences	of	presence,	
noting	that	there	is	a	requirement	of	“continuous	real	time	responses	to	human	sensory,	
cognitive,	 and	 affective	 processing	 systems	 to	 objects	 and	 entities	 in	 a	 […]	











potential	 for	 breaking	 down	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 implied	 agential	 humanist	 subject:	 the	
current	parameters	of	presence	and	 immersion	require	 that	 the	hardware	 involved	 in	
their	production	is	able	to	simulate	real	world	spaces	in	such	a	way	that	forms	neat	ties	
between	the	somatic,	 the	sensory,	and	the	technological.	Yet,	presence	and	immersion	
can	 also	 produce	messy	 and	 unruly	 interactions	 between	 these	 realms	 of	 experience,	
where	the	user’s	body	is	smeared	between	ontological	realms	of	the	 ‘here’	and	‘there.’	
This	is	to	say	that,	at	least	to	some	degree,	users	have	to	adapt	to	the	technology,	in	the	
same	way	 that	 the	 technology	adapts	 to	 the	movements	and	responses	of	 the	user.	 In	
actioning	 the	 “transportation”	 between	 real	 and	 virtual	 environments,	 immersive	









sensation	 not	 of	 “being	 there,”	 but	 rather	 of	 	 “I	 am	 here,	 but	 not	 quite.”	 This	 kind	 of	
sensation	 offers	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 spectrality,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	 reinforces	 the	
presence	of	fleshy	bodily	materiality.	To	feel	the	antagonistic	affects	and	pulls	between	a	
here	 and	 there	 aligns	with	 various	work	 on	 uncanny	 subjectivities	which	 are	 strewn	
between	tiered	ontological	planes,	which	form	the	basis	of	Chapters	3	and	4.	In	a	similar	
vein,	 immersion	 is	often	experienced	as	a	certain	kind	of	abjectivity,	as	opposed	to	 its	
more	common	alignments	with	comfort	and	blissful	absorption.	
	Immersion,	 too,	 can	 enable	 the	 affective	 sensation	 of	 being	 in	 a	world	 that	 is	
beyond	the	user	and	their	subjective	experience,	a	world	programmed	by	alien	rules	that	






that	engage	with	 it.	 In	order	to	 illustrate	these	antagonistic	affects,	 I	will	 look	at	work	
across	a	spectrum	of	contemporary	phenomenological	thought	particularly	in	relation	to	
subjectivities	beyond	the	human.	These	will	include	(but	are	not	limited	to):	Sara	Ahmed’s	
Queer	 Phenomenology	 (2006),	 Ian	 Bogost’s	 Alien	 Phenomenology	 (2012),	 and	 Susan	
Kozel’s	Process	Phenomenologies	 (2015).	 Each	of	 these	 texts	 explore	 the	 intricacies	 of	
agency	 and	 access	 that	 exceed	 the	 subject	 by	 analysing	 lived	 affective	 and	 embodied	
experiences	of	that	which	is	necessarily	outside	the	bounds	of	immediate	comprehension.	
Each	 of	 the	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis	 focus	 on	 specific	 forms	 of	 subjectivity	 that	 have	







§ VR	 enables	 new	 perceptual	 opportunities	 where	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 co-







experiences	which	 challenge	 the	agency	and	access	of	 the	humanist	 subject.	 In	
order	to	move	VR	away	from	its	discourses	of	limitless	experience	on	the	behalf	of	
its	users,	considerations	of	VR	as	a	posthuman	technology	enable	opportunities	to	
instead	 critique	 absolute	 agency	 and	 valorised	 modes	 of	 perception	 (e.g.	
empathy).	
	
More	 broadly,	 this	 work	 will	 speak	 to	 the	 ways	 Virtual	 Reality	 may	 be	 able	 to	
affectively	create	sensations	of	subjectivities	beyond	the	human	that	intersect	with	each	






constant	 pulls	 toward	 “empathy”	 and	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	 embodied	 experience	 of	
someone	else.		
	 In	 its	 focus	 on	 areas	 of	 digital	 culture	 and	 VR	 experience	 that	 are	 neither	
transcendent	 or	 transparent,	 this	 project	 captures	 a	 broader	 phenomenological	
understanding	 of	 VR,	 analysing	 both	 its	 potential	 successes	 and	 generative	 failures.	
Whilst	presence	and	immersion	remain	central	to	the	thesis,	they	will	be	reconfigured	in	
order	to	push	the	boundaries	of	their	meaning	in	relation	to	novel	and	unruly	experiences	
of	 virtual	 environments.	 New	 reports	 emerging	 of	 the	 details	 of	 VR	 experiences	
specifically	reference	intimacy	and	its	implications	for	agency	and	access.68	I	argue	that	a	
shift	of	focus	towards	“agency”	and	“access,”	and	the	ways	they	contribute	to	presence	
and	 immersion,	 will	 provide	 more	 thorough	 insights	 into	 the	 spectrum	 of	 VR’s	
























our	 ever	 more	 intimate	 relationship	 with	 networked	 devices;	 the	 changing	
character	of	work;	the	formation	of	communities	and	collective	identities	online;	
the	 implications	 of	 algorithmic	 systems	 for	 human	 agency;	 the	 influence	 of	
medical	 breakthroughs	 on	 popular	 conceptions	 of	 the	 body	 and	 brain;	 the	
emergence	of	new	cultural	forms	that	prioritise	feeling	over	meaning.70	
	
Technologies	which	 rely	on	physical	 intimacy	with	 the	human	body	are	 consequently	



















ultimately	destabilise	 the	notion	of	human	agency.	Ngai	 suggests	 that	when	agency	 is	
pulled	 away,	 we	 experience	 “affective	 indeterminacy,”	 or	 “being	 lost	 in	 one’s	 own	
affective	map.”72	The	“affective	turn,”	which	emerged	in	the	mid-1990’s	as	an	approach	
which	 focused	on	bodily	 sensation	and	dynamic	body-world	encounters,	 reconfigured	
the	human	body	as	part	of	multitudinous	ecologies.73	These	ecologies	refer	to	the	body’s	
interconnectedness	 with	 objects	 and	 matter;	 these	 could	 include	 all	 entities,	 from	
technological	hardware,	to	microscopic	cells,	to	huge	meteors.	In	order	to	consider	the	
affective	 implications	 of	 framelessness,	 this	 thesis	 will	 use	 affect	 as	 a	 framework	 for	
considering	the	unfurling	sensations	of	VR	on	the	body	when	in	use.	The	thesis	refers	to	
a	range	of	 literary	and	critical/theoretical	texts	to	exemplify	and	visualise	some	of	the	
nuanced	 affects	 that	 VR	 produces.	 In	 so	 doing,	 it	 forges	 a	 dialogue	 between	
phenomenology	and	affect	studies	in	order	to	analyse	VR’s	unique	interactions	with	the	
body,	 and	 how	 these	 generally	 exceed	 VR’s	 popular	 framings	 in	 its	 advertising	 and	
discourse.	Each	chapter,	as	I	outline	below,	will	respond	to	various	ecological	elements	of	
VR	 experiences,	 and	 the	 ways	 the	 body	 comes	 into	 affective	 contact	 with	 hardware,	
software,	and	virtual	environment/s.	





immersion	 do	 little,	 if	 anything,	 to	 portray	 the	 affective	 intricacies	 that	 VR	 makes	
possible.	 It	will	 further	expand	on	 the	ways	agency	and	access	are	 framed	 in	popular	
representations,	 in	 the	ways	 that	 they	 target	 specific	audiences	of	users,	 and	promise	
total	access	into	immersive	virtual	environments.	In	order	to	counter	the	notion	of	VR’s	
“limitless”	potentials,	 this	chapter	will	 introduce	some	of	the	history	of	“enframing”	 in	
phenomenological	 thinking	 (Heidegger;	Hansen),	 and	consider	 the	ways	VR	 intersects	
with	 this	 area	 of	 philosophical	 enquiry	 through	 its	 focus	 on	 the	 individual	 (human)	
subject.	 Enframing	 isn’t	 a	 wholly	 encompassing	 phenomenological	 framework	 for	










and	 access	 are	 not	 wholly	 given	 to	 them.	 By	 analysing	 VR’s	 emerging	 “frames,”	 in	
conjunction	 with	 contemporary	 phenomenological	 approaches	 which	 consider	
compromised	 agency	 and	 access,	 this	 chapter	 demonstrates	 that	 framelessness	 may	
enable	 new	 understandings	 of	 VR’s	 unique	 potential	 to	 push	 beyond	 individualistic	
representations.	
	 Chapter	2	sees	 the	oozing	of	VR	outside	of	 its	comfortable	 frames	of	reference.	
Unpicking	the	concept	of	“presence,”	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	emergence	of	flesh	as	a	
unit	 for	 capturing	 VR’s	 unruly	 potential.	 This	 chapter	 is	 all	 about	 carnal,	 or	 bodily	





shift	 focus	 towards	 moments	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 ontological	 disparity.	 The	 human	
subject	is	no	longer	captured	by	skin	and	bone,	but	is	part	of	complex	assemblages	which	
inform	 new	 networks	 of	 affectivity.	 The	 fictional	 references	 in	 this	 chapter	 provide	
analogies	for	the	ways	fleshy	presence	emerges	in	retaliation	to	a	corporatized	push	to	
transcendence	and	 transparency.	 James	Tiptree	 Jr	 (Alice	Sheldon)’s	The	Girl	Who	Was	
Plugged	In	(1973)	and	the	videogame	Inside	(2016)	both	present	dystopian	landscapes	
which	 ponder	 “what	 comes	 next?”	 in	 worlds	 increasingly	 permeated	 by	 digital	
technology.	 Both	 of	 these	 texts,	 I	 argue,	 allow	 their	 reader/player	 to	 interact	 with	
unhuman	 subjects,	where	 technology	 pushes	 humanity	 beyond	 itself.	 I	 draw	 here,	 on	
Dylan	 Trigg’s	 definition	 of	 the	 unhuman	 as	 the	 intercorporeity	 of	 the	 human	 and	
nonhuman	within	 the	same	body.74	The	 flesh,	and	unhumanity,	 I	argue,	are	embodied	
realisations	 of	 the	 complex	 assemblages	 that	 intimate	 technologies	 like	 VR	 produce,	
where	subjectivity	is	smeared	somewhere	between	an	ontological	here	and	there.	
	 Chapter	 3	 focuses	 in	 on	 a	 reframing	 of	 “immersion,”	 and	 the	ways	 one	 can	 be	
immersed	within	unruly	landscapes	forged	by	mediated	error,	as	opposed	to	seamless	
and	accessible	worlds.	It	will	consider	the	affective	potential	of	VR	glitches,	given	their	












–	namely,	pushing	beyond	the	 frames	of	knowability	 towards	 the	 limits	of	our	human	
understandings	of	the	world	(enframing).	It	will	turn	to	approaches	to	the	weird,	both	in	
fiction	and	 in	 theory,	 in	order	 to	 formulate	 a	discourse	 surrounding	error,	 glitch,	 and	
unique	 affects	which	 emerge	 during	 VR	 use.	 It	will	 use	 both	 Jeff	 Vandermeer’s	 novel	
Annihilation	(2014),	and	Alex	Garlands	2018	film	adaptation	as	its	central	case	studies,	
exploring	 their	 narration	of	 perceptual	 error	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	push	understandings	




	 The	 final	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 functions	 as	 a	 “putting	 into	 practice”	 of	 the	
approaches	established	in	each	of	the	first	three	chapters.	Chapter	4	looks	closely	at	the	
popularity	of	horror	games	and	experiences	for	VR,	arguing	that	this	popularity	emerges	




reality,	 given	 its	 affective	 intensity	 and	 proximity	 to	 users’	 bodies;	 there	 is	 a	 certain	
degree	of	vulnerability	to	the	image	involved	in	the	use	of	virtual	reality,	in	the	sense	that	
the	image	perceptually	surrounds	the	body	in	its	embrace.		
VR	 has	 an	 interesting	 relation	 to	 horror	 narratives,	 given	 the	 widespread	
popularity	of	horror	content	 for	the	medium—this	coupled	with	 its	association	with	a	
kind	of	futuristic	complacency.	Such	complacency	produces	new	forms	of	cultural	horror;	
we	only	need	 look	at	 the	widely	circulated	 image	taken	at	 the	Mobile	World	Congress	
event	in	2017	(which	we’ll	encounter	again	in	Chapter	1),	which	shows	Mark	Zuckerberg	
walking	 smugly	 through	 an	 audience	 (seemingly	 all	men)	wearing	 Google	 Cardboard	











various	 horror	 narratives	which	 focus	 on	 the	 ontological	 porousness	 of	 old	 and	 new	
media	 technologies.	Fear	 is	 induced	when	the	contents	of	a	 technology	seep	out	of	 its	
hardware,	 and	 nonhuman	 entities	 are	 released	 into	 the	 human	 world.	 Aligning	 with	
contemporary	 horror	 texts	 and	 their	 embodied	 relations,	 the	 genre	 is	 particularly	
relevant	for	further	understanding	subjectivity,	affective	response	and	the	engagement	
of	cognitive	schema.		
Whether	 its	 cinematic	 frames	 and	 camera	 work,	 or	 frames	 through	 which	 to	
observe,	 frames	and	 framing	play	a	prevalent	part	 in	many	works	of	horror.	As	Adam	
Daniel	notes,	“the	composition	of	the	frame	can	be	seen	as	a	delimiting	device	used	to	
elicit	 our	 attention	 to	 both	what	 is	 shown	 and	what	 threatens	 to	 be	 shown.”77	When	
translated	 to	 the	360-degree	environment	of	 virtual	 reality,	 viewers	are	 rather	 left	 to	
absorb	the	environment,	knowing	that	something	could	emerge	from	outside	their	point	
of	 view	 at	 any	 given	 time.	With	 the	 developments	 in	 head	 and	 body	 tracking	 in	 VR,	
producers	now	have	the	capacity	to	place	things	into	the	virtual	space	specifically	where	























wonderful,	 and	 more	 importantly	 embodied	 and	 affective	 potentials	 of	 experiencing	
mediated	 realities	 which	 are	 frameless,	 untethered,	 and	 ontologically	 complex.	 In	 so	
doing,	I	argue	that	we	can	better	understand	the	‘realities’	of	VR	use,	and	embrace	the	




























affects	 that	 implicate	multiple	actors	and	nonhuman	forces.	By	 looking	at	 the	kinds	of	
language	 and	 images	 used	 to	 evoke	 experiences	 of	 virtual	 worlds	 in	 fiction	 and	
contemporary	advertising,	this	chapter	will	argue	that	much	of	VR’s	potential	does	not	
inherently	come	with	the	innovative	possibilities	of	forging	new	kinds	of	realism.		Rather,	
VR’s	 underexplored	 potential	 is	 revealed	 during	 real-time	 encounters	 with	 the	
unexpected,	where	users	experience	messy	sensations	that	escape	immediate	cognitive	
capture.	Such	unruly	moments	realise	the	truly	material	ties	between	the	technology	and	
the	 body.	 That	 is	 to	 say	 that	 this	 chapter	 hopes	 to	 formulate	 a	 fleshy	 and	 affective	
phenomenology	of	immersive,	technologically	mediated	experiences	in	order	to	open	up	
the	 somewhat	 limiting	 popular	 discourses	 surrounding	 VR	 and	 its	 contemporary	
applications.	 Instead,	 discourses	 of	 framelessness	might	 open	 up	 and	 encourage	 new	
ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 first-hand	 experiences	 of	 virtual	 environments,	 and	
acknowledging	and	embracing	emergent	and	unexpected	moments.	
Combining	iterations	of	frames	and	acts	of	framing,	the	chapter,	and	the	thesis	at	
large,	 aims	 to	 expand	 the	 permeating	 discourses	 surrounding	VR	 that	 allude	 to	 these	
ideas:	where	representations	and	discourses	mark	certain	limited	‘framings’	of	VR;	where	
‘frames’	 are	 appropriated	 to	mean	 ‘interface’	 and	 framelessness	 becomes	more	 about	
technological	transparency;	where	phenomenological	thought	focuses	on	the	human	will	
to	‘enframe’	the	world.	All	of	these	ideological	realms	might	be	expanded	if	we	consider	
a	 mode	 of	 ‘framelessness’	 which	 captures	 the	 ways	 bodies	 respond	 to	 virtual	







interface	 and,	 thus,	 untethered	 access	 to	 virtual	 worlds.	 Rather,	 I	 argue	 that	
framelessness	 offers	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 predominant	 representations	 of	 VR	 by	
acknowledging	what	sits	 just	outside	of	users’	reach	and	understanding,	 looking	more	
closely	at	the	underexplored	affectivities	of	this	intimate	technology	(i.e.	carnal	and	close	
to	 the	body).	This	chapter	seeks	to	 lay	out	a	 theoretical	 framework	 for	understanding	
VR’s	unique	affects	by	initiating	novel	discussions	around	the	ways	VR	implicates	both	
‘access’	 and	 ‘agency.’	 These	 terms	 readily	 capture	 the	 ‘realities’	 of	 using	 VR	 during	
moments	of	disruption.	Immersion,	as	a	holistic	goal	in	the	industry,	does	not	necessarily	
equate	 to	 absolute	 access	 in	 virtual	 environments.	 ‘Immersivity,’	 or	 the	 capacity	 of	 a	
technology	to	 ‘immerse’	 its	users,	raises	specific	ethical	and	political	 issues	relating	to	
self,	which	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 discourses	 and	 representations	 of	 VR	 in	 contemporary	
advertising	 that	 I	 will	 go	 on	 to	 consider,	 	 which	 will	 include	 advertisements	 and	
accompanying	discourses	used	by	VR	developers	Oculus,	Samsung	and	HTC.	
	 In	 order	 to	 illustrate	 pre-existing	 ambivalences	which	 exist	 in	 the	VR	 space,	 	 I	
begin	by	giving	a	short	introduction	to	the	technology’s	associations	with	both	presence	
and	absence.	Presence	will	be	explored	in	greater	depth	in	Chapter	3,	but	here,	I	look	at	












in	 VR;	 the	 problem	 of	 accessibility	 in	 the	 VR	market	 is	 one	 that	 persists,	 despite	 the	

















maintains	 a	 focus	 on	 materiality,	 and	 is	 not	 synonymous	 with	 non-mediation	 and	
technological	 transparency.	 I	 introduce	 the	act	of	 ‘breaking’	 frames	as	 challenging	 the	
valorisation	 of	 user	 agency	 and	 access	 in	 the	 production	 and	 development	 of	 VR	
applications.	Nonhuman	actors	and	forces,	including	momentary	errors	in	VR	software,	
are	 often	 ignored	 or	 escape	 critical	 attention	 through	 the	 inherent	 framing	 and	
promotion	of	user	empowerment.	In	order	to	premise	the	thesis’	ideas	concerning	frames	
and	 enframing,	 I	 turn	 to	 insights	 into	 phenomenological	 “enframing”	 (Heidegger;	
Hansen)	and	 traditions	which	have	 considered	 the	ways	humans	 frame	and	structure	
their	worlds,	objects,	and	things	as	solely	being	for	their	own	use.	At	present,	VR	struggles	
to	move	away	from	its	centralising	of	the	human,	and	the	valorisation	of	human	agency.	







to	 simulate	 the	 logics	 and	perceptions	of	 other	objects	 and	nonhumans.	 For	 example,	











as	New	Materialism,	as	 these	 fields	question	persistent	ontological	 frameworks	which	
continue	 to	 place	 the	 human	 at	 their	 centre.	 In	 line	 with	 these	 ideas,	 this	 chapter	
establishes	an	ethical	 approach	 to	 the	concepts	of	agency	and	access,	 and	argues	 that	









oftentimes	 these	 phenomena	 are	 what	 inherently	 contribute	 to	 their	 ubiquity.	 For	




location	 tracking	 can	 inevitably	mark	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 phone	 owner’s	 body	 in	 the	
world;	such	systems	remain	relatively	ontologically	‘absent,’	yet	feed	through	real-time	
data	concerning	bodily	movement.	It	is	in	these	kinds	of	instances	that	we	might	consider	
that	 presence	 and	 absence	 are	 always	 inherently	 materially	 bound	 with	 the	 living,	
moving	 body.	 These	 issues	 have	 embedded	 themselves	within	 existing	 academic	 and	
theoretical	 discourses	 of	 technological	 use;	 Sherry	 Turkle	 perhaps	 most	 influentially	
captured	this	 in	her	2011	work	Alone	Together,	where	she	stated	that	technology	and	
networked	life	“allow	us	to	hide	from	each	other.”2	Turkle’s	work	alludes	specifically	to	
ubiquitous	 technologies	 that	 are	 embedded	 into	 our	 everyday	 lives.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
immersive	technologies,	formulations	of	presence	and	absence	take	on	particular	forms	













absence	 simultaneously,	 and	 both	 phenomena	 feature	 heavily	 within	 existing	 VR	
discourses.	 As	 we	 will	 come	 to	 see,	 the	 presence	 of	 VR	 hardware,	 from	 an	 ‘outside’	
perspective	(i.e.	viewing	someone	who	is	using	VR)	can	connote	embodied	and	critical	
passivity,	 coldness,	 and	 compromised	 awareness.	 Whilst	 the	 hardware	 maintains	 an	
unbreakable	presence,	 the	user	 is	 regarded	 as	 being	 less-present,	 or	 even	 absent.	 The	
hardware	clings	to	the	face	of	its	user,	almost	like	the	facehugger	in	Ridley’s	Scott’s	1979	
Alien:3	 its	 presence	 looks	 unnatural,	 conveying	 a	 kind	 of	 inhumanness.	 But	 not	
dissimilarly	 to	 the	alien	clinging	 to	 the	 face	of	 its	human	prey,	 the	actual	processes	of	
connection	and	 symbiosis	between	 the	body	and	 the	hardware	 encompass	 a	 complex	
ecology	which	brings	together	cognition,	simulation,	embodiment,	and	the	coded	world	
represented.	 The	 binary	 oppositions	 of	 presence	 and	 absence	 in	 VR	 discourses	
oftentimes	draw	attention	away	from	other	avenues	of	potential	and	critical	enquiry:	the	




rather	 than	 experiential;	 the	 locus	 of	 virtual	 reality	 is	 a	 collection	 of	machines.”4	 The	
opacity	of	VR	is	difficult	to	break	away	from:	access	to	the	complexities	of	our	connections	
with	 this	 immersive	 technology	 is	 limited	because	VR	consistently	 fails	 to	break	away	





















markets	 in	 the	thesis’	 introduction,	Virtual	Reality	has	extended	 its	reach	significantly	





popularity	 of	 images	 of	 VR	 during	 use.	 He	 explores	 the	 evidence	 that	 suggests	 that	







VR	 inherently	 draws	 on	 other	 commercial	 technology	 sectors.	 In	 more	 recent	
years,	VR	has	become	very	closely	associated	with	gaming,	with	a	significant	proportion	
of	its	applications	being	game-based.7	With	these	developments,	VR	has	inevitably	relied	













now	 producing	 “immersive	 journalism”	 and	 360-degree	 content	 for	 their	 platforms.8	
YouTube	videos	also	provide	popular	access	to	the	medium,	where	audiences	are	able	to	
view	online	influencers,	mainly	those	who	host	gaming	shows,	watching	and	playing	VR	
applications.9	 The	 dependence	 of	 VR	 on	 other	 mediums	 should	 not	 be	 ignored,	 or	











capacity	 to	 make	 its	 users	 complacent	 and	 seemingly	 “un-present”	 during	 use,	 or	
increasingly	dystopian	and	corporate	connotations	that	allude	to	forms	of	ignorance	and	








































enabled	 the	 image’s	mutability	 into	 numerous	 viral	 images	 as	 it	 humorously	 came	 to	
reinstate	 the	 imaginings	 of	 VR’s	 free	 floating	 embodiment	 practices.	 If	 anything,	 the	
image	of	Luckey	on	Time	Magazine	reinforces	the	desire	to	push	away	from	embodied	
understandings	 of	 immersion,	 and	 instead	 regard	 it	 as	 total	 sensory	 overhaul,	 which	
consequentially	 resists	 critical	 attention;	 though	Luckey’s	 body	 is	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
image,	 if	 anything,	 it	 ironically	 encourages	 viewers	 to	 discard	 of	 any	 critical	 thinking	
about	the	ways	virtual	reality	is	complexly	entangled	with	embodiment.	Instead,	it	visibly	
frames	 the	 false	 idea	 that	VR	 ‘does	 away’	with	 the	weight	 of	 embodiment,	 discarding	
physicality	for	the	pleasures	of	an	immaterial	and	obscured	virtual	world	on	the	other	
side	of	the	headset	(purchase	to	find	out	more…).		
The	 depiction	 of	 Palmer	 Luckey	 is	 just	 one	 example	 of	 the	 popular	 corporate	
messaging	 that	 surrounded	 VR’s	 re-emergence,	 and	 continues	 to	 play	 a	 part	 in	 its	
imaginings.	The	image	visibly	captured	the	wider	cultural	perception	of	virtual	reality	as	




the	 technology	 they	 sell	 in	 very	 specific	 ways.	 Compromised	 agency	 is	 one	 of	 the	
conditions	users	of	VR	are	asked	to	accept	in	order	to	reach	the	end	result	of	being	wholly	
immersed,	 and	 to	 behold	 totally	 unlimited	 access	 to	 the	 simulated	worlds	 VR	makes	
possible.	Little,	if	any	reference	is	made	to	the	odd,	discomforting	affective	implications	










this	becomes	problematic	when	 it	 is	perhaps	 the	most	prevalent	mode	of	 accessing	a	
medium	that	on	many	levels	remains	inaccessible	to	wider	audiences.	In	addition,	images	
like	 this	also	 reinforce	and	produce	 imagined	audiences	of	 the	 technology	and	 the	oft	
referenced	white	male	“nerd”	stereotype.	
These	 representational	 issues	persist,	 and	 can	be	 seen	 in	 a	number	of	popular	




control	 seized	 via	 mass	 complacency:	 take	 as	 another	 example	 the	 image	 of	 Mark	
Zuckerberg	walking	 through	 the	Mobile	World	 Congress	 in	 2017.	 The	 image	 shows	 a	
conference	 hall	 full	 of	 businessmen	 wearing	 VR	 headsets	 with	 Zuckerberg	 walking	
through	the	blinded	crowds,	smirking.	The	audience	members	have	each	been	provided	








Not	 dissimilarly	 to	 the	 well-circulated	 Palmer	 Luckey	 cover,	 this	 image	 became	 the	
source	of	hundreds	of	memes,	with	sources	like	The	Verge	claiming	that	the	image	“looks	
like	the	concept	art	for	a	dystopian	sci-fi	film.”11	Yet	another	‘popular	framing,’	this	image	




the	 goals	 and	 aspirations	 the	 infamous	 corporation.	 All	 of	 the	 micro-contexts	 that	
surround	the	 ‘big	players’	 in	 the	VR	space	matter—they	root	VR	 in	a	very	real	socio-












about	 the	ways	 in	which	agency	 is	represented	 from	the	hardware’s	 ‘outsides.’	To	the	
technology’s	 detriment,	 user	 agency	 is	 shown	 as	 being	 seemingly	 dissolved	 and	
depictions	 of	 VR	 in	 use	 do	 little	 to	 account	 for	 the	 unique	 affects,	 processes,	 and	
entanglement	between	users’	bodies	and	VR	hardware.	Aside	from	these	well-known	still	























the	other	side	of	 the	coin	 in	VR	advertising	actually	places	 too	much	emphasis	on	 the	
agency	of	the	individual	subject,	and	loses	sight	of	the	assemblage	of	actors	that	VR,	in	
actuality,	 entails.	 Agency	 and	 access	 become	 totally	 untethered,	 giving	 the	 illusion	 of	







of	 ‘invasion’	 see	 the	 depiction	 of	 a	 rupturing	 of	 physical,	 particularly	 domestic,	 space	
where	 the	 virtual	 invades	 the	 physical.	 Representations	 of	 ‘evasion’	 speak	 to	 certain	
kinds	 of	 excessive	 access	 in	 virtual	 spaces	 previously	mentioned,	where	material	 and	
socio-political	 constraints	 are	 wholly	 evaded.	 And	 finally,	 ‘departure’	 defines	 the	
representations	of	movement	into	virtual	space	as	a	“stepping	into”	a	“new	reality”	which	
is	truly	otherworldly,	marketing	forms	of	untethered	access.	By	outlining	these	central	
tropes,	 it	 will	 be	 possible	 to	 grant	 consideration	 of	 the	 philosophical	 and	 ethical	
implications	 of	 ‘stepping	 into’	 a	 virtual	 environment,	 as	 well	 as	 uniting	 the	 common	
thematics	which	 form	 the	 premise	 of	 visual	 depictions	 of	 VR	 in	 popular	 culture.	 It	 is	
necessary	to	reconsider	these	tropes,	and	the	ways	they	visually	represent	the	emergence	










The	 ‘invasion’	 trope	 is	 seen	 in	 representations	 like	 that	 shown	 in	 the	 images	













show	what	 is	 being	 depicted	 via	 the	 headset.	 Images	 6	 and	 7	 taken	 from	Oculus	 Rift	












This	 trope	 visually	 tells	 us	 something	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 agency	 in	 immersive	
technologies	is	two-fold:	users	are	granted	access	to	the	seemingly	vast	geographies	of	
















se.	 Little,	 if	 any	 focus	 is	 given	 to	 the	 hardware	 itself;	 rather,	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 the	
potential	VR	users	who	seek	to	experience	the	supposed	“new	reality”	this	technology	
makes	 possible.	 Such	 a	 new	 reality,	 it	 is	 suggested,	 removes	 the	 individual	 from	 the	














In	 these	 particular	 advertisements,	 the	 user’s	 bodily	 and	 visible	 responses	 to	 the	
environments	become	 the	key	 selling	point	 to	 the	 technology.	Where	attention	 to	 the	
technology	itself	is	minimal,	the	user’s	overt	emotional	reactions	to	the	experiences	are	
















“Step	 into	 the	Oculus	 Rift,”	 implying	 a	 certain	givenness	of	 the	world.	 By	 givenness,	 I	
suggest	that	the	world	is	represented	as	totally	accessible	for	the	user,	with	every	element	






little	 to	 speak	 to	 the	 inherent	 constraints	 of	 the	 technology	 which	 limit	 action,	 and	
ultimately	user	access	and	agency.	
These	 representational	 framings	of	Virtual	Reality	do	much	 to	 influence	public	
perceptions	around	the	tools.	This	is	significant,	because	the	majority	of	people	still	rely	
on	these	kinds	of	 images	to	access	VR	at	all.	Though	headsets	have	entered	consumer	
markets	 and	 have	 become	moderately	more	 affordable,	 access	 to	 the	 technology	 still	
remains	relatively	limited.	A	study	conducted	by	YouGov	in	2017,	for	example,	stated	that	
only	 6%	 of	 the	 British	 population	 owned	 a	 VR	 headset.15	 There	 is	 very	 limited	
preparation,	 or	 prior	 embedded	 knowledge	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 using	 VR,	 and	 for	 its	
capacity	to	influence	how	we	conceive	of	bodies	and	selves,	including	our	own.	The	white	
male	corporate	success	story	remains	a	central	selling	point.	As	a	consequence,	usership	
is	 representationally	 homogenised.	 We	 have	 also	 seen	 that	 user	 experience	 is	
representationally	homogenised,	too:	popular	tropes	in	advertising	sell	the	story	of	total	
agency	 and	 access	 which	 centralises	 the	 individual	 user.	 As	 I	 will	 continue	 to	 attest	
throughout	 this	 work,	 more	 attention	 must	 be	 payed	 to	 VR’s	 inherent	 nuances,	 the	














form	 part	 of	 its	 underlying	 processes.	 The	 bodies	 and	 selves	 of	 users	 are	 part	 of	 an	
entangled	system	of	nonhuman	actors	which	work	to	mould	how	we	interact	with	VR,	
but	also	produce	the	potentials	to	push	the	technology	beyond	the	bounds	of	expectation.	
The	 humanist	 problem	 of	 VR	 continues	 on.	 Each	 of	 the	 representations	 of	 VR	
discussed	above	either	fetishize	an	abundance	of	user	agency,	or	experiences	of	virtual	




to	 the	 complete	 obfuscation	 in	 understanding	 concerning	 how	VR	 systems	work:	 the	
























a	 parodic	 hint	 at	 the	 anthropomorphisation	 of	 the	 animal	when	 it	 interacts	with	 the	
hardware.	A	flight	simulation	plays	through	the	headset,	with	the	ostrich	attempting	to	
fly,	much	to	the	bewilderment	of	its	flock.	Eventually,	with	the	aid	of	the	simulation,	the	
ostrich	 takes	 off	 and	 soars	 across	 the	 landscape.	 The	 advertisement	 ends	 with	 the	




and	 shock	 with	 the	 extension	 of	 cognitive	 capacities	 into	 virtual	 realms.	 The	 ‘cute’	
depictions	 of	 the	 ostrich’s	 eyes	 widening	 as	 it	 interacts	 with	 the	 simulation,	 and	 its	
stumbling	 clumsily	 through	 the	 herd	 attempts	 to	 capture	 the	 humorous	 bodily	
movements	perceived	from	VR’s	‘outsides;’	this	marks	another	push	to	represent	VR	as	
inviting	 and	 accessible,	 despite	 the	 reality	 of	 an	 ostrich	 and	 VR	 being	 a	 moderately	
disturbing	combination.	It	depicts	VR	as	both	otherworldly,	but	also	rooting	the	body	in	
clunky	 and	 chaotic	ways:	 though	 the	 ostrich	 perceives	 itself	 to	 be	 flying	 through	 the	
clouds,	free	from	physical	constraints	in	its	physical	environment,	the	‘outside’	shows	it	




it	 resolves	 to	 illustrate	 a	 kind	 of	 neutrality	 and	 naturalness	 of	 perception	 via	 VR.	 It	
informs	 users	 that	 they	 don’t	 have	 to	 be	 expert	 users	 to	 try	 it,	 and	 encourages	

















at	 least	 captured	 some	 of	 the	 processes	 and	 becomings	 involved	 in	 the	 subject’s	









accessed	 via	 goggles.	 Though	 as	 Lisa	 Swanstrom	 notes,	 the	 narrative	 of	 Snow	 Crash	
“perpetuates	 a	 logic	 of	 encapsulation,”19	 the	 ontological	 realms	 between	 reality	 and	
virtual	 reality	 are	 never	 wholly	 contained,	 but,	 rather,	 produce	 an	 affective	 middle-
ground	of	ecological	processes:	the	body	is	affecting	and	affected,	as	is	the	technological	









frame”	 emerged	 during	 the	 Luddite	 movement	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 where	 workers	










machines	 that	 threated	 human	 work	 through	 urges	 toward	 machine	 autonomy	 and	
efficiency.	 Opposing	 the	 commonplace	 understanding	 of	 a	 “luddite”	 as	 referring	 to	









subject[s]	 transcend[ence	of]	 the	mechanisms	of	 control.”21	Although	 these	breakages	
were	physical	 acts	 of	 resistance,	 this	 same	 resistance	 can	be	 enacted	 conceptually	 by	
























access	 and	 agency	 for	 individual	 users.	 Rather	 than	 an	 act	 of	 protest	 against	 the	
integration	of	tools,	this	mode	of	frame	breaking	instead	marks	the	willing	integration	of	












The	 continued	 discussion	 of	 the	 move	 through	 and	 beyond	 frames	 and	 framing	 is	




[v]irtual	 reality	 operates	 most	 often	 under	 the	 logic	 of	 transparency.	 For	
enthusiasts,	 the	 perfect	 interface	 is	 one	 in	 which	 the	 user,	 wearing	 a	 head-
mounted	display,	 feels	as	 if	 she	has	 fallen	 through	Alberti’s	window	and	 into	a	
world	of	computer	graphics.	For	them	the	immediacy	of	virtual	reality	comes	from	
the	illusion	of	three-dimensional	immersion	and	from	the	capacity	for	interaction.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 traditional	 painting,	 photograph,	 or	 film,	 the	 viewer	 is	 located	
beyond	the	frame,	looking	in.23	













interpreted	 as	 being	 synonymous	 with	 technological	 transparency.	 When	 Bolter	 and	
Grusin	discuss	the	emergence	of	transparency	through	other	mediums	(photography	and	
film),	they	suggest	that	viewer	is	located	beyond	the	frame;	with	VR,	on	the	other	hand,	it	
is	 inferred	 that	 users	 are	 wholly	 embedded	 within	 the	 frame.	 In	 his	 2012	 work	 The	
Interface	Effect,	Alexander	Galloway	states:	
Frames,	windows,	doors,	and	other	thresholds	are	those	transparent	devices	that	
achieve	 more	 the	 less	 they	 do:	 for	 every	 moment	 of	 virtuosic	 immersion	 and	
connectivity,	for	every	moment	of	volumetric	delivery,	of	inopacity,	the	threshold	
becomes	one	notch	more	 invisible	 […]	As	 technology,	 the	more	dioptric	device	
erases	the	trace	of	its	own	functioning	(in	actually	delivering	the	thing	presented	
beyond),	the	more	it	succeeds	in	its	functional	mandate	[…]	the	more	intuitive	a	






















of	 enquiry.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 legacy	 reveals	 some	 of	 the	 humanist	 tendencies	 of	
framing;	enframing,	in	both	philosophical	discourse	and	media	encounters,	is	the	act	of	
understanding,	 experiencing,	 and	 seeing	 the	 world	 from	 a	 specifically	 human	 (and	
inherently	reductive)	perspective.	In	the	same	way	that,	as	humans,	we	reduce	things	to	
a	 specific	 ordering	 for	 use,25	 media	 also	 constitute	 a	 framing	 of	 the	 world	 as	
representation.	 In	order	 to	 truly	 think	about	 the	unique	affective	potentials	of	 virtual	
reality,	and	to	open	up	discourses	which	oftentimes	misrepresent	agency	and	access,	I	
argue	 that	 this	 phenomenological	 approach	 to	 framing	 will	 enable	 an	 encompassing	
understanding	of	why	we	might	begin	to	think	beyond	frames,	but	also	how	we	might	
consider	unruly	interactions	with	our	technological	tools.	
Phenomenological	 accounts	 of	 enframing,	 arguably	 beginning	with	Heidegger’s	




with	 technological	 tools.	 Philosophical	 accounts	 of	 human/technology	 interaction	
discuss	 the	ways	 that	 technology	 enables	 us	 to	 understand	 further	 the	ways	 humans	
enframe	the	world	by	analysing	immediate	experiences	of	it.	Heidegger’s	essay	explores	
the	use	of	technology	as	a	means	of	interacting	with	the	world	as	it	exists	as	“standing	
reserve,”	 or	 waiting	 to	 be	 accessed	 through	 and	 by	 human	 use	 of	 tools.	 Heidegger’s	
conceptualisation	of	enframing	sees	human	dependence	on	tools	as	bringing	nature	to	a	
state	where	it	can	be	accessed,	so	that	both	humans	and	the	world	of	appearances	are	
enframed	 to	 be	 configured	 into	 an	 ordering	 for	 use.	 This	 relationship	 to	 technology,	
Heidegger	 asserts,	 gives	 way	 to	 the	 essence	 of	 technology	 itself	 as	 “Gestell”,	 or	















Modern	 technology	 as	 an	 ordering	 revealing	 is,	 then,	 no	merely	 human	 doing.	
Therefore	we	must	take	that	challenging	that	sets	upon	man	to	order	the	real	as	
standing-reserve	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 shows	 itself.	 That	





escape	 our	 (human)	 comprehension.	 The	 act	 of	 enframing	 is	 not	 perceivable	 to	 the	
physical	eye,	and	is	articulated	by	Heidegger	via	its	strangeness	and	ambiguity	as	humans	
and	 their	 being-in-the-world	 are	 revealed	 to	 one	 another.	 In	 this	 way,	 human	
embodiment	–	and	its	technological	extensions–	sees	human	Being	(our	always	being	in	






back	 to	 these	 long-withstanding	 phenomenological	 traditions.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 regard	 that	
Heidegger’s	works	continue	to	inform	a	trajectory	of	re-readings;	the	‘enframing’	concept	
is	of	particular	interest	to	new	media	theorist	Mark	B.	N.	Hansen,	who	aligns	Heideggerian	
phenomenology	 with	 experiences	 of	 new	 media	 and	 VR	 most	 explicitly.	 Where	
Heidegger’s	approach	towards	technology	more	broadly	considers	objects	of	use	that	are	
“by	no	means	anything	technological,”	(p.4)	Hansen	rewrites	bodily	enframing	into	the	
cultural	 and	 technological	milieu	of	 immersive	digital	 events	 and	objects.	Heidegger’s	
emphasis	 on	 enframing	 is	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 the	 realisation	 of	 Being	 and	 its	
relationship	 to	 the	 world;	 Hansen,	 rather,	 sees	 enframing	 as	 a	 performative	 role	
undertaken	 by	 the	 experiencing	 body.	 Though	 Hansen’s	 approach	 aligns	 Heidegger’s	
 
28	Ibid	p.19.	
29 Please note that throughout the thesis, where works are quoted extensively for close reading and analysis, I 





much	 of	 Heidegger’s	 discussion	 of	 enframing	 as	 both	 revealing	 and	 concealing	 is	
mitigated	so	that	the	body	is	put	in	the	“empowered”	position	of	giving	form	to	digital	
data.	 Such	 an	 analysis	 only	 accounts	 for	 the	ways	 the	 body	might	 enable	 a	 seamless	
conversion	of	 formless	 information	 into	 fully	 realised	 feeling,	 and	not	 those	 elements	
which	 remain	 concealed,	 arduous	 or	 beyond	 immediate	 cognitive	 comprehension.	 An	
account	 which	 might	 see	 the	 body	 as	 disempowered,	 as	 responding	 to	 the	 affective	






digitisation.”30	 This	 movement	 sees	 enframing	 take	 on	 new	 technicalities,	 where	 the	
focus	shifts	towards	the	process	in	which	information	is	converted	into	concrete	bodily	
affect.	As	Hansen	puts	it:	
Correlated	with	 the	 advent	 of	 digitisation,	 then,	 the	 body	 undergoes	 a	 certain	
empowerment,	 since	 it	 deploys	 its	 own	 constitutive	 singularity	 (affection	 and	
memory)	not	to	filter	a	universe	of	preconstituted	images,	but	actually	to	enframe	
something	(digital	 information)	that	 is	originally	 formless.	This	originary	act	of	
enframing	information	must	be	seen	as	the	source	of	all	technical	frames	(even	if	
these	 appear	 to	 be	 primary),	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 these	 are	 designed	 to	 make	
information	perceivable	by	the	body,	that	is,	to	transform	it	into	the	form	of	the	
image31.	












constituting	and	actualizing	capacity	of	 (human)	embodiment.	The	 technical	 frame,	or	
interface	 of	 digital	 media	 is	 constituted	 as	 its	 ‘objective	 support,”33	 an	 ontological	
separator	 –	 keeping	 data	 permanent	 instead	 of	 the	 impermanent	 “mental	 or	
instrumental”	 form	 of	 visual	 memory.	 By	 framing	 virtual	 space	 and/or	 digital	 data,	




as	 temporaneous	 glitching,	 the	 body	 does	 not	 become	 a	 framing	 source—rather,	 the	
realm	 of	 subjectivity	 is	 confronted	 by	 the	 digital	 as	 it	 exists	 beyond	 the	 embodied	
interaction	 with	 it.	 In	 immersive	 VR	 experiences	 in	 particular,	 the	 body	 does	 not	







enframing	 closer	 to	 the	 experiencing	 human	 body,	where	 it	 comes	 to	 be	 an	 affective	





















the	 lure	of	entering	worlds	where	anything	 is	possible.	VR	promises	 that	 scenarios	of	
limitless	 potential	 can	 be	 truly	 realised	 in	 this	 brand-new	 era	 of	 cyberspace.	 A	 new	


















all	 that	 concerns	 us	 are	 the	 fleshy	 beings	 that	 our	 kindred	 and	 the	 stuffs	with	












Bogost’s	 approach,	 inspired	 by	Object-Oriented	Ontology,35	 notes	 that	 the	 human	 has	
taken	centre	stage	in	phenomenological	enquiry,	formulating	a	tiny	microcosm	of	what	it	
means	 to	experience	 the	world	 the	only	way	 ‘we’	will	understand	 it	 –	 as	being	 for	us	
(Heidegger). However,	to	align	‘fleshy	being’	with	the	human	specifically	will	come	to	be	
challenged;	in	the	second	chapter,	‘Flesh’	will	be	referred	to	as	a	specific	materialised	unit	
of	 experience	 which	 is	 shared	 by	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 alike,	 embracing	 the	
“multifarious	complexity	of	being	among	all	things.”36	Unlike	the	perhaps	more	‘human’	
understanding	 of	 the	 ‘skin’	 as	 the	 primary	 interface	 of	 human	 experience,37	 the	 flesh	
beholds	the	affective	capacity	to	move	between	various	ontological	realms.	 It	not	only	
informs	human	affectivity,	but	unsettles	human	being-in-the-world	as	a	unit	removed,	
displaced,	 or	 ripped	 away	 from	 the	 unified	 body	 which	 so	 typically	 informs	
phenomenology.	 	 The	 well-sculpted	 bust	 of	 the	 (white,	 male)	 human	 on	 the	 worldly	
mantelpiece	has	been	discovered	dashed	on	the	floor	and	has	been	replaced	with	a	lump	
of	unhuman	flesh.	Though	the	particularities	of	the	‘unhuman’	and	‘flesh’	will	be	explored	
thoroughly	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 here	 I	 draw	 on	 phenomenological	 accounts	 which	
premise	 this	 initial	move	away	 from	human	agency	and	access.	Though	they	maintain	


























that	 “beyond	 the	 human,	 another	 phenomenology	 persists.”40	 For	 Dylan	 Trigg	 in	
particular,	this	phenomenology	is	unhuman:	a	new	body	is	revealed	that	sees	the	affective	
intercorporeity	of	the	human	and	nonhuman.	Brian	Massumi’s	work	brings	together	the	
affective	and	 the	virtual	 via	 the	 claim	of	 their	being	 “an	 incorporeal	dimension	of	 the	

















apparatus	beyond	 the	body	 can	be	mobilised.	 The	 able-bodied,	white	male	 imaginary	


















orientation	 forms	 her	 central	 analysis,	 and	 creates	 a	 perceptive	 understanding	 of	 the	
“straightness”	or	“wonkiness”	of	perception,	as	it	exists	within	specific	spaces	and	socio-
political	contexts.	Orientations	are	devices	which	affect	what	bodies	can	do,	mapping	out	
phenomenal	 space	 in	 order	 that	 bodies	 gain	 access	 or	 are	 barred	 from	 certain	
phenomenological	 experiences	 or	 interactions.	Ahmed	 captures	 ‘orientations’	 through	
the	 ways	 that	 they	 function	 as	 affective	 devices;	 she	 maintains	 that	 phenomenal	
orientation	 is	 very	 much	 felt	 on	 the	 surface	 of	 the	 body.	 Ahmed	 provides	






giddiness	and	nausea,	which	 is	 the	awareness	of	our	own	contingency	and	 the	
horror	with	which	fills	us.43	
	
By	 aligning	 phenomenology	 with	 considerations	 of	 queer	 studies’	 orientations	
specifically,	Ahmed’s	work	considers	the	ways	 in	which	objects	are	both	reachable,	or	
recede	 from	 certain	 bodies.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 aforementioned	 philosophers,	 queer	
moments	 are	 articulated	 as	 instances	 in	 which	 the	 subject	 is	 disorientated	 and	 as	 a	
consequence,	 becomes	 exposed	 to	 strange	 affective	 responses	 which	 emerge	 at	
embodied,	 psychological,	 and	 physiological	 levels.	 In	 thinking	 through	 the	 scope	 of	
orientation,	 Ahmed	 sees	 the	 heteronormative	 orientation	 as	 a	 straight	way	 of	 seeing,	
literally	 forming	 an	 in-line	mode	 of	 perception	 and	being-in-the-world	which	 enables	








blocked;	 “they	 [queer	 moments]	 inhibit	 the	 body,	 such	 that	 it	 ceases	 to	 extend	 into	
phenomenal	space.”44	Referring	to	the	bodily	horizon	as	that	which	“gives	objects	their	
contours	and	[…]	allows	[…]	objects	to	be	reached,”45	the	queer	moment	intervenes	in	the	
“reaching	 forward”	 toward	 an	 object	 –	 an	 alternative	 line	 or	 bodily	 horizon	 is	 drawn	
within	the	social	space	depending	on	orientations.	Ahmed	continues:	
	










Ahmed	 suggests	 that	 a	queer	moment	provides	 a	 temporal	 engagement	with	a	




away,	 as	 threatening	 to	 become	 out	 of	 reach”	 (p.566).	 Thus,	 queerness	 for	 Ahmed	
manifests	as	both	a	temporaneous	instance	of	object	slippage,	or	movement	away	from	














phenomenology	which	 strays	 from	 the	 vertical	 and	 horizontal	 lines	 of	 perception:	 to	
consider	 the	bodily	horizon	as	very	much	embedded	 into	social,	cultural,	and	political	









centred	 around	 a	 simulation	 entitled	 ‘Virtual	 Drag,’	 a	 VR	 experience	 created	 using	
photogrammetry	techniques	and	3D	projections.	The	simulation	invites	users	to	traverse	
a	number	of	elaborate	and	emphatic	environments	which	are	centred	around	six	different	
drag	 personas.	 The	 drag	 queens	 and	 kings’	 3D	 images	 were	 produced	 using	
photogrammetry,	and	maintain	an	unruly	aesthetic	where	disparate	images	do	not	quite	
match	up,	thus	producing	unique	digitally	rendered	images.	Bennett	and	Beckwith	argue	















The	 figures	 depicted	 in	 the	 simulations	 are	 overtly	 digitised,	 showing	 part	 of	 the	
processes	 of	 their	 reproduction	 within	 the	 virtual	 space.	 This	 overtly	 non-seamless	
depiction	 of	 digitally	 rendered	 bodies	 and	 objects	 reveals	 the	 ways	 the	 images	 are	
produced	and	their	underlying	structures	–	with	access	to	the	gridlines	hidden	beneath	
the	garments,	with	different	images	having	certain	levels	of	colour	and	opacity	which,	in	
turn,	 reveals	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 images.	 The	 bodies	 also	 move	 with	 a	 strange,	
glitching	momentum	which	 seemingly	unsettles	but	 invites	attention	 to	 the	processes	
embedded	within	the	artistic	creation.	For	Bennet	and	Beckwith,	the	glitches	in	the	piece	
“crack	the	hyperreal	veneer	of	digital	media	to	reveal	its	underlying	construction.”48	By	
drawing	 attention	 to	 its	 digitised	 contours,	 the	 artwork	 rallies	 against	 the	 push	 for	
seamless	 experiences	 in	 the	 virtual	 reality	 space.	 Bennett	 and	 Beckwith	 argue	 that	
“virtual	reality	troubles	the	experience	of	reality;”49	by	alluding	to	 its	own	fabrication,	
‘Virtual	 Drag’	 pushes	 the	 expectation	 of	 what	 virtual	 reality	 should	 be—not	 as	 a	
replication	 of	 ‘reality’	 but	 as	 an	 imperfect	 simulation.	 As	 such,	 the	 artists	 come	 to	
conclude	 that	 virtual	 reality	 experiences	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 “form	 of	 becoming	 in	




















has	 already	 been	 planned	 ahead	 by	 the	 developer	 and	 as	 such	 forges	 new	 kinds	 of	
agencies.	The	work	of	Bennett	and	Beckwith	plays	with	the	notion	that	gender	might	be	
readily	 codified	 in	 virtual	 spaces.	 As	 an	 artwork,	 ‘Virtual	 Drag’	 initiates	 an	 affective	
experience	in	which	one	is	able	to	feel	the	presence	of	the	construction	of	gender	itself.	
Returning	 to	 Ahmed’s	 work,	 we	 might	 consider	 the	 ways	 virtual	 reality	 instantiates	
various	pre-existing	forms	of	gendered	occupation.		
Ahmed	rewrites	the	frequently	narrated	orientation	of	the	philosopher	writing	at	
the	 table	 to	 exemplify	 the	 affordances	 and	 access	 of	 the	writing	 space.	 Ahmed	places	
queer	 phenomenology	 at	 the	 sight	 of	 the	 philosopher’s	 back,	 a	 looking	 behind	 at	




































become	synonymous	with	 this	 sense	of	 total	 access	–	both	of	which	have	become	 the	
common	expectation	of	virtual	reality	devices.	Yet,	the	more	we	consider	immersion	as	a	
means	of	technology	becoming	transparent,	the	more	we	fail	to	acknowledge	its	ethical	
and	 political	 implications.	 By	 resisting	 the	 discourses	 of	 immediate	 ‘presence,’	
‘immersion,’	and	absolute	access,	we	are	able	to	consider	the	systems	associated	with	the	
technologies	 we	 use,	 their	 underlying	 systems,	 and	 the	 ways	 they	 mediate	 complex	
affective	relations.	Assumptions	about	immersion,	as	a	form	of	mediated	givenness,	as	
















of	 its	 construction	 or	 who	 profits	 from	 it.”53	 VR’s	 is	 entangled	 within	 the	 spheres	 of	
technocapitalism:	the	big	companies	who	are	buying	into	the	VR	space	specifically	market	
their	 tools	 in	 a	 way	 that	 depicts	 uninterrupted	 access	 to	 promote	 their	 experiential	
possibilities.	 In	 2016,	Mark	 Zuckerberg	 delivered	 a	 live	 broadcast	 to	 Facebook	 users	






the	 sensation	 that	 they	 were	 “in	 the	 same	 place	 and	 can	 make	 eye	 contact.”55	 This	
broadcast	caused	a	huge	amass	of	discontent	amongst	Facebook	users,	as	Zuckerberg	and	
Franklin	decided	to	“take	a	trip”	to	flood	stricken	Puerto	Rico.	Only	three	weeks	after	the	
arrival	 of	 Hurricane	 Maria	 and	 the	 subsequently	 devastating	 effects	 on	 the	 island,	
Zuckerberg	told	viewers	that	it	was	“magical	to	feel	like	you’re	actually	in	the	place.”56	
This	broadcast	was	testament	to	the	lack	of	ethical	awareness	when	it	comes	to	access	in	
virtual	 environments.	 To	 appropriate	 real-world	 spaces	 in	 this	way	 and	 testify	 to	 the	
amazing	 sensation	 of	 feeling	 like	 they	 were	 actually	 there,	 Zuckerberg	 and	 Franklin	














the	 idea	 of	 ‘being	 in	 a	 place’	 sees	 an	 erasure	 of	 boundaries	 for	 the	 presumed	 ‘virtual	
tourist:’	there	is	a	conscious	effort	to	market	an	ease	of	movement	across	geographical	




whilst	 also	 flattening	 “real	 world”	 experience.	 This	 is	 one	 instance	 within	 a	 wide	
continuum	of	 VR	 production	which	 aims	 to	 promote	 empathy	 as	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	
point-of-view	VR	experiences.	The	depiction	of	Mark	Zuckerberg	walking	 through	 the	
ignorant	masses,	 or	 his	 attempt	 to	 advertise	 the	Oculus	 headset	 by	 visiting	 the	 then-
recently	devastated	Puerto	Rico,	sees	immersion	and	presence	forming	part	of	a	wider	
ethical	problem	–	the	problem	of	assuming	total	access.	Ahmed’s	queer	phenomenology,	
or	 slantwise	 perception,	 offers	 an	 alternative	 approach	 which	 validates	 instances	 of	




on	 the	 human	 user,	 but	 would	 push	 further	 to	 consider	 the	 complex,	 embodied	
assemblage	incurred	within	VR	experiences	that	also	includes	nonhuman	actors.	Despite	




issues	 around	 technologies	 like	 VR	which	 affectively	 and	 intimately	 tie	 human	 users	
together	 with	 nonhuman	 technologies;	 though	 the	 experiential	 and	 ontological	 lines	
between	 perception	 and	 mediated	 environments	 become	 porous,	 the	 hardware	
maintains	a	nonhuman	essence	in	the	way	it	links	to	the	body	and	processes	information.		
In	 traditional	 ethical	 enquiry,	 the	 ‘face’	 enacts	 the	 central	 signifier	 of	 the	
exteriority	of	‘the	other.’	Emmanuel	Levinas’	definitional	ethical	writings,	in	particular,	









becomes	 ethically	 bound	 to	 itself	 through	 the	 ‘face,’	 the	 distinct	marker	 of	 humanity	
through	 which	 “the	 other—the	 absolutely	 other—presents	 himself.”58	 Novel	 ethical	
issues	emerge	when	 the	 face	 is	mediated,	and	when	 faces	are	perceived	via	mediated	
worlds.	In	VR	in	particular,	as	the	Zuckerberg	in	Puerto	Rico	incident	makes	evident,	the	
face	of	the	other	is	trumped	by	the	promoted	experiential	novelty	for	the	individual	user.		
The	 use	 of	 ‘face’	 within	 virtual	 simulations	 has	 become	 widespread,	 creating	
experiences	for	the	neoliberal	user	of	VR	to	access	the	lives	of	perceived	others	in	order	
to	promote	“empathy.”	These	kinds	of	experiences,	including	examples	such	as	‘Clouds	
Over	Sidra,’59	are	positioned	solely	as	perceptual	experiences	 for	users;	 the	 ‘face’	gets	
mediated	particular	ways	in	order	to	evoke	a	predesignated	emotional	response.	Such	




as	 Rosi	 Braidotti	 notes,	 oftentimes	 these	 kinds	 of	 applications	 form	 part	 of	 a	 dense	
network	 of	 otherness	 which	 frame	 negative	 difference;	 sexualised,	 racialised,	 and	




a	 human	 ethics,	 and	 turn	 towards	 a	 posthuman	 ethical	 framework.	 A	 posthuman	
positioning	sees	a	move	away	 from	the	unified	at-oneness	of	 subjectivity,	and	 instead	
focuses	 on	 ethical	 encounters	 through	 the	 non-unitary	 subject.	 This	 non-unitary	
approach	 to	 subjectivity	 recognises	 an	 individual	 whose	 affective,	 embodied,	 and	
distributed	experience	is	part	of	a	process	of	multiple-belongings	and	becomings;	that	is	
to	 say	 that	 the	 humanist	 ‘subject’	 does	 not	 capture	 the	 constant	 process	 of	 which	



























reflexivity:	 VR	 should	 encourage	 an	 outward	 facing	 reflection	 not	 on	what	 has	 to	 be	
gained	by	the	individual,	but	how	it	might	open	experience	beyond	unified	subjectivity.	
Jaron	Lanier’s	recent	work	Dawn	of	the	New	Everything:	A	Journey	Through	Virtual	Reality	
narrates	 the	 evolution	 of	 VR	 from	 its	 early	 trials	 in	 Silicon	 Valley,	 to	 modern	 day	
consumer	 devices.	 Lanier	 has	 been	 dubbed	 the	 “founding	 father	 of	 virtual	 reality.”63	
Despite	 his	 scepticism	 towards	 social	 media	 as	 platforms	 for	 performing	 self,64	 he	
maintains	 his	 advocacy	 for	 VR’s	 humanist	 potential.	 The	Dawn	 of	 the	New	Everything	
defines	VR	as	a	“technology	of	noticing	experience	itself.”65	He	continues:	
	
As	 technology	 changes	 everything,	 we	 here	 have	 a	 chance	 to	 discover	 that	 by	
pushing	 tech	 as	 far	 as	 possible	we	 can	 rediscover	 something	 in	 ourselves	 that	















implications.	 VR	 researchers	 have	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 reality	 of	 inner	 life,	 for	








Recent	 scholarship	 in	 both	 the	 posthumanities	 and	 affect	 studies	 have	moved	
towards	articulations	of	nonhuman	actors,	or	the	un-humaning	of	embodiment,	allowing	





been	 forwarded	 by	 philosophical	 thinkers	 Giles	Deleuze	 and	 Félix	Guattari	 as	 a	more	




















into	 being.”70	 Some	 of	 the	 more	 nuanced	 approaches	 encompassed	 within	 New	
Materialist	theory	will	be	explored	in	Chapter	3,	in	order	to	articulate	the	ways	virtual	
identity	and	embodiment	are	constructed	in	narratives	via	complex	interactions	between	
“matters	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 bodies,	 and	 between	 the	 social	 and	 environmental	
conditions	in	which	bodies	exist.”71	For	now,	what	these	fields	offer	is	a	questioning	of	a	
persistent	ontological	framework	which	continues	to	place	the	human	at	its	centre.		
Rosi	 Braidotti’s	 work	 on	 posthuman	 ethics	 and	 articulations	 of	 difference	 is	
centred	 upon	 what	 she	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 non-unitary	 subject.	 Braidotti’s	 non-unitary	




A	 sustainable	 ethics	 for	 a	 non-unitary	 subject	 proposes	 an	 enlarged	 sense	 of	







an	 approach	 to	 the	 life-world	 which	 is	 shaped	 by	 its	 continuous	 state	 of	 becoming.	
Braidotti	 refers	 to	 this	 as	 “bios-zoe:”	 “the	 endless	 vitality	 of	 life	 as	 continuous	
becoming.”74	“Zoe”	prefaces	an	understanding	of	the	world	which	always	exists	beyond	
subjectivity;	 it	 is	 through	Zoe	 that	we	can	conceptualise	 the	multitudinous	 forces	and	
encounters	 from	 ‘others’	 as	 they	 exist	 as	 human,	 non-human,	 and	 earth	 others.	 ‘Bios’	
denotes	the	“specific	social	nexus	of	humans.”75	Bios	and	Zoe,	Braidotti	states,	are	“the	
















rather,	 ‘Being’	 is	 embraced	 through	 its	 interconnections	between	 ‘selves’	 and	 ‘others,’	
including	 nonhuman	 and	 earth	 others;	 self-centred	 individualism	 is	 regarded	 as	 an	
obstacle.	 This	 reconfiguration	 of	 ethics	 accounts	 for	 technologically	mediated	worlds.	
Body-tech	assemblages	like	VR	benefit	from	this	reconfiguration,	given	that	they	bring	







acknowledging	 the	 ways	 systems	 and	 structures	 are	 built	 into	 technology,	 and	
acknowledging	 the	 smearing	 of	 subjectivity	 across	material	 and	 virtual	 spaces.	 Affect	
tests	the	boundaries	of	 ‘self’	and	‘other.’	A	push	towards	an	affective	understanding	of	
interactions	 with	 virtual	 environments	 provides	 an	 alternative	 approach	 to	 absolute	
access,	immersion,	and	infinite	possibility	that	is	most	prevalent	in	VR’s	representational	
framings	and	discourses.	In	an	approach	which	decentres	the	individual	subject	and	focus	




inside	 simulations	 where	 they	 encounter	 the	movement	 of	 cells	 through	 human	 and	
nonhuman	beings.77	These	kinds	of	 applications	do	not	 valorise	human	agency	 in	 the	

















	 VR	 can	 most	 definitely	 be	 a	 useful	 educational	 tool	 in	 this	 regard,	 enabling	









In	 the	 Eyes	 of	 the	 Animal,78	 by	Marshmallow	 Laser	 Feast	 (2016),	 explores	 the	
subjective	experiences	of	a	number	of	different	organisms,	offering	users	the	opportunity	
to	experience	a	point-of-view	experience	inspired	by	the	perceptual	capacities	of	various	








regarding	 the	 potential	 altering	 or	 enhancing	 effects	 technology	 can	 have	 on	 our	






































team	collected	drone	 footage	 and	360	videos	 in	 real	 environments,	 using	 scanners	 to	
embed	the	footage	into	software	in	order	to	edit	the	images	and	add	textures	and	sounds	
to	 the	 pieces	 to	 align	with	 different	 kinds	 of	 animals.	 LiDAR	 scanners	 send	 out	 laser	























the	ways	we	might	 unthink	 these	 prevalent	 ideas:	 how	 agency	 is	 compromised,	 how	
transparency	 exceeds	 the	 interface	 and	 bleeds	 into	 domestic	 spaces,	 how	 nonhuman	
agents	 are	 implicated,	 and	 how	 applications	 oftentimes	 evade	 ethical	 critique.	
Framelessness,	 I	 want	 to	 suggest,	 equates	 to	 an	 ontological	 porousness	 that	 is	 more	
complicated	than	‘absolute	access;’	it	might	raise	questions	that	go	beyond	immersion	as	
a	 holistic	 goal,	 but	 challenge	 its	 resistance	 to	 ethical	 realities.	 By	 introducing	 the	
phenomenological	understanding	of	‘enframing,’	the	chapter	has	explored	how	we	might	
















































technologies;	 the	 emergence	 of	 strange	 affects;	 and	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	 role	 of	
nonhuman	actors	in	the	production	of	virtual	environments.	By	frameless	fictions,	I	refer	
to	 a	 set	 of	 fictional	 texts	 that	 illustrate	 the	 ways	 framelessness	 plays	 out	 in	 various	
experiences	of	mediated	environments,	where	human	agency	and	access	are	challenged,	












1).	Mutation	 is	 unruly.	 It	 does	 not	 adhere	 to	 patterns,	 nor	 to	 expectation,	 but	 rather	
emerges	under	surfaces	and	causes	an	ontological	shift	as	one	being	becomes	another.	N	
Katherine	 Hayles	 stated	 in	 her	writing	 on	 ‘The	 Condition	 of	 Virtuality’	 that	mutation	








can	 no	 longer	 be	 counted	 on	 to	 replicate	 itself,	 when	 pattern’s	 disruption	 by	
randomness	becomes	visibly	evident	in	the	body.2	
	
The	 emergence	 of	 randomness	within	 new	media	 discourse	marks	 a	 shift	 away	 from	
containment,	 individualism,	and	expectation,	precipitating	a	move	 towards	 the	unruly	
and	emergent.	In	fact,	Hayles	argues	that	randomness	and	mutation	are	a	result	of	a	move	
away	from	presence	and	absence,	towards	pattern	and	randomness.3	This	chapter	turns	
to	 flesh	 as	 it	 stands	 in	 for	 the	mutation	of	 subjectivity	within	 the	 evolution	of	 virtual	
environments.	Flesh,	I	argue,	is	the	realisation	of	framelessness	as	it	exists	at	the	limits	of	
fixed	ontological	matter.		
As	 we	 saw	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 presence	 and	 absence	 comprise	 the	 predominant	
framings	of	VR	in	the	consumer	market,	namely	that	users	are	depicted	as	being	either	













framings	of	VR	 are	broken	down.	The	messy	materiality	 of	VR,	 and	 the	body,	 persist.	
Rather	than	valorising	the	floaty	immateriality	and	limitlessness	shown	in	VR’s	popular	
framings,	this	chapter	pays	attention	to	the	ambivalent	slippages	that	emerge	in	virtual	
environments;	 it	 begins	 in	 the	 in-between,	 where	 the	 emergence	 of	 affective	 and	
embodied	 encounters	 with	 virtual	 worlds	 reveal	 that	 the	 smooth	 discourses	 and	
representations	of	VR	are	reductive	to	the	niche	and	unruly	interactions	this	technology	
actually	makes	possible.	In	order	to	achieve	this,	this	chapter	will	focus	on	science-fiction	
and	 body-horror	 narratives,	 whose	 eerie	 depictions	 of	mutation	 bodies	 provoke	 very	
material	imaginings	of	‘presence.’		
Chapter	 1	 indicated	 that	 presence	 emerges	 in	 representations	 of	 VR	 not	 as	 a	
feeling	of	being	there,	but	of	an	absolute	being	here,	where	the	depictions	of	bodies	 in	































for	 its	 presentness-to-hand,	 its	 vivid	materiality,	 and	 the	ways	 our	 comprehension	 of	
materiality	is	heightened	during	VR	use.	In	the	moment	that	a	VR	headset	does	not	initiate	











the	 production	 of	 virtual	 environments,	 and	 in	making	 them	 affectively	 present.	 This	
chapter	acts	as	a	kind	of	intervention	to	the	popular	imaginings	of	VR	that	we	have	seen	
in	the	previous	chapter.	Turning	to	texts	outside	the	VR	space,	this	chapter	looks	closely	
at	 fictions	 which	 capture	 the	 emergence	 of	 carnal,	 bodily	 presence	 during	 unruly	
encounters	with,	or	within,	virtual	environments.	Looking	at	some	examples	of	science	
fiction	and	body-horror	narratives,	including	Alice	Sheldon’s	(James	Tiptree	Jnr)	The	Girl	





























we	 can	 become	 better	 able	 to	 configure	 a	 set	 of	 frameless	 fictions	 which	 share	 and	
illustrate	some	elements	of	its	potential	affects.	
Combining	the	phenomenology	of	the	flesh	with	a	number	of	narratives	which	see	
the	 flesh	 emerge	 through	 unruly	 interactions	 with	 technology,	 this	 chapter	 explores	
frameless	fictions	which	push	beyond	transcendence,	seamlessness,	and	disembodiment.	




etymologies.	 I	 want	 to	 explore	 Alice	 Tiptree’s	 narrative	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	 an	












away	 from	 an	 inherent	 association	 of	 technology	 with	 productivity,	 efficiency	 and	
smoothness.	Rather,	focus	is	placed	on	the	strange	sensations	and	experiential	collisions	




if	our	orientation	 towards	 the	world	 is	not	based	on	access,	but	a	 lack	of	 it?	Tiptree’s	
novella,	I	argue,	uses	the	physicality	of	the	human	body	to	reveal	its	brute	rootedness	to	
a	here,	and	lack	of	access	the	façade	of	an	idyllic	there.	Tiptree	uses	the	human	body	as	a	






	 The	Girl	Who	Was	Plugged	 In	 is	 a	 novella	written	by	 the	 author	Alice	 Sheldon,	
under	 the	pseudonym	James	Tiptree	 Jnr,	 in	1973.	For	all	of	 its	accolades	as	a	work	of	
science	 fiction,	 most	 notably	 its	 being	 awarded	 the	 Nebula	 Prize,	 this	 novella	 has	
remained	relatively	underexplored.	It	has	been	analysed	in	relation	to	its	exploration	of	
gendered	 labour	 and	 its	 early	 imaginings	 of	 cybernetics,10	 but	 little	 has	 been	written	
about	 the	 complex	 articulations	 of	 embodiment,	mutation,	 and	 unruly	 affect	 that	 are	
realised	throughout	the	narrative.	It	is	with	Tiptree’s	narration	of	bodily	presence	and	
unruly	affect	that	I	use	the	novella	to	begin	this	work.	The	analysis	that	follows	will	look	














Tiptree’s	 novella	 is	 centred	 around	 the	 character	 of	 P	 Burke,	 the	 “groggy	 girl	
brute”11	who,	after	attempting	suicide,	is	taken	in	by	a	corporate	entity	called	GTX.	GTX	
offer	 P	 Burke	 the	 opportunity	 to	 become	 a	 cyborg	 controller,	where	 she	 is	 given	 the	
opportunity	 to	operate	 the	perfect	 “girl	body”	of	Delphi,	 a	beautiful	humanoid	 cyborg	
created	 to	 function	 as	 an	 embodied	 advertising	 mechanism.	 The	 embodiment	 ties	
between	 P	 Burke	 and	 Delphi	 become	messier	 as	 the	 novella	 progresses,	 as	 ruptures	
between	P	Burke’s	here	and	there	emerge.		But	what	Tiptree’s	prose	emphasises	is	the	
affective	and	emotional	ties	of	the	two	characters	as	P	Burke’s	subjectivity	 is	smeared	
between	 her	 body	 here	 and	 Delphi’s	 perfect	 body	 there.	 Where	 P	 Burke	 and	 Delphi	
maintain	very	specific	presence	throughout	the	narrative	in	the	ways	that	they	exist	as	






































the	 ways	 ‘presence,’	 a	 term	 which	 has	 become	 so	 associated	 with	 seamlessness	 and	
functionality,	is	an	inherently	messy,	ontologically	rooted,	and	affective	phenomenon.	
The	 contrasting	 articulations	 of	 mundanity	 and	 lifelessness	 vs	 novelty	 and	
liveliness	constantly	shape	the	ontological	presence	of	each	character	present	within	the	
The	Girl	Who	Was	Plugged	In.	In	each	case,	there	is	an	infusion	of	human	and	nonhuman	
forces	 which	 shape	 the	 lived	 reality	 of	 Tiptree’s	 world,	 all	 of	 which	 produce	 their	
distinctive	chasms	between	one	another.	Indeed,	the	reader	is	pulled	into	the	thematics	
of	 re-embodiment	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 text;	 the	 novella	 begins	 through	 an	


































the	 city	 worship	 custom-made	 gods,	 humanoid	 creatures	 of	 corporate	 celebrity.	 The	















Tiptree’s	 narration	 of	 the	 environments	 of	 her	 story	 evokes	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	
physical	presence,	that	is	affectively	experienced	by	the	reader	as	they	move	through	it.	
Despite	 its	 seaming	 mundanity,	 the	 technology	 that	 resides	 in	 the	 space	 is	 placed	
perceptually	to	the	side;	focus	instead	is	placed	on	the	affective	depictions	of	people,	their	
movement,	and	in	particular,	the	carnal	presence	of	P	Burke.	From	the	outset,	and	as	we	




that	 intimate	 technologies	 like	VR	are	able	 to	 forge.	The	Girl	Who	Was	Plugged	 In	 is	a	
narrative	which	recognises	 the	persisting	presence	of	 the	body,	particularly	when	 the	
desire	sold	to	its	users	is	bodily	transcendence.	
Tiptree	 satirises	 the	 seamlessness	 of	 her	 cityscape;	 human	 beings	 and	 the	
technologies	and	 infrastructures	 that	permeate	the	city	seamlessly	 integrate.	Tiptree’s	
representation	 of	 the	 city	 provides	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 kinds	 of	 cybernetic	 cities	
engrained	into	a	public	imagination	under	the	influence	of	earlier	cyberpunk	writers	like	
William	 Gibson,	 Pat	 Cadigan	 and	 Neal	 Stephenson—where	 dazzling	 architecture	 and	
bright	 lights	 are	 the	 central	 features	 of	 futuristic	 worlds.	 Unlike	 these	 imaginings,	
Tiptree’s	 world	 isn’t	 fantastical,	 overwhelmed	 by	 fluorescence,	 stark	 images	 and	









The	 underground	 corporate	 control	 system	 of	 GTX	 is	 alluded	 to	 when	 the	









“just	 like	 people”	 (p.2),	 enables	 them	 to	 function	 unseen:	 though	 their	 hands	 are	
described	as	“lifting	shyly”,	 they	are	contrastingly	“smashing”	–	beholding	the	agential	






they	 move	 through	 the	 world.	 The	 embedded	 narration	 of	 the	 obfuscated	 network	
typologically	represents	their	obscurity	in	the	world	painted	by	Tiptree’s	narrator:	the	
written	 prose	 continues	 to	 seamlessly	 walk	 the	 reader	 through	 the	 world	 without	
disruption	from	the	black	boxed	system	it	walks	across.	The	corporation,	GTX,	remains	










give	 them	 a	 weightlessness;	 in	 a	 sense,	 Tiptree’s	 prose	 makes	 the	 presence	 of	 the	
humanoids	light	and	cold,	they	lack	an	affective	weight	in	Tiptree’s	otherwise	affective	
prose.	 Yet,	 unruly	 affects	 seemingly	 prevail	 in	 the	 novella.	 Ruptures	 between	
body/world/technology	 begin	 to	 subtly	 unfurl.	 Indeed,	 when	 describing	 the	
aforementioned	garble	of	the	cityscape,	the	narrator	uses	terms	related	to	embodiment	
and	flesh,	referring	to	the	desire	to	prevent	the	“haemorrhages	of	information”	(p.3).	This	
image	 gives	 a	 liveness	 and	 growth	 to	 information,	 bringing	 together	 the	 messy	
entanglement	 that	P	Burke	will	 eventually	 embody	as	 she	 interfaces	with	Delphi.	The	














Unlike	 the	 abstract	 environment	 around	 her,	 it	 is	 P	 Burke’s	 body	which	 is	 seen	 as	 a	




anything	 but	 seamless;	 she	 struggles	 through	 a	 world	 that	 doesn’t	 work	 for	 her,	
“cross[ing]	 trip[ping]	 and	 collid[ing]	 with	 the	 casualty	 rail”	 (p.2)	 across	 a	 moving	





a	 rupturing	of	 the	 flow,	a	 fleshy	haemorrhage,	within	 the	depicted	 landscape.	Yet	 this	
allusion	to	“bugging	out”	is	a	nod	toward	her	future	as	she	will	become	a	melding	“of	flesh	
and	metal”	(p.4).	GTX	recruit	P	Burke	as	a	“human”	remote	which	will	be	used	to	control	
















imagined	 technology	 can	 actually	 eradicate	 bodily	 difference:	 real-world	 embodiment	
becomes	a	sequence	of	glitches,	and	GTX	offer	 the	opportunity	 for	 technology	 to	offer	
something	more	 ‘perfect’	 than	the	real	world.	The	call	 to	 transcendence,	as	we	saw	in	




In’	 (2019).17	 Paying	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 Tiptree	 narrates	 P	 Burke’s	 disability,	 Felt	
attests	to	the	ways	such	portrayals	are	“tied	to	a	cybernetic	conception	of	noise	and	error	
as	 valuable	 byproducts	 of	 a	 body’s	 encounter	 with	 communication	 devices.”18	 Not	
dissimilarly	to	the	concerns	of	this	chapter	at	large,	Felt’s	analysis	of	The	Girl	Who	Was	
Plugged	 In	emphasises	 the	“frictions	between	users	and	their	machine	 interfaces”	and	
“materialises	 unexamined	 performances	 of	 critical	 labour.”19	 As	 noted	 in	 the	 thesis’	
introduction,	 users	 and	 their	 bodies	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 and	 disruption	 of	 the	
experiential	goals	of	immersion	and	presence.	As	opposed	to	marking	a	form	of	bodily	
transcendence,	 Tiptree’s	work	disrupts	notions	 of	 the	 technologically	 enhanced	body,	
through	“the	impetus	of	supplementation	[and]	technological	prostheses	[to]	transience	
one’s	given	abilities,	or	render	the	unenhanced	body	disabled.”20	Rather,	the	disruptions	





































her	 ability	 to	 seamlessly	 integrate	 with	 a	 system	 they	 have	 put	 together.	 She	 isn’t	
regarded	 as	 a	 body,	 a	 human:	 she	 is	 simply	 part	 of	 an	 unfeeling	wider	 technological	
assemblage.		
There	 is	 a	 perceptual	 contrast	 depicted	 in	 Tiptree’s	 writing	 between	 the	
embodiment	 of	 both	 Delphi	 and	 P	 Burke:	 where	 P	 Burke	 is	 treated	 inhumanely,	 her	
humanness	seeps	out	through	her	organicity,	her	fluid	movement,	her	flesh.	Delphi,	on	
the	other	hand,	is	precisely	not	human	because	of	the	way	she	functions	perfectly	in	the	
world.	 She	 lacks	messiness,	 and	 this	marks	her	 inhumanness.	Delphi	 is	 the	 embodied	
framing	of	an	idealised	feminine	beauty,	described	in	the	novella	as	a	“porno	for	angels”	
(p.5);	P	Burke’s	sensation	of	being	part	of	Delphi	sees	her	“sit	there	hugging	her	perfect	
girl	 body,	 looking	 at	 you	 out	 of	 delighted	 eyes”	 (p.5).	 Yet	 simultaneously,	 P	 Burke	 is	
















the	 world	 is	 depicted	 as	 wholly	 weightless	 and	 immaterial,	 P	 Burke’s	 body	 and	 its	
entanglement	of	wires	and	flesh	becomes	part	of	a	grim	assemblage	that	still	feels	and	
touches	despite	 its	projection	 into	 the	control	of	Delphi.	What	Tiptree’s	work	does	so	










“parties—clothes—suncars”	 (p.9).	As	a	 consequence,	 “in	P	Burke’s	 starved	seventeen-
year-old	 head	 the	 ethics	 of	 the	 product	 sponsorship	 float	 far	 away”	 (p.9).	 Here,	 her	
immersion	 in	 the	body	and	 life	of	Delphi,	where	she	 is	given	access	 to	all	of	 the	most	
elaborate	 material	 goods,	 sees	 P	 Burke	 leave	 behind	 any	 notion	 of	 the	 problematic	
systems	that	are	at	play.	Being	able	to	fit	in	and	receive	instruction	to	operate	the	body	of	
the	glamorous	Delphi	becomes	more	about	the	access	she	now	has,	as	opposed	to	her	






She’s	 always	known	Delphi	has	almost	no	 sense	of	 taste	or	 smell	 […]	And	 that	




















	 P	 Burke’s	 success	 is	 ultimately	 measured	 by	 her	 seamless	 adaptation	 to	 the	
technology	with	which	 she	 is	 connected,	 and	 imparting	 control	 over	 Delphi	 which	 is	
error-free.	Yet,	 in	so	doing,	her	sense	of	feeling	and	affectivity	is	wholly	compromised.	
The	messy	materiality	‘outside’	the	shell	of	Delphi	continues	to	exist,	and	P	Burke’s	own	
















Though	 the	 remotes	 are	 built	 to	 be	 adored,	 they	 cannot	 experience	 the	 physical	 and	
affective	sensations	of	contact.	When	Paul	realises	that	Delphi	is	being	controlled	by	GTX,	
Delphi	 is	 for	the	first	 time	seen	as	the	not-human	figure	of	 the	story.	When	asking	for	
Delphi’s	reassurance,	“he	[Paul]	doesn’t	know	it	but	he’s	seeing	a	weirdie.	Remotes	aren’t	
hooked	up	to	flow	tears”	(p.21).	For	the	first	time,	Delphi	is	uncategorizable.	She	is	no	







Delphi	goes	 from	“a	nervous	 little	 statue”	 (p.24)	 to	 sobbing	uncontrollably	when	Paul	
discovers	that	she	is	really	an	avatar	under	the	control	of	GTX.	P	Burke’s	emotional	and	

















and	 wires	 are	 amalgamated	 into	 a	 grotesque	 spectacle.	 This	 rupturing	 marks	 the	
emergence	of	a	presence	beyond	the	human.	
What	appears	in	the	ruptures	of	the	here	and	there	is	a	discombobulated	mass	of	
flesh.	 P	 Burke’s	 body	 becomes	 an	 immanent	 mass,	 fighting	 towards	 an	 illusory	
transcendence.	Aside	from	placing	emphasis	on	the	sensation	of	presence	in	the	world	of	
P	Burke,	the	reader	is	more	overtly	exposed	to	the	carnal	presence	of	flesh,	as	her	body	












rupturing	 heralded	 in	The	 Girl	Who	Was	 Plugged	 In	 signals	 the	messy	 and	 unsettling	




of	 the	 once	 perfectly	 sculpted	 human	 bust.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 regard,	 with	 the	 vividness	 of	
Tiptree’s	narrative	in	mind,	that	I	go	on	to	argue	that	Merleau-Ponty’s	The	Phenomenology	
of	 the	 Flesh	 (1968)	 can	 enable	 an	 understanding	 of	 embodied	 relations	 with	 virtual	


















Videodrome	 not	 only	 causes	 mutations	 within	 its	 viewers,	 but	 itself	 emerges	 in	




























hedonistic	 growth	 and	 technological	 transparency	 is	 an	 inherent	 unruliness.	 Alice	
Tiptree’s	narration	of	 the	 flesh	 is	 noisy	 –	 it	 speaks	 loudly,	more	 so	 than	 the	novella’s	
protagonists.	 The	 realisation	 of	 the	 flesh	 enacts	 mutation,	 the	 unruly	 and	 random	
encounters	 which	 manifest	 in	 the	 body	 when	 the	 user	 attempts	 to	 interact	 with	
immersive	mediated	worlds.	 I	want	 to	 further	explore	VR’s	weird	entanglements	with	
flesh	by	turning	towards	phenomenological	discourses	which	focus	on	this	strange	unit	
of	being.	By	considering	a	phenomenology	of	the	flesh,	we	might	better	understand	how	it	
comes	 to	 represent	unruliness,	 a	push	 towards	a	 lack	of	human	agency	and	unlimited	
access	 towards	 something	 that	 encourages	 us	 to	 enter	worlds	 beyond,	 but	 that	 these	
worlds	might	not	feel	familiar	or	indeed	comfortable.	
	 Philosophical	 approaches	 to	 flesh	 date	 back	 to	 the	 beginnings	 of	 the	
phenomenological	 tradition	 in	 the	early	20th	century.	For	 the	purposes	of	 this	 thesis,	 I	
begin	my	analysis	with	Edmund	Husserl’s	successor	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty,	as	flesh	is	
perhaps	 most	 notably	 realised	 in	 his	 works.	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 exploration	 of	 what	 he	
terms	 the	 “phenomenology	 of	 the	 flesh”	 was	 first	 posited	 in	 the	 unfinished	 work	
published	after	his	death,	The	Visible	and	the	Invisible	(1964).25	Merleau-Ponty	used	the	
unit	of	flesh	to	capture	intercorporeity	and	shared	human	experience.	Pushing	beyond	
the	 somewhat	 individualist	 narratives	 of	 perception	 forwarded	 by	 his	 predecessors,	
Merleau-Ponty	 saw	 perception	 as	 both	 interchangeable	 and	 multidirectional;	 though	
perception	 inherently	 requires	 a	 subject-perceiver,	 the	 subject	 themselves	 are	 always	
already	perceived.	The	seer	and	the	seen	are	reversible.	Alphonso	Lingis	(translator	of	











provides	an	alternative	model	 as	 it	 “captures	 the	 lines	of	 force	of	 the	world.”27	Lingis	
continues:	
	










only	 become	 visible,	 but	 they	 become	 present.	 Merleau-Ponty	 uses	 the	 well-known	
analogy	of	touching	one’s	hand	with	the	other	to	exemplify	this:	a	hand	can	both	touch	










where	we	encounter	and	 feel	 things	outside	 the	body,	and	 in	 that	moment	converting	
them	into	substance.	
I	approach	the	flesh	here	as	not	necessarily	a	subject	shift,	but	an	abjection	of	the	









capture	 them	 reductively,	 the	 flesh	 captures	 the	moment	 of	 interaction	 not	 as	 one	 of	
reduction	but	of	a	kind	of	unknowing.	The	flesh	is	not	human	flesh,	but	carnal	substance	
–	it	touches	and	is	touched,	but	does	not	make	sense	of	the	things	it	interacts	with.	Rather,	

























world;	 it	 resists	anthropological	 readings.	Rather,	 the	 flesh	creates	a	 layering	 through	
which	the	visible	is	made	“pregnant	with	texture”	(p.136).	Merleau-Ponty’s	articulation	
of	 the	 flesh,	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 invisible,	 are	 noted	 as	 his	 last	 contributions	 to	 his	
phenomenological	 apex,	The	Visible	 and	 the	 Invisible	 remaining	 incomplete	 before	 his	




phenomenological	 thinking	which	pushes	beyond	 the	human	–	and	 it	 is	 the	 flesh	 that	
enables	this	extension	(or	contraction).	The	world	is	not	framed	for	or	by	(hu)man,	but	is	
itself	a	massive	being,	a	surface	of	“scattered	visibility.”30	Flesh	is	the	ever-present	carnal	




	 Flesh	maintains	 its	 influence	 on	new	media	 theory	 and	broader	 contemporary	
philosophical	enquiry.	Steven	Shaviro	uses	 flesh	as	 the	substance	of	what	he	calls	 the	
“cinematic	body,”	arguing	that	flesh	is	“intrinsic	to	the	cinematic	apparatus,	at	once	its	
subject,	its	substance,	its	limit.”31	Shaviro’s	“cinematic	body”	returns	focus	to	the	viewer’s	














Grosz	 returns	 to	 the	work	of	Merleau-Ponty,	 arguing	 that	 as	being’s	most	 elementary	
level,	flesh	enables	a	“reconce[ption	of]	materiality	so	that	it	includes	rather	than	opposes	
the	psychic	and	the	sexual.32”	Grosz’s	work	outlines	the	intersections	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	












what	 is	 phenomenologically	 given,	 of	 what	 the	 body-subject	 experiences,	 has	
resonances	with	probably	 the	most	crucial	and	unique	contribution	of	 feminist	
theory—its	 capacity	 to	 use	 lived	 experience	 and	 experiential	 acquaintance	
(connaissance)	 as	 a	 touchstone	 or	 criterion	 in	 the	 evaluation,	 not	 only	 of	
theoretical	 paradigms	 and	 propositions,	 but	 also	 of	 day-by-day	 and	 mass	
politics.33	
	
Merleau-Ponty’s	 emphasis	 on	 lived	experience,	 in	his	 earlier	writings,	 is	 here	used	as	
another	way	of	framing	an	important	facet	of	feminist	theory,	as	a	way	of	emphasising	
lived	experience.	The	flesh,	for	Grosz,	is	integral	to	feminism	because	of	its	“active	and	
passive	 functioning,	 its	 role	 in	 both	 the	 inscription	 and	 subversion	 of	 socio-political	
values.34”	Flesh	 is	 re-interpreted	 in	Grosz’s	work	as	a	 “non-binarized	ontology”	 (p.43)	
which	stands	in	simultaneously	for	the	subject	and	object	folding	into	one	another.	The	
flesh	is	not	a	privileged	category	of	being	as	unitary	and	definable,	rather	it	is	an	open,	





linking	 and	 separating	 the	 one	 from	 the	 other”	 as	 subject/object;	 mind/body;	
visible/invisible	(p.46).	
	 Grosz	further	expands	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	descriptors	of	the	flesh	by	drawing	on	
















occupy	 different	 logical	 positions—the	 one	 is	 the	 foundation	 and	 origin	 of	 the	
other.	The	tangible	is	the	invisible,	unseeable	milieu	of	the	visible,	the	source	of	












ontological	binaries	which	seek	 to	disguise	 the	entanglements	of	 flesh,	affectivity,	and	
bodily	 practice.	 With	 this	 theoretical	 underpinning,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 bodily	 unity	 is	




intwined	with	 the	 flesh	 as	 a	 unit	 of	 experience.	 In	 all	 of	 its	 conceptualisations	 across	
critical	 theory	 and	 philosophy,	 flesh	 marks	 a	 certain	 unruliness	 that	 illustrates	
approaches	to	being-in-the-world	as	messy,	as	affective,	as	mutative.	Much	of	this	sticky	












considerations	of	VR	and	 immersive	 technologies	which	extend	beyond	 the	 individual	




frame	(skin	 to	 flesh),	 it	 is	not	ethically	 framed	(it	 is	 faceless),	and	 it	 resists	subjective	
framing.	The	flesh	is	brute	carnality,	and	the	unsettling	depictions	of	flesh	entangled	with	










computer	 generated	 imagery	 (CGI)	 and	 video	 games	which	 represent	 their	mediums’	
capacity	to	represent	bodies	as	abject	forms;	rather	than	moving	away	from	noise,	I	look	
at	digital	 images	 that	disregard	 fixed	ontologies	 and	embrace	noise,	providing	a	push	
against	the	prevalent	rhetorics	of	speed,	efficiency,	and	seamlessness	in	contemporary	
technoculture.	 These	 examples	 visualise	 some	of	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 flesh	 and	 its	
entanglement	in	virtual	spaces,	opening	up	the	possibilities	for	embracing	framelessness	
and	the	unruly.	In	so	doing,	it	enables	us	to	see	how	philosophies	of	flesh	have	become	











images	 do	 not	 achieve	 realism,	 but	 rather	 photorealism	 –	 “the	 ability	 to	 fake	 not	 our	
perceptual	and	bodily	experience	of	 reality	but	only	 its	photographic	 image.”36	 In	 this	
regard,	Manovich	continues,	“the	synthetic	image	is	free	of	the	limitations	of	both	human	





these	 ideas	we	 can	 see	 that	 there	 remains	 a	 conflict	 between	 the	 capacity	 to	 perfect	
reality,	 to	 extend	 it,	 or	 to	 dirty	 it,	 and	 make	 it	 noisy.	 Virtual	 reality	 opens	 more	

























































“post-continuity	 filmmaking.”39	 This	 form	 of	 film	 production,	 which	 sees	 the	 logical	
continuity	 of	 time	 and	 space	 as	 being	 “less	 important”40	 than	 classical	 cinematic	
sequences,	sees	the	combination	of	techniques	and	the	blending	of	social,	psychological,	












experiences	 that	 combine	 the	 imagery	 of	 classical	 cinema	 with	 new	 forms	 of	
technological	 imagery.	 Though	 the	 stills	 above	 are	 not	 taken	 from	 ‘cinematographic	
films,’	they	mark	a	depiction	of	bodies	not	as	characterised	individuals,	but	characterised	
via	 the	narration	of	 form.	Omoss	speaks	of	his	artistic	practice	and	 the	articulation	of	
bodies,	stating	that	the	theme	of	his	work	is	
	
the	exploration	of	 form,	 in	the	geometric	and	structural	sense	of	 the	word,	and	
using	film	as	the	medium	to	express	those	forms.	So	often	film	is	used	to	explore	
narrative	 and	 characters,	 and	 in	 this	 series	 I	 […]	 explore	 the	 narrative	 and	
character	 of	 the	 forms	 themselves…	 I	 direct	 the	 structures	 to	 a	 degree,	 like	 a	
director	would	with	an	actor,	but	at	some	point	I	give	control	over	to	the	machine,	















with	 the	 randomly	 generated	 machinic	 powers	 of	 the	 computer	 in	 order	 to	 create	
uncanny	 effects	which	 destabilise	 the	 body	 as	 a	 concrete	 frame,	 a	 secure	 ontological	







flesh	 dislodged	 from	 a	 comfortable	 ontological	 grounding.	 The	 pressures	 and	 forces	
instilled	within	 the	 computer	 animation	 extend	 beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 a	 purely	 human	




















































than-human	 presence.	 Indeed,	 Foucault’s	 work	 historicises	 institutional	 movements	
where	the	masses	are	divided	into	individual	units,	in	order	to	avoid	messy,	swarming	
collectives.	 The	 result	 of	 these	 enforced	 institutional	 power	 structures	 is	 the	
“transformation	 of	 confused,	 useless	 or	 dangerous	 multitudes	 into	 ordered	
multiplicities.”48	 Foucault’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 oppressive	 enforcement	 of	 power	marks	 a	
significant	 shift	 from	 the	 immanent	 masses	 toward	 transcendent	 individualism.	 The	
individual	as	a	member	of	the	state,	an	employee	of	the	state,	a	subject	whose	beliefs	are	
dictated	by	the	state	is	able	to	achieve	success	and	be	rewarded	if	their	bodies	become	
useful,	 efficient,	 and	 a	 “political	 technology.”49	 The	 “political	 economy	 of	 the	 body”50	
creates	 a	 directionality	 towards	 a	 “bodiless	 reality”	 (p.17)	 produced	 by	 absolute	
productivity	and	seamless	momentum	with	state	enforcements.	In	my	contextualising	of	
Foucault’s	work	here,	I	emphasise	the	ways	flesh,	and	the	phenomenology	of	the	flesh,	
resist	 the	 division	 of	 the	 ‘multitude.’	 If	 flesh	 is	 to	 be	 a	 unit	 through	which	we	 better	
understand	VR’s	affective	and	corporeal	dimensions,	then	its	capacity	to	break	away	from	
singular	subjectivity	must	be	emphasised.	That	is	that	the	experience	of	VR	should	not	be	













in	 an	 era	 of	 social	 media,	 cloud	 computing,	 algorithmic	 trading,	 network	

















and	nonhuman	actors	entangled	within	one	 carnal	manifestation,	 and	 this	ontological	
fluidity	of	the	flesh	offers	a	rigorous	framework	for	thinking	through	some	of	the	affective	
intricacies	of	virtual	reality,	centrally,	the	strange	sensations	of	the	in-between.	All	of	the	
artworks	 discussed	 thus	 far	 reveal	 the	 emergence	 of	 flesh	when	 bodies	 interact	with	
novel	technologies:	Tiptree/Alice	Sheldon’s	novella	illustrated	the	ways	the	fleshy	body	






















necessarily	 represents	 the	 strange	 and	 unruly	 entanglements	 produced	 between	 the	
human	body	and	the	nonhuman	apparatus.		
In	 order	 to	 take	 these	 unsettling	 images	 of	 the	 in-between	 further,	 I	 want	 to	
suggest	that	we	might	learn	more	about	VR	if	we	look	even	further	away	from	human	
subjectivity,	and	towards	a	subjectivity	where,	like	the	artworks	above,	the	human	and	
nonhuman	 coalesce	 into	 the	 same	 flesh.	 Between	 the	 narration	 and	 visual	
representations	of	fleshy	beings	interacting	with	technological	systems,	we	can	come	to	
understand	 that	 the	 flesh	 neither	 resides	 in	 the	 realms	 of	 the	 human	 or	 nonhuman.	
Rather,	the	flesh	resides	in	the	realms	of	unhumanity.	The	unhuman,	I	argue,	captures	the	
essence	 of	 a	 frameless	 subjectivity	 which	 resides	 in	 the	 in-between	 of	 human	 and	
nonhuman.	And	the	unhuman	might	also	encourage	the	movement	away	from	a	valorised	











places	 the	 figure	 specifically	at	 the	core	of	horror	and	emerging	phenomenologies	 “in	
which	 the	 gaze	 of	 human	 subjectivity	 loses	 its	 privileged	 place.”52	 Trigg	 locates	 the	
unhuman	at	 the	 cusp	of	 traditional	phenomenology,	where	new	subjectivities	 emerge	


























Trigg	 also	 unites	 the	 tropes	 of	 the	 horror	 genre	 with	 the	 weird	 affect	 of	 the	
unhuman.	 There	 are	 clear	 intersections	 with	 VR	 subjectivities	 and	 the	 horror	 genre,	
which	will	be	explored	 in	 the	 final	 chapter	of	 this	 thesis,	but	here,	 I	want	 to	 consider	
Trigg’s	exploration	of	the	“unhuman	body”	as	a	site	for	experiencing	abjectivity,	and	the	
ways	we	might	 better	 respond	 to	 instances	where	 VR	 simulations	 and	 avatar	 bodies	
might	resist	us	and	make	the	sensations	of	interacting	with	VR	disorientating.	Drawing	
on	 the	 work	 of	 Julia	 Kristeva	 (1982),	 Trigg	 repurposes	 the	 sense	 of	 unknowability,	
“something	that	escapes	understanding,”54	as	an	unhuman	phenomenon.	Trigg	voices	“an	
existence	 that	 both	 enables	 and	 exceeds	 all	 subjectivity.”55	 His	 analysis	 of	 horrific	
representations	of	beings	which	exceed	the	bindings	of	fixed	ontologies	asserts	that	the	













own	 limitations,	 and	 to	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 human	 body	 (as	 an	 alternative	 to	
limitlessness	and	transcendence).	Trigg’s	particular	emphasis	on	horror	and	the	uncanny	
sees	the	“alienness	of	matter”	(p.55)	as	a	central	facet	of	coming-into-contact	with	the	





the	 avatar	 body,	 react	 in	 a	 way	 that	 was	 wholly	 beyond	 normative	 subjectivity.	 The	
unhuman	emerges	when	there	 is	an	unsettling	and	unanticipated	 interaction	between	








It	 is	 through	this	alienness	of	matter	 that	we	might	unite	VR,	 flesh,	and	the	unhuman.	
Flesh	exists	at	the	limits	of	fixed	ontologies,	away	from	the	bodily	frame.	In	the	same	way,	
the	unhuman	marks	an	account	of	a	subjectivity	beyond	the	human,	but	relies	on	human	
affectivity	 to	 be	 realised.	 VR	 essentially	 produces	 the	 sensations	 of	 unhumanity	 by	



















marginalisation	 and	 oppression	 created	 by	 technological	 monopolies,	 where	 digital	
connections	produce	new	forms	of	sociality	beyond	traditional	social	formations.	Such	
definitions	of	the	unhuman	again	draw	attention	to	the	limits	of	humanity,	and	the	need	
to	 explore	 new	 subjectivities	 that	 emerge	 in	 unique	 encounters	 between	 human	 and	
nonhuman	agents.		
	 The	unruly	is	a	key	element	of	the	theorisation	of	the	unhuman,	and	this	is,	in	part,	










control	 by	 the	 player.	 This	 videogame,	 I	 argue,	 provides	 an	 interactive	 grammar	 of	
unhumanity	and	the	phenomenology	of	 the	 flesh	that	we	can	begin	to	apply	to	virtual	
reality	 experiences,	 and	 overtly	 acknowledges	 the	 entanglements	 of	 player,	 gaming	












Before	 turning	 to	 the	 game	 Inside	 (Playdead,	 2016),	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 how	
videogames	 as	 a	medium	behold	 the	 affective	 capacities	 to	 produce	 the	 unhuman.	 In	
particular,	videogames	act	as	unique	mediums	for	eliciting	specific	forms	of	affect,	and	
the	capacity	for	players	to	be	touched	by	videogames	has	been	explored	by	a	range	of	




gameworld,	 and	 notes	 that	 specific	 design	 elements	 negotiate	 the	 “affective	 and	
emotional	engagement”	players	have	with	games.59	Eugénie	Shinkle	pushes	beyond	the	
capacity	 for	 game	 design	 to	mediate	 affect,	 arguing	 that	 players	 “possess	 subrational	
agency”60	which	enables	lateral	and	unpredictable	responses	to	perceived	environments.	
Shinkle	 argues	 that	 “games	 actualise	 affect	 in	 ways	 that	 designers	 (whatever	 their	
motives)	do	not	always	anticipate.”61	Aubrey	Anable	notes	that	affect	can	be	read	as	a	
specific	orientation	towards	representations,	and	demonstrates	how	game	studies	has	
seen	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 emergent	 gameplay,	 towards	 emergent	 feelings.	 Anable	 reads	
videogames	 as	 mediums	 which	 enact	 “specific	 affective	 dimensions,	 legible	 in	 their	
images,	algorithms,	temporalities,	and	narratives.62	Across	the	spectrum	of	approaches	
aligning	 videogames	with	 affect	 theory	 is	 a	 questioning	 of	 the	 ontological	 boundaries	
between	 players,	 programming,	 representation	 and	 material	 hardware.	 Whether	




























can	 leave	 their	 players	 feeling	 uneasy;	 they	 can	 evoke	 strange	 satisfaction	 and	
unanticipated	 thrills.	 Strange	 affects	 seep	 out	 of	 the	 programmable	 corners	 of	
videogames	and	they	are	not	always	predictable.	Take,	for	example,	when	a	videogame	
glitches,	momentarily	 resisting	 both	 the	 control	 of	 the	 player,	 and	 also	 its	 embedded	
programming	and	control	systems.	At	these	moments,	games	become	unruly	sites	where	
they	do	something	that	neither	the	player	nor	programmer	could	predict.	They	can	also	
make	 their	 players	 feel	 strange	 through	 their	 unique	 aesthetic	 and	 representational	
capacities.	 Videogames	 have	 always	 allowed	 for	 the	 depiction	 of	 unsettling	 and	





in	 2016.63	 The	 narrative	 centres	 around	 a	 young	 boy	 who	 moves	 through	 a	 dark,	
unforgiving	world	of	complex	mind	control	systems,	coming	into	contact	with	a	number	
of	unsettling,	deadly	creatures.	Within	the	gameworld,	everything	living	is	subject	to	the	

















world	 the	game	 represents:	not	only	does	 the	player	get	 given	very	 little	 information	
about	the	storyline	the	game	follows,	but	they	are	also	given	little	sense	of	the	amount	of	
agency	they	behold,	or	who	or	what	are	the	central	agents	controlling	the	world	depicted.	
As	 a	 puzzle	 platformer,	 the	 game	 infrastructure	 is	 predicated	 on	 the	 user	 making	
mistakes	in	order	to	solve	the	puzzles	in	the	environments	through	trial	and	error.	Death	
is	recurrent;	in	moments	where	the	boy	is	killed,	his	body	becomes	lifeless	meat	(we	will	







the	 scenes	 evolve	 from	 rural	 fields	 and	 abandoned	 farm	 buildings	 towards	 desolate,	
Fordist	 industrial	 spaces;	 these	 include	 large	 factory	 buildings	which	house	 conveyor	
belts,	levers,	and	creaking	pipelines.		
	
Aside	 from	 the	 visual	 landscapes,	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 Inside	draws	 attention	 to	 those	









the	 supposed	 human	 boy	 and	 the	 nonhuman	 objects	 and	 systems	 he	 interacts	 with,	
interactions	which	are	enacted	by	the	player.	
Elements	 of	 unhumanity	 reveal	 the	 affective	 relationship	 the	 game	 initiates	
beyond	the	bounds	of	absolute	player	autonomy;	a	sense	of	control	is	given	to	the	player,	
yet	 simultaneously	 this	 control	 is	pulled	away	as	other	actors	emerge	 throughout	 the	
gameworld.	The	multisensory	nature	of	Inside	has	been	explored	in	much	of	the	writing	
and	 reviews	 of	 the	 game,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	ways	 the	 game’s	 audio	 track	
reveals	narrative	elements.64	Yet	little	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	affective	intricacies	
of	the	game’s	textures,	the	contours	of	its	design	and	the	ways	subjectivities	beyond	the	
human	 are	 depicted.	 Alternative	 logics	 and	 models	 of	 physics	 are	 revealed	 through	
strange	experiments	contained	within	the	gameworld.	There	are	human	corpses	tied	to	
chords	that	float	upwards	under	water,	and	other	gravitational	forces	which	push	rather	













vibrational	 force	 which	 is	 omitted	 from	 the	 mechanism,	 his	 body	 explodes	 and	 flies	
towards	the	screen	in	shards	of	flesh.	This	moment	is	affectively	transient,	mimicked	by	
vibrational	 feedback	 in	 the	 controller,	 and	unsettling	 sounds	of	 rupturing	 flesh	as	 the	
corpse	 gets	 flung	 towards	 the	 player.	 The	 game,	 in	many	 different	ways,	 attempts	 to	
mimic	the	affective	coming-into-contact	with	the	unhuman	through	a	layered	narrative	





players,	 instead	 programming	 affective	 queues	 to	 prompt	 player	 action.	 The	 game’s	
aesthetic	design	depicts	all	of	its	human	characters	as	abstract	and	faceless.	There	is	no	




touching	 opens	 up	 between	 representation,	 screens,	 code,	 and	 bodies.”65	 The	 game’s	
affective	dimensions	enable	the	player	to	gain	some	insights	into	the	idea	that	the	young	
boy	 is	 being	 hunted	 down	 by	 some	 kind	 of	 anonymous	 institution.	 Given	 the	 lack	 of	
intradiegetic	information	relayed	at	the	beginning,	there	is	no	emotional	attachment,	but	
certainly	an	affective	one.		




























to	 feel,	 typically	 after	 the	 first	 sad	 death	 following	 an	 early	 mistake,	 a	 sense	 of	
responsibility	toward	the	boy,	but	has	little	control	over	the	wider	structures	–	why	he	
must	 survive,	where	he	 is	 going,	 and	 for	what	 purpose.	 There	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 evolution	
within	the	objects	the	boy	can	interact	with	as	you	progress	throughout	the	game,	all	of	




farming	 landscapes,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 game	 marks	 an	 absolute	 rupturing	 of	 bodily	
subjectivity	into	the	unknown	and	eerie	rhetorics	of	the	Unhuman	“huddle.”		




the	 somewhat	 redundant	 narratives	 of	 transcendence	 and	 immateriality	 it	 is	 so	
enmeshed	within	 in	the	contemporary	moment.	Inside	puts	the	phenomenology	of	 the	
flesh	into	action,	as	that	which	shatters	unified	subjectivity	and	looks	towards	communal,	









away	from	itself.67	 If	we	 looked	to	VR	to	acknowledge	the	 limits	of	specifically	human	
action,	agency,	and	access,	then	we	might	more	truthfully	understand	what	the	medium	
can	 make	 possible,	 and	 how	 it	 can	 toy	 with	 the	 notions	 of	 transcendence	 and	 the	
obfuscation	of	materiality.	
The	unhuman	serves	a	particular	purpose	within	the	game,	in	that	it	provides	a	
framework	 of	 compromised	 agency	 which	 is	 central	 to	 the	 game’s	 narrative.	 The	




sporadic	 allusions	 to	unhumanity	 throughout	 the	 game	 congeal	 themselves	 into	what	






















the	 huddle	 moves	 in,	 its	 movement	 is	 largely	 dictated	 by	 the	 nonhuman	 mechanics	
embedded	within	 the	medium	 itself.	This	production	of	unhuman	subjectivity	realises	
some	of	the	interactional	grammars	which	VR	could	look	toward	in	order	to	embed	and	




The	 huddle	 is	 initially	 encountered	 by	 the	 player	 upon	 locating	 a	 vat	within	 a	
building	comprising	of	computer	networking	rooms	and	laboratories.	Human	figures	in	










a	pumping	mechanism	within	 its	enclosure,	as	 if	 it	being	used	as	some	kind	of	energy	
source;	in	this	way,	the	huddle	is	the	functioning	source	of	the	unhuman	network	at	the	
heart	of	the	game,	and	it	is	implied	that	the	huddle	has	been	created	by	an	underground	
entity	 in	 order	 to	 power	 the	 strange,	 experimental	 puzzles	 the	 player	 participates	 in	
throughout	the	rest	of	the	story.	The	experiments	are	predominantly	focused	on	mind	







according	 to	Alexander	Galloway	 and	Eugene	Thacker’s	 theorisation	 in	The	Exploit:	 A	
Theory	of	Networks	 (2007)	can	be	read	as	an	emergence	of	 the	unhuman	via	network	



















and	always	potential,	emerging	at	 the	point	of	new	synergies	 that	are	 impersonal	and	
intersubjective.	 The	 swarm,	 as	 one	 unhuman	 unit,	 marks	 the	 dissolution	 of	 human	
subjectivity	towards	an	aggregate	phenomenology.	The	huddle	is	the	realisation	of	the	
unhuman	swarm	in	Inside,	in	the	way	that	it	maintains	an	elemental	human	feel	(flesh),	
but	 produces	 an	 entirely	 new	 aggregate	 entity.	 Galloway	 and	 Thacker	 argue	 that	
unhuman	figurations	capture	the	“tension	between	unitary	aggregation	and	anonymous	
distribution,	 between	 the	 intentionality	 of	 the	 network	 as	 an	 ‘abstract	 whole.’”70	The	
Exploit	sees	the	unhuman	as	a	marker	of	the	underlying	agency	of	networks	that	monitor	
and	control	human	subjects.	This	analysis	of	networks	reveals	the	nonhuman	elements	
that	 come	 to	 inform	 our	 understandings	 of	 human	 subjectivity	 as	 it	 is	 (re)produced	
through	digital	 technologies	 in	 the	 form	of	bits	 and	atoms.	The	unhuman	 reveals	 and	
breaks	down	the	valorisation	of	the	human	subject	as	absolute	agent,	and	allows	access	













game,	 the	ways	 through	which	 the	 technologies	 present	within	 its	world	 reconfigure	
subjectivity,	and	their	inherent	implications.	The	huddle	is	the	subjectivity	which	powers	
the	network	it	 is	controlled	by;	 its	brute	matter	 is	an	energy	source.	 In	this	sense,	 the	
world	 of	 Inside	 is	 depicted	 as	 one	 giant	 network-body.	 Its	 entanglements	 of	 wires,	













The	 affective	 tie	 between	 the	 player	 and	 the	 huddle	 is	marked	 by	 a	 fluid	 and	
unstable	link	between	the	actions	they	take	through	the	control	pad,	the	feedback	sent	














Though	 the	huddle	 is	 horrific	 and	yields	 its	 own	unruly	 corporeal	 agency,	 it	 is	
seemingly	bound	to	the	underground	corporate	entity	that	created	it	in	the	first	place.	
The	 huddle	 remains,	 to	 some	 degree,	 ungraspable;	 it	 enables	 a	 reconsideration	 of	
valorised	player	control	as	a	means	of	progression	through	the	gameworld.	The	affective	
modality	 of	 interacting	 with	 a	 videogame	 marks	 the	 medium’s	 capacity	 to	 attend	 to	
realms	 beyond	 the	 human,	 producing	 new	 agencies	which	 escape	 and	 exceed	 human	
grasp.	This	sense	of	ungraspability	does	not	necessarily	reference	a	literal	holding	onto	








do	 little	 justice	 they	 do	 to	 a	 medium	 which	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 push	 these	 unruly	
interactions	even	further.	Like	Inside,	VR	should	ask	more	of	 its	audiences	to	consider	
agents	 beyond	 themselves.	 The	 most	 memorable	 moments	 of	 VR	 experiences,	






















of	his	world.”73	There	 is	a	multidimensional	agential	problem	at	 the	core	of	 the	game,	












environment	 in	 order	 to	 solve	 the	puzzles.	 Yet	 these	puzzles	 become	more	 and	more	
complex,	as	the	dimensions	of	the	networks	in	the	game	reveal	themselves.	






unhuman	 bodies,	moving	 in	 perfect	 synchronicity	 towards	 an	 unknown	 location.	 Not	
dissimilarly	to	the	mind-controlled	pigs	earlier	in	the	game,	these	figures	move	as	if	they	





























synchronous	 rhythm	 of	 the	 system	 warrants	 death,	 and	 the	 puzzle	 restarts.	 Such	
unhuman	 bodily	 rhetorics	 mark	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 unhuman	 subject	 under	 “the	



















is	 evident	 that	 more	 “human”	 bodies	 are	 surveilling	 and	 monitoring	 the	 “unhuman”	
bodies,	and	this	is	primarily	revealed	by	the	bodily	rhetorics	each	of	the	bodies	enact.	The	
unhuman	bodies	slouch	and	stumble	forward,	their	faces	not	even	looking	in	the	direction	
they	 are	 walking.	 They	 seemingly	 resemble	 the	 undead,	 the	 zombie	 –	 a	 kind	 of	
regurgitated	 stumble.	 They	 represent	 a	 compromised	 form	 of	 (un)humanity	 that	 is	























they	 come	 to	 small	 generators	 that	 the	 boy	 is	 able	 to	 unplug.	 When	 unplugging	 the	
generators,	they	spark	and	force	the	boy	to	retreat	backwards.	Such	an	act	is	made	to	feel	
as	though	it	is	a	form	of	resistance,	not	just	in	the	way	it	feels	as	though	it	is	a	breakage	




















a	network	which	 the	player	has	participated	 in.	 It	 is	 implied	 that	 the	boy	might	have	
actually	been	the	central	unhuman	subject	of	the	game	from	the	outset.	The	implication	
that	 the	boy	 is	also	being	controlled	 inadvertently	 implicates	 the	player	 in	 the	game’s	

















feelings	 gameworlds	 are	 able	 to	 produce.	 Feelings	 move	 from	 fear	 to	 frustration,	
monotony	to	excitement,	simplicity	to	impossibility,	fulfilment	and	emptiness.	Though	all	
games	 necessarily	 implicate	 some	 of	 these	 feelings,	 Inside	 asks	 of	 its	 players	 to	 truly	
acknowledge	how	it	feels	to	be	played;	its	affective	impact	is	realised	through	aligning	















produces	on	 the	player.	 It	 is	a	game	that	provides	some	of	 the	grammars	 for	 thinking	
through	the	unhuman,	flesh,	agency,	and	access	that	VR	should	attend	to;	on	the	whole,	




































complexities	 of	 agency,	 access,	 and	 phenomenological	 representations	 of	 frameless	
worlds.	Taking	into	account	the	concrete	‘framings’	of	VR	in	Chapter	1,	and	their	erosion	
into	flesh	in	this	chapter,	the	following	looks	more	closely	at	‘weird	affect,’	as	it	has	been	
introduced	 in	 this	 chapter.	 Building	 out	 of	 this	 chapter’s	 attention	 to	 presence	 as	 the	













	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Jussi	Parikka,	Insect	Media.	
	
Thus	far,	this	thesis	has	considered	two	varying	approaches	to,	and	interpretations	of,	
framelessness.	 The	 first	 chapter	 sought	 to	 break	 down	 the	 popular	 framings	 of	 VR,	
arguing	that	the	reliance	on	limitlessness	and	total	experiential	freedom	ultimately	offers	
unrealistic	valorisations	of	user	agency	and	access	in	the	contemporary	VR	space.	To	this	
end,	 the	 first	 chapter	 introduced	 framelessness	 as	 an	 ideological	 challenge	 to	 this	
narrative—one	 that	 simultaneously	 challenges	 humanist	 ideals,	 whilst	 offering	 new	


























continue	 to	 toy	 with	 the	 established	 terminologies	 surrounding	 VR,	 and	 explore	
alternative	experiences,	 representations	and	theoretical	approaches	 to	 immersion.	Not	
unlike	presence,	immersion	has	become	a	somewhat	elusive	word	in	both	the	marketing	
of	 VR,	 and	 descriptions	 of	 its	 use.	 As	 has	 been	 previously	 discussed,	 the	 framings	 of	
immersion	have	become	synonymous	with	VR	hardware	itself;	its	capacity	to	submerge	
users,	 as	 if	 in	water,2	 into	virtual	worlds	governed	by	alternative	 logics	and	 rules	has	
become	the	technology’s	definitional	and	experiential	centre.	VR	experiences	are	difficult	
to	narrate;	there	is	not	yet	a	prevalent	discourse	which	allows	users	to	wholly	capture	

















claim	 that	 glitches	 do	 not	 necessarily	 ‘break’	 immersion.	 In	 fact,	 they	 produce	 a	 new	
opportunity	for	a	certain	kind	of	immersion	in	worlds	that	are	not	created	for	the	user,	










mediated	 error,	 including	 glitch	 and	 noise.	 Overall,	 the	 chapter	 wants	 to	 utilise	 the	
narrativization	 of	 weirdness	 to	 further	 understand	 immersion	 in	 worlds	 not-for-us3	
(humans),	where	the	world	recedes	from	us	as	opposed	to	welcoming	us	in.	This,	it	will	
argue,	is	the	emergence	of	frameless	immersion—a	form	of	immersion	that	is	more	than	




the	 weird	 and	 weirdness	 will	 come	 later	 in	 this	 chapter.	 However,	 to	 offer	 a	 brief	
definition,	 the	weird	might	 be	 considered	 as	 that	which	marks	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	
human	with	 an	 unknown	Outside,	 a	 place	 or	 being	 that	 is	 completely	 other	 than	 the	
human/world.	 Oftentimes,	 weird	 fiction	 relays	 the	 affective	 and	 phenomenological	
(human)	responses	to	encounters	with	worlds	and	other-than-human	beings	that	defy	
the	coded	logics	of	the	human	world.	As	we	have	seen	already,	unhuman	subjectivity	sees	

























etymology	 of	 immersion	 already	 unpicked	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 and	 argue	 that	





worlds,	 and	 enweird	 the	 technology	 for	 the	 user.	 The	 enmeshing	 of	 glitch,	 noise,	 and	
immersion	 in	 this	chapter	will	exemplify	another	 form	of	 frameless	 fiction	which	sees	
mediated	error	not	as	counterproductive,	but	as	disruptive	and	revelatory.	
At	this	stage	of	VR	development,	the	novel	feelings	produced	by	entering	a	virtual	


























is	 like	 a	 vibration	 or	 a	 shimmering,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 shimmering	 is	 based	 on	





realm,	 and	 the	 system	which	 produces	 it;	 the	 VR	 user	 is	 not	 simply	 an	 observer,	 but	
affective,	 affecting,	 and	 affected	by	 the	 encounters.	 Kozel	 defines	 affect	 as	 “bleed[ing]	
across	the	borders	of	a	single	body,”	describing	it	as	“more	like	a	cloud:	it	is	as	likely	to	
be	 creepy	 as	 it	 is	 euphoric	 and	 it	 does	 not	 just	 come	 from	 bodies,	 but	 encompasses	
objects,	structures,	animals,	systems,	and	all	things	environmental.”8	She	describes	affect	
as	 being	 part	 of	 an	 ecological	 essence	 which	 extends	 beyond	 the	 human	 subject,	
considering	 the	ways	affect	 flows	amongst	all	 things	within	a	given	environment.	 It	 is	
through	this	ecological	essence	of	affect	that	I	associate	VR	with	the	genre	of	the	weird	
and	the	manifestation	of	weird	affect:	the	weird	challenges	human	agency	and	access	in	





I	will	 be	 investigating	 Jeff	 Vandermeer’s	 2014	 novel	Annihilation,	 and	 the	 film	
adaptation	of	the	same	name	(Alex	Garland,	2018)	as	my	central	case	studies	here,	works	
of	weird	fiction	that,	I	argue,	give	novel	insights	into	the	intersections	of	the	weird	and	











error.	 In	Garland’s	adaptation,	 the	CGI	rendering	of	 the	novel’s	central	setting,	Area	X,	
sees	natural	phenomena	blended	with	mediated	 imagery;	 it	 is	 captured	by	a	 series	of	
perceptual	glitches	which	mark	the	limits	of	the	human	world.	For	example,	the	borders	
of	the	landscape	presented	in	the	film	replicate	a	kind	of	seeping	interface	to	represent	
its	 otherworldliness	 and	 the	 weirdness	 of	 its	 infrastructure.	 In	 order	 to	 realise	 this	
chapter’s	 claim	 that	 glitch,	 noise,	 and	 immersion	 can	 form	 a	 shared	 dialectic,	 it	 will	
analyse	 the	 narration	 and	 visual	 representations	 of	 experiential	 glitches	 within	
Annihilation	as	a	form	of	frameless	immersion.	It	will	consider	the	ways	that	the	texts’	
narration	of	weird	entities	shares	common	ground	with	experiences	of	unruly	mediation,	
as	 they	 both	 seek	 to	 reveal	 the	 underlying	 contours	 of	 perceived	 realities	 –unruly	
mediation	 unravels	 the	 black-boxed	 architectures	 of	 technology,	 where	 the	 weird	
unravels	 the	 façade	 of	 human	 logic	 and	understanding	 by	 revealing	 their	 limits.	 Both	
instances	 also	 allude	 to	 agencies	 beyond	 the	 human,	 and	 simultaneously	 produce	
unsettling	and	disorienting	affects	for	characters,	readers,	and	viewers	alike.	
Mapping	 out	 this	 chapter’s	 trajectory,	 it	 will	 firstly	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	





ways	 existing	 definitions	 speak	 to	 specific	 conceptualisations	 of	 VR’s	 ‘insides’	 and	
‘outsides,’	its	insides	being	that	of	a	user	being	immersed	wholly	in	a	virtual	world,	and	
outsides	being	 the	hardware,	body,	and	 ‘real	world’	environment.	 In	order	 to	offer	an	
alternative	to	these	persistent	framings,	I	will	then	turn	more	closely	to	Eugene	Thacker’s	
positioning	 of	 phenomenological	 and	 planetary	 insides	 and	 outsides,	 as	 that	which	 is	
familiar	and	unfamiliar	to	human	experience.	With	Thacker’s	work	in	mind,	the	chapter	
then	turns	towards	the	theoretical	discussions	of	‘the	weird’	and	its	relationship	to	affect;	
establishing	 that	 affect	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 pull	 immersion	 away	 from	 the	
dualistic	inside/outside	model.	It	will	then	look	closely	at	Jeff	Vandermeer’s	Annihilation	









inherently	 weird	 encounters	 in	 the	 ways	 that	 they	 enweird	 the	 ontologies	 between	
human	and	machine;	this	sub-section	looks	closely	at	the	manifestos	of	Rosa	Menkman	





the	 visualisation	 of	mediated	 error.	 	 My	 hope	 is	 that	 this	 chapter	will	 allow	 for	 new	
considerations	of	the	ways	VR	development	can	embrace	the	unruly,	and	how	developers	
might	work	alongside	the	limitations	posed	by	the	technology.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	











immersion	 itself	 remains	 relatively	 obscure.	 In	 the	 realm	 of	 contemporary	 virtual	
environments,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 ‘realism’	 of	 a	 mediated	 world	 has	 become	 the	
predominant	factor	in	determining	its	immersive	potential.		
As	one	example	of	the	contemporary	reliance	on	the	term	“immersion”	to	convey	







“nothing	 less	 than	 total	 immersion,	 the	 sensation	 of	 a	 lived	 experience.”10	 In	
contemporary	discourse,	 immersion	has	come	closer	and	closer	 to	being	synonymous	
with	 recreating	 the	 experience	 of	 reality.	 This	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 stilt	 the	 exciting	
potentials	 VR	 offers,	 if	 it	 simply	 becomes	 the	 endless	 pursuit	 of	 the	 recreation	 of	 the	
perception	of	the	real	world.	The	framing	of	immersion-as-realism	is	seductive,	because	
it	 is	 comfortable.	 However,	 a	 world’s	 detail	 doesn’t	 necessarily	 make	 it	 welcoming;	
enticing	worlds,	as	we	will	come	to	see,	can	still	resist	us	in	ways	that	are	not	lifelike,	but	
fundamentally	weird.	
Mel	 Slater’s	 work	 is	 often	 cited	 in	 academic	 work	 exploring	 definitions	 of	
immersion	in	regards	to	VR	experiences	specifically.	In	earlier	work	written	with	Sylvia	
Wibur	(1997),	Slater	and	Wilbur	define	immersion	as	“the	idea	of	external,	objectively	
measurable	 characteristics	 that	 lead	 to	 a	 capability	 of	 placing	 an	 individual	 inside	 a	
computer	generated	environment.”11	In	a	1996	article,	Slater	points	to	immersion	as	“an	
objective	 description	 of	what	 any	 particular	 system	does	 provide.”12	 In	 a	 later	 article	
written	in	2009,	Slater	reflects	on	his	earlier	definitions	of	immersion,	stating:	
	
by	 definition,	 one	 system	 would	 be	 more	 ‘immersive’	 than	 another	 if	 it	 were	
superior	 on	 at	 least	 one	 characteristic	 above—for	 example,	 higher	 display	
resolution	or	more	extensive	tracking,	other	things	being	equal.13		
	
In	 this	 regard,	 Slater	 suggests	 that	 superior	 systems	 allow	 for	 increased	 immersivity.	


















the	 system.”15	 Slater’s	 definitions	 of	 immersion	 place	 emphasis	 on	 the	 quantifiable	
elements	of	the	experience	and	on	the	capabilities	of	the	hardware’s	capacity	to	mimic	











There	 is	 some	 novelty	 to	 be	 restored	 to	 the	 term	 immersion	 by	 looking	 at	 its	
origins	 and	 lineage	 within	 mediums	 other	 than	 contemporary	 virtual	 environments.	
Much	 of	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 immersion	 and	 immersive	 experiences	 draws	 on	
ontological	‘insides’	and	‘outsides.’	The	inside	is	oftentimes	considered	to	be	the	virtual	
environment	(the	world	displayed	on	the	interface)	whilst	the	outside	is	that	of	the	real	
world	 (the	 physical	 space	 where	 the	 body	 of	 the	 user	 moves).	 Marie	 Laure	 Ryan’s	
Narrative	 as	 Virtual	 Reality	 (2001)	 considered	 the	 ways	 immersion	 manifests	 in	 the	
reading	of	textual	narratives,	where	readers	engage	in	an	“imaginative	relationship	to	a	
textual	 world,”	 forging	 “an	 experience	 through	 which	 a	 fictional	 world	 acquires	 the	
presence	of	 an	 autonomous,	 language-independent	 reality	populated	with	 live	human	
beings.”16	Ryan’s	work	illustrates	a	taxonomy	of	immersion	in	relation	to	textual	worlds.	
Firstly,	she	defines	‘Spatial	Immersion’	as	the	blending	of	the	reader’s	private	landscape	
with	 the	 textual	 geography,	 providing	 a	 sense	 of	 security	 and	 rootedness.	 She	 then	
explores	 ‘Spatial-Temporal	 Immersion’	 as	 the	 reduction	 of	 distance	between	narrator	















we	 see	 that	 immersion	 stands	 in	 for	 the	 coming	 together	of	 the	 ‘experiencer’	 and	 the	
virtual	 world	 –	 where	 the	 space	 and	 time	 of	 the	 real	 world	 are	 reproduced.	 Little	














empirical	 study,	 Bell	 et	 al	 concluded	 that	 immersion	manifests	 as	 a	 “fully	 embodied,	

















framings	 of	 inside	 and	 outside,	 replacing	 them	 with	 an	 Outside,	 the	 realm	 of	




haven	 inside,	 either.	 In	 order	 to	 further	 understand	 how	 we	 might	 reconceptualise	
immersion	to	encompass	experiences	that	extend	beyond	realism,	we	might	consider	the	
ways	we	can	become	immersed	in	worlds	that	resist	us.		
	 Before	 turning	 to	 the	 weird,	 I	 look	 to	 Eugene	 Thacker’s	 philosophical	 tiers	 of	
worldly	familiarity	found	in	his	Horror	of	Philosophy	series.	Within	this	series,	Thacker	
explores	 the	 ways	 philosophical	 enquiry	 inherently	 evokes	 horror	 through	 its	
demarcation	of	insides	and	outsides,	in	the	ways	that	it	highlights	the	absolute,	horrific	
unknowability	 of	 the	 world.	 For	 Thacker,	 ‘the	 inside’	 alludes	 to	 that	 which	 is	










it.	 Following	 this,	 Thacker	 refers	 to	 the	 “world-in-itself,”	which	 is	 the	world	which	 is	
described	as	 “biting	back,”	 the	world	 in	an	 “inaccessible,	 already-given	state”22	 that	 is	










essentially	 attempt	 to	 frame	 the	world	 and	 give	 it	meaning.	 Thacker	 delineates	 these	





Planet,	 is	 always	 already	beyond	 the	human.	Between	 these	 conceptualisations	of	 the	

















change,	 natural	 disasters,	 the	 energy	 crisis,	 and	 the	 progressive	 extinction	 of	
species	world-wide24	
	










access	 to	 this	 “world	 outside”	 by	 enabling	 specific	 representations	 of	 the	 non-human	
entering	the	human	world,	and	offering	a	series	of	encounters	which	disrupt	the	world	
as	it	is	enframed	within	human	thinking.		
Thacker’s	 approach	 gives	 some	 useful	 insight	 into	 the	 validity	 of	 limitation,	 a	
framework	which	disorients	the	human	subject	from	the	centre	of	a	universe	that	is	never	
for	us.	In	so	doing,	Thacker	almost	looks	at	the	history	of	phenomenological	thinking	from	
an	 outside,	 looking	 at	 human	 experience	 and	 saying	 “this	 is	 never	 enough.”	 This	
philosophy	of	insides	and	outsides	is	wholly	different	to	understandings	of	the	insides	
and	outsides	which	prevail	in	writing	on	“immersive”	experiences.	But	Thacker’s	Horror	




doesn’t	 do	 exactly	 as	 we	 tell	 it	 to.	 This	 is	 where	 givenness	 is	 compromised,	 and	 we	
embrace	the	persistent	unknowability	of	the	world,	instead	of	trying	to	conquer	it.	The	
horror	that	Eugene	Thacker	alludes	to	is	an	affect	which	emerges	when	we	acknowledge	







As	we	have	 seen,	 conceptions	of	 immersion	are	often	 rooted	within	a	dualistic	
ontological	model	of	insides	and	outsides.	Yet	if	we	reconceptualise	what	these	‘insides’	
and	 ‘outsides’	 are,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 further	 understand	 the	 affective	 implications	 of	
immersion	in	worlds	that	do	not	place	user	agency	and	access	at	their	centre.	Rather	than	
an	 unfurling	 coming-into-contact	 with	 a	 world	 never	 wholly	 in	 reach,	 immersion	 is	
commonly	synonymous	with	the	affects	of	submersion,	requiring	users	to	adapt	to	new	
conditions.	We	might	 instead	draw	watery	 inspiration	 from	 immersion’s	 etymological	
roots	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 porous	 nature	 of	 immersion,	 not	 as	 an	 all-encompassing	
experience,	 but	 one	 that	 instead	 ebbs	 and	 flows	 in	 real-time.	 It	 is	 here	 that	 I	 turn	 to	
















worlds	 beyond	 human	 perception.	 The	 weird	 pushes	 at	 the	 borders	 of	 other	 known	
genres,	including	horror	and	science	fiction,	but	resists	generic	classification.26		In	both	
works	of	fiction	and	philosophical	thought,	the	weird	is	invested	in	the	narration	of	things	





Gilman’s	 dreams	 consisted	 largely	 in	 plunges	 through	 limitless	 abysses	 of	
inexplicably	 coloured	 twilight	 and	 bafflingly	 disordered	 sound;	 abysses	whose	




















architecture,	 geometrical	 patternings,	 and	 “unearthly	 symmetry”	 of	 the	 house.	 In	 the	
excerpt	above,	we	see	the	narrator	describing	Gilman’s	incapacity	to	explain	the	worlds	






his	 subjectivity,	 is	 made	 to	 feel	 “grotesque;”	 this	 element	 of	 bodily	 horror	 has	 been	
explored	in	Chapter	2,	and	will	be	returned	to	in	more	detail	 in	the	following	chapter.	
Here,	however,	it	is	worth	noting	that	Lovecraft’s	narration	almost	reads	as	the	glitching	
projection	of	a	body	 in	another	environment:	when	 in	 the	dream	space,	Gilmore	 feels	
othered	 from	 his	 own	 body,	 yet	 immersed	 within	 the	 “limitless	 abysses”	 of	 his	





and	 comfortable	 form	 of	 realism.	 Rather,	 it	 turns	 to	 the	 body	 as	 the	 locus	 of	 feeling	
immersed	in	strange	sensations	and	affects	of	the	space	beyond	the	familiar	world.	Weird	
fiction	provides	an	avenue	through	which	to	interpret	immersion	in	worlds	not-for-us,	











I	 used	 to	 introduce	 this	 thesis.	 It	 is,	 with	 this	 exploration	 of	weird	 texts	written	 and	




	In	 his	work	The	Weird	 and	 the	 Eerie,	 influential	 cultural	 theorist	Mark	 Fisher	
responds	to	a	letter	written	by	Lovecraft	in	1972	to	the	editor	of	Weird	Tales,	where	‘The	
Dreams	in	the	Witch	House’	was	originally	published.	In	the	letter,	Lovecraft	asked	for	
the	 collective	 of	 magazine	 writers	 to	 “leave	 humanity	 and	 terrestrialism	 at	 the	
threshold.”30	 Lovecraft	 indicates	 that	 in	 order	 to	write	weird	 fiction	 successfully,	 one	
must	 attempt	 to	 narrate	 the	 unknowability	 of	 the	 world.	 Responding	 to	 Lovecraft’s	
request	in	his	own	work	written	four	decades	later,	Fisher	notes:	
	





in	 order	 for	 its	 alien	 contours	 to	 be	 realised.	He	 describes	 the	weird	 as	 a	 hint	 at	 the	





















The	 weird,	 then,	 is	 premised	 upon	 interplay	 and	 exchange:	 as	 opposed	 to	 being	
submerged	in	a	world,	as	is	suggested	by	the	etymology	of	immersion,	weird	encounters	
mark	a	complex	entanglement	between	here	and	there,	the	familiar	and	unfamiliar.	
	 The	 author	 of	 Annihilation,	 Jeff	 Vandermeer,	 discusses	 the	 emergence	 of	
weirdness	in	literature	in	his	own	critical	writings	about	the	genre	that	best	captures	his	












which	 he	 describes	 as	 “minimal	 allegorical	 displacements	 of	 the	 human,”35	 the	weird	
would	alternatively	be	concerned	with	the	tentacle	or	 limb-type,	 that	 is	“suggestive	of	
absolute	alterity.”36	Roger	Luckhurst	describes	the	weird	as	being	“difficult”	and	“elusive”	
in	 the	way	 that	 it	 “dissolves	generic	glue.”37	 In	particular,	Luckhurst	suggests	 that	 the	
weird	 is	a	 “mode	that	offers	a	 formal	rendition	of	perversity,	understood	as	a	 twisting	























China	 Miéville	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 octopus	 is	 the	 actualisation	 of	 what	 he	 terms	 a	
problematised	ontology,	suggesting	that	the	octopus’	tentacle	marks	“the	epochal	shift	to	
a	weird	culture.”41	In	his	articulation	of	the	tentacular,	chaotic	weirdness	of	the	octopus,	
Miéville	 discusses	 the	 impossibility	 of	 the	 merging	 of	 human	 subjectivity	 with	 the	
absolute	 alterity	 of	 the	 weird	 and	 suggests	 rather	 that	 there	 is	 a	 “haptic	 flirtation”42	
between	the	two.	The	notion	of	this	“haptic	flirtation”	provides	something	of	a	significant	
approach	to	the	ways	we	understand	embodiment	in	virtual	spaces.	A	haptic	encounter	
which	 at	 once	 forges	 an	 interaction	 between	 the	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 does	 not	




that	 “the	 octopus	 should,	 with	 the	 oozability	 of	 Weird	 skin,	 merge	 with	 the	 skull	 to	
become	a	skulltopus,”43	yet	acknowledges	 that	 this	 is	never	possible;	 though	 the	skull	
marks	the	loss	of	humanity,	the	antiquity	of	the	human	remains.	The	tentacular	weird,	
Miéville	 argues,	 “enweird[s]	 ontology	 itself.”44	Miévelle’s	 configuration	 of	 the	 octopus	
morphology	provides	a	useful	insight	into	the	contact	points	of	worlds	of	alterity,	those	
which	do	not	 have	 the	 human	 at	 their	 centre.	 Though	Mieville	 argues	 that	 touch	 and	





















human	 access	 and	 agency.	 When	 virtual	 environments,	 (particularly	 those	 that	 are	
proximal	to	our	bodies)	do	things	we	do	not	expect,	they	become	weird.	They	reveal	the	





I	 want	 to	 return	 to	 the	 personal	 experience	 of	 a	 VR	 glitch	 that	 I	 relayed	 at	 the	 very	
beginning	of	the	thesis,	the	moment	where	my	body	moved	so	abruptly	in	fright	during	a	
horror	 game	 that	 the	 head	 of	 my	 avatar	 came	 away	 from	 its	 body.	 I	 return	 to	 this	
experience	because	we	can	look	at	it	anew	in	the	context	of	the	weird	and	understand	it	
differently:		though	anecdotal,	I	use	this	as	a	visceral	example	of	the	unruly	interactions	
that	 can	 occur	 between	 bodies	 and	 virtual	 environments	 through	 contemporary	 VR	
devices.	 This	 unruly	 interaction	 added	 even	 more	 fright,	 but	 also	 possibility,	 to	 the	
narrative	that	I	was	experiencing.	In	thinking	about	the	oozability	of	the	world	as	my	body	
came	into	contact	with	it,	or	the	ontological	and	affective	fluidity	of	the	environment,	it	
struck	 me	 during	 that	 encounter	 that	 immersion	 and	 glitchiness	 might	 be	 able	 to	
simultaneously	co-emerge.	








the	 experiential	 glitch:	 humans	 come	 into	 contact	 with	 weird	 entities	 that	 reveal	 the	
underlying	contours	of	the	‘realities’	they	perceive.	This	is	not	dissimilar	to	the	potentials	







idea	 of	 the	 beyond	 human	 (that	 makes	 itself	 present	 precisely	 through	 coming	 into	
contact	with	humanity)	is	prevalent	throughout	Vandermeer’s	novel,	especially	via	the	
capturing	 of	 the	 perceptual	 flux	 between	 the	 organic/non-organic,	 still/moving,	
object/organism.	 Each	 entity	 in	 the	 text	 is	 mutative,	 subtly	 changing	 beneath	 their	
respective	surfaces.	The	tower	that	the	protagonist	slowly	makes	her	way	towards	in	the	
text,	the	example	which	is	central	in	my	analysis	below,	marks	a	kind	of	experiential	glitch	
where	 a	 stone	 structure	 takes	 on	 a	 fleshy,	 living,	 and	 organic	 presence.	 The	 filmic	
representation	of	Annihilation	represents	the	contours	of	Area	X,	the	central	setting	of	
the	narrative,	through	various	forms	of	visual	glitch,	and	disruptive	digital	imagery	enacts	
Vandermeer’s	 visceral	 narrative	 descriptions	 of	 the	 area’s	 mutating	 surfaces.	









and	 short	 stories	 is	 still	 emerging.45	At	 this	 stage,	 the	 relatively	 small	 pool	 of	writing	








implications	 and	 its	 voicing	 of	 the	 nonhuman.	 Finola	 Anne	 Prendergast,	 for	 example,	
considers	Annihilation’s	underlying	ethical	backdrop,	and	the	ways	in	which	the	novel’s	
weird	 genre	 tropes	 “can	 forward	 theoretical	 conversations	 about	 environmental	
ethics.”46	 Prendergast	 argues	 that	 the	 novel’s	 “use	 of	 horror	 tropes	 implicitly	
acknowledges	human	anxiety	about	value	 systems	 that	 accord	human	and	nonhuman	
lives	 the	 same	 value.”47	 Though	 ecological	 implications	 are	 evidentially	 central	 to	
Vandermeer’s	worldbuilding,	I	want	to	shift	the	ecological	frameworks	in	which	his	work	
is	positioned	and	address	the	co-emergence	of	the	natural	and	technological	in	the	text’s	
transition	 from	 novel	 to	 film.	 In	 particular,	 the	 depiction	 of	 what	 is	 labelled	 as	 ‘The	
Shimmer’	 in	Garland’s	 film	adaptation	uses	 the	visual	replication	of	mediated	error	 to	









Annihilation	narrates	 the	 experiences	 of	 nameless	 characters,	 labelled	 only	 by	





the	 first-person	perspective	of	 the	protagonist,	 “the	biologist,”	who	writes	of	her	real-
time	 experiences	 in	 a	 field	 journal.	 The	 film	 adaptation	 follows	 a	 similar	 storyline	 to	
Vandermeer’s	novel,	but	instead	refers	only	to	the	border	which	encompasses	the	area,	
which	is	labelled	as	‘the	shimmer.’	The	film,	starring	Natalie	Portman,	visually	narrates	











coming-into-contact	 with	 the	 strange	 Outside	 of	 the	 novel’s	 central	 setting.	 Area	 X,	 I	






exceeding	of	human	comprehension	 is	what	makes	 the	space	 inherently	weird,	as	 the	







the	 text,	 each	 individual	 entity	 individually	 marking	 strange	 encroachings	 onto	 the	
human	world	by	the	other-than-human.	According	to	Mark	Fisher,	one	of	the	central	ways	
in	which	the	weird	impresses	itself	on	the	human	subject	is	via	the	“rhythms,	pulsions	
and	 patternings	 of	 the	 nonhuman.”48	 The	 nonhuman	 evokes	 weirdness	 through	 its	
decentralising	of	 the	human	world.	The	 landscape	of	Area	X	 in	Vandermeer’s	novel	 is	
scattered	with	subtle	hints	 towards	 the	nonhuman	entities	which	reside	within	 it.	We	
predominantly	encounter	the	environment	through	the	first-person	perceptions	of	the	
biologist.	In	contrast	to	her	ecological	expertise,	the	landscape	of	Area	X	is	unruly	–	her	










the	 human	 structures	 maintain	 a	 stasis,	 whilst	 nonhuman	 elements	 and	 organisms	
continue	to	thrive	and	mutate	with	an	unsettling	momentum.	The	landscape,	for	example,	
appears	to	be	constantly	“giving	way,”49	where	the	crumbling	human	infrastructures	are	
described	as	 “sunken,”	 “rotting,”	 “rusted”	or	 “buried	 in	dirt.”50	The	 landscape	 radiates	
strange	 illusions	of	absolute	stillness,	with	hints	 towards	subtle,	persistent	movement	
which	 marks	 the	 continual	 growth	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 within	 its	 unruly	 ecology.	 The	
biologist	notes	that	the	stillness	within	the	area	dulls	their	“ability	to	gauge	direction,”	
describing	the	water	that	“never	stirred,	set	like	glass”	and	“the	constant	motionless	rain	







most	 explicitly	 articulated	 through	 the	 ways	 the	 biologist	 perceives,	 and	 affectively	
encounters,	the	nonhuman	counterparts	scattered	throughout	the	world	of	the	novel,	all	
of	which	simultaneously	evoke	both	fear	and	awe.	One	example	is	the	group’s	discovery	
of	a	 strange	 foreboding	 tower	 that	 “plunges	 into	 the	earth”51	as	 if	dropped	 there.	The	
tower	provides	the	setting	of	many	of	the	strange	encounters	that	occur	throughout	the	
novel;	its	walls	and	floors	are	colonised	by	strange	and	beautiful	ecologies	of	plants	and	





also	 a	 mimicry	 of	 the	 symptoms	 of	 illness	 and	 dread	 simultaneously.	 The	 biologist’s	

















































walls	of	 the	 tower,	and	 this	 ‘infection’	enables	her	 to	perceive	hidden	elements	of	 the	
frameless	world	that	surrounds	her.	
Area	 X	 is	 narrated	 as	 a	 dense	 ecological	 landscape	 that	 blends	 the	
animate/inanimate,	dead	object/living	tissue,	nonhuman/human.	Such	representations,	
and	 the	 consequent	 transgression	 of	 ontological	 categories,	 share	 similarities	 with	




characters’	 interactions	with	Area	X	 illustrate	 the	 capacity	 of	weird	 fiction	 to	 capture	
ambivalent	affects	within	immersive	worlds.		
Vandermeer’s	text	uses	the	human	body	as	a	jumping	off	point,	a	way	of	framing	
the	 ungraspable	 essence	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 world	 which	 “encroaches	 on	 the	 human	
subject.”52	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	weird	also	 realises	an	approach	which	 recognises	human	
embodiment,	but	makes	the	valorisation	of	human	subjectivity	impossible.	The	weird	is	
premised	on	 the	 compromising	 of	 human	access	 and	 agency,	 rather	using	 the	human	
body	to	give	voice	to	everything	which	is	not	human;	the	octopus	tentacle	reaches	out	
and	touches	the	human	body,	and	retreats	back	into	its	mysterious	abyss.	The	weird	finds	



























As	mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	chapter,	 I	make	 the	case	 that	glitches	can	be	
aligned	 with	 immersion	 because	 they	 provide	 access	 to	 unexplored	 hardware	
infrastructures,	producing	weird	encounters	with	the	workings	of	the	technology.	I	first	
want	to	tackle	the	aspects	of	mediated	error	and	their	disruptive	potentials;	I	will	then	




artworks	 which	 seek	 to	 challenge	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 user	 in	 an	 age	 of	 ubiquitous	
technological	use.	This	will	be	more	thoroughly	illustrated	in	the	following	chapter,	which	
will	 look	 closely	 at	 the	ways	 that	 interactions	with	 glitchy	media	 inform	 artworks	 of	
spectrality	and	horror,	where	anticipated	flow	is	suddenly	interrupted	by	a	presence	or	
unhuman	being	which	manifests	as	a	disruptor.	We	can	experience	glitches	in	VR	that	we	
never	 anticipate	 will	 happen;	 we	 can	 suddenly	 apprehend	 a	 distortion	 without	
understanding	what	has	caused	it,	or	be	taken	aback	by	the	sudden	jolting	of	the	display.	
In	VR,	glitches	cause	visceral	bodily	reactions	because	they	are	so	proximal	to	our	bodies	






























a	noise	artefact.	She	goes	on	 to	describe	 them	as	being	part	of	a	 “constantly	mutating	
materiality”58	 where	 the	 computer	 is	 neither	 opaque	 nor	 transparent,	 but	 part	 of	 a	
process	of	becoming	that	is,	in	part,	to	do	with	its	interaction	with	human	embodiment	















layering	 “obfuscated	protocols	 that	 find	 their	origin	 in	 ideologies,	 economies,	political	
hierarchies	and	social	conventions.”59		
Menkman	continues	to	explore	the	phenomenological	implications	of	glitch-space	














over	 systems	 which	 exist	 outside	 ourselves	 […]	 The	 glitch’s	 inherent	
moment(um),	the	power	it	needs	or	has	to	pass	through	an	existing	membrane	or	






challenge	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 artist.	 She	 states	 that	 queer	 theory	 itself	 “glitches	 the	
understanding	of	identity	as	a	stable	and	fixed	category	by	introducing	noisy	concepts	


















used	 in	 an	 anticipatory	 way,	 for	 aesthetic	 purposes,	 the	 unique	 affects	 of	 their	

















refer	 to	 the	 overlaying	 of	 glitch	 aesthetics	 onto	 images,	 for	 example,	 a	 planned	
reproduction	of	mediated	error.	
	 Olga	 Goruinova	 and	 Alexei	 Shulgin	 contest	 in	 their	 essay	 ‘Glitch’	 in	 Software	
Studies:	 A	 Lexicon	 that	 glitches	 are	 immediately	 rendered	 as	 aesthetic	 through	 their	
unpredictable	 and	 perceivable	 nature.	 They	 argue	 that	 glitches	 are	 marks	 of	
“(dys)functions,	 re(actions)	 and	 (e)motions	 that	 are	 worked	 out	 in	 human-computer	







nonhuman	 elements	 of	 the	 human-computer	 assemblage.	 Glitches	 enable	 a	 mode	 of	
perception	which	 pushes	 beyond	 the	 boundaries	 of	 human	 understanding,	 creating	 a	


















To	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 multifarious	 types	 of	 error	 which	 bring	 materiality	 to	 the	






a	 rupturing	 of	 subjectivity.	 The	 mutation	 of	 the	 material	 body	 indicated	 “a	 form	 of	











Noise,	 as	 another	 commonly	 cited	 form	 of	 mediated	 error,	 pays	 even	 more	
attention	 to	 the	ways	error	 can	emerge	 through	multisensory	 channels	because	of	 its	
interconnections	with	 the	material.	 In	 her	 continued	 enquiry	 of	mediated	 error,	Rosa	
Menkman	 refers	 to	 noise	 as	 “a	 (often	 undesirable,	 unwanted,	 other	 and	 unordered)	
disturbance,	break,	or	addition	within	the	signal	of	useful	data.”70	Noise	commonly	refers	
to	an	electronic	signal	being	interrupted	or	accompanied	by	an	unwanted	change.	Mark	
Nunes	 describes	 noise	 as	 a	 “symptom	 of	 both	 the	 creation	 of	 errors	 in	 an	 otherwise	
friction	free	system	and	a	way	for	the	system	to	mask	and	distract	from	otherwise	existing	




‘undesirable.’	 In	 this	 regard,	 noise	 is	 another	 form	 of	 affective	 error.	 In	 her	work	 on	
sounding	noise,	Marie	Thompson	argues	for	its	affective	implications	to	take	it	beyond	
popular	connotations	of	the	moralised	polemics	of	“unwanted,	undesirable	or	damaging	





















the	 unanticipated	 allows	 users	 to	 think	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 givenness	 of	 our	
technological	interactions.		
Both	 glitches	 and	 noise	 are	 commonly	 narrated	 as	 negative	 attributes	 which	
disrupt	our	intended	interactions	with	digital	technologies.	Yet	such	interruptions	invite	
temporal	moments	in	which	the	user	is	productively	exposed	to	the	hidden	layers	of	their	
systems.	 With	 both	 phenomena,	 it	 is	 never	 entirely	 clear	 what	 the	 source	 that	 has	
provoked	 the	 occurrence	 is,	 yet	 it	 produces	 a	 weird	 encounter	 which	 alters	 our	
perception	of	a	thing.	As	Thompson	notes:	“when	noise	interrupts,	it	demands	a	reaction;	
it	induces	a	change,	or	modification	in	the	system	that	it	acts	upon.”	(p.17.	She	continues:	
“in	 turn,	noise	can	be	 thought	of	as	productive,	 insomuch	 that	 it	generates	a	systemic	
change;	 for	 better	 or	 for	 worse,	 an	 alternative	 order	 is	 created	 out	 of	 the	moment	 of	
disorder.”	 (p.18)	 There	 should	 be	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 glitch	 and	 noise	 not	 as	
unproductive	 or	 undesirable,	 but	 phenomena	 that	 can	 ultimately	 produce	 new	
understandings	 and	 unique	 encounters	 that	 ultimately	 ignite	 change	 –	 not	 for	 the	
betterment	of	the	individual	user,	but	between	an	assemblage	of	actors.		
	 Both	noise	and	glitch,	I	argue,	should	be	regarded	as	weird	encounters	in	the	ways	
that	 they	 mark	 a	 certain	 form	 of	 encroaching	 on	 the	 human	 subject,	 pushing	 at	 the	
thresholds	 of	 the	 known	 and	 toward	 the	 unknown,	 arguably	 unhuman	 realm	 of	
technological	experience.	 In	 the	moment,	glitches	and/or	noise	emerge	as	particularly	
embodied	phenomena	via	immersive	technologies,	the	ecology	of	human	and	nonhuman	
agents	 implicated	 in	 the	 production	 of	 immersion	 is	made	 present.	 Immersion	 is	 not	
something	that	VR	can	do,	but	something	that	is	influenced	by	a	variety	of	actors.	This	is	
the	 premise	 of	New	Materialist	 notions	 of	 affect,	 and	 something	 that	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	
weird:	affect	 initiates	a	 rethinking	of	ethics	and	 interruption.	 In	her	book	Meeting	 the	


























intra-activity.”	 (p.206)	 Intra-action	 offers	 access	 into	 the	 ways	 material	 is	 always	
becoming,	through	a	mode	of	realism	“that	is	not	premised	on	a	metaphysics	of	essence	




to	 include	 nonhuman	 agents	 which	 reflect	 their	 practice.	 Taking	 the	 idea	 of	 matter	
explored	in	Butler’s	work	on	‘Bodies	That	Matter,’	Barad	notes	that	“matter	is	substance	
































	 I	 want	 to	 spend	 some	 time	 here	 establishing	 a	 new	 taxonomy	 of	 glitches	 that	
reveals	 their	 unique	 affective	 potential	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 immersive	 and	 haptic	 virtual	
environments.	All	of	the	aforementioned	weird	and	unruly	elements	of	glitch	interactions	
are	 experientially	 pushed	 further	 in	 VR	 simulations,	 where	 the	 human-computer	
assemblage	is	perhaps	the	most	proximal	and	felt,	where	the	mediated	world	replaces	
the	 whole	 of	 the	 user’s	 immediate	 perception.	 Thus,	 when	 the	 virtual	 world	 does	
something	 unanticipated,	 the	 user’s	 proprioceptive	 vision	 is	 essentially	 momentarily	
disrupted	via	 random	machinic	error.	Glitches	are	experienced,	more	so	 than	ever,	 as	
wholly	 affective	 and	 immersive	 realms	 of	 new	 understanding:	 the	 user,	 in	 a	 sense,	
perceptually	 encounters	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 system	 in	 an	 affective	 and	
embodied	manner.	It	remains	that	glitches	in	VR,	and	the	feelings	they	produce,	cannot	







My	attempt	 to	generate	a	 taxonomy	of	 glitches,	 then,	 is	not	 to	produce	 further	
anthropomorphised	visions	of	the	glitch.	Rather,	it	is	an	attempt	to	capture	the	unique	
affects	 of	 proximal	 VR	 glitches,	 and	 the	 ways	 technological	 error	 more	 broadly	
encompasses	 moments	 where	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 actors	 interact	 in	 a	 variety	 of	
different	ways.	I	thus	refer	to	my	taxonomy	as	a	‘glitch	ecology,’	the	ways	that	glitches	
and	 their	 interwoven	 affects	 co-emerge	 to	 produce	 new	 embodied	 encounters	which	
bridge	between	ontological	planes.	I	use	the	term	‘ecology’	as	inspired	by	affect	theory;	
Marie-Louise	 Angerer79	 and	 Tonya	 Davidson	 et	 al80	 regard	 ecologies	 as	 micro-
geographies	 through	 which	 affects	 emerge.	 Affective	 ecologies	 mark	 the	 generative	
encounters	 between	 organisms	 and	 things	 external	 to	 them,	 resulting	 in	 a	 change	 in	
condition:	 ecologies	 of	 affect	 capture	 and	 allow	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 production	 of	





experienced	 in	VR,	 but	 it	 also	 incorporates	 the	 types	 of	 glitches	 that	 are	 emerging	 in	
reports	 of	 VR	 experiences	 more	 broadly.	 The	 glitches	 within	 the	 taxonomy	 are	 not	
antagonistic	 to	one	another,	but	come	together	 in	a	cooperative	ecology	through	their	
relationship	 to	 the	 body	 of	 the	 user.	 This	 is	where	 glitches	 in	 VR	 differ	 to	more	well	







potentials	 of	 the	 body	 and	 technology	 coming	 together	 via	 unruly	 encounters.	 Such	
encounters,	I	argue,	ultimately	challenge	the	façade	of	absolute	user	agency;	immersive	













The	 first	 modality	 of	 glitch	 I	 refer	 to	 is	 ‘emergent.’	 An	 emergent	 glitch	 is	
unintentional	 and	 occurs	 randomly	 during	 use	 of	 a	 technology,	 triggering	 an	





something	 the	 developer	 could	 not	 have	 predicted.	 An	 example	 might	 be	 that	 of	 a	
calibration	disruption	in	a	VR	headset,	where	a	sudden	movement	of	the	body	meant	that	
the	 virtual	 environment	 suddenly	 pulls	 away	 from	 the	 body	 of	 the	 user.	 The	 abrupt	
movement	of	the	body,	and	its	concurrent	movement	of	the	hardware	causes	a	glitch	to	
emerge.	 The	 term	 ‘emergence’	 is	 regarded	 as	 the	 capacity	 for	 variation	 outside	 the	



































There	 is	 no	 ‘logical	 explanation’	 for	 why	 the	 glitch	 occurred	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 the	








the	 producer	 of	 the	 artwork.	 Thus,	 the	 glitch	 becomes	 an	 artistic	 indicator	 of	
compromised	human	agency,	making	our	bodies	feel	vulnerable	to	the	entities	that	have	
























the	 game	 Goat	 Simulator,83	 for	 example,	 where	 the	 world	 inherently	 glitches	 for	 the	
purposes	of	humour.	Thus,	the	affective	implications	of	the	ruly	glitch	are	oftentimes	not	





The	 last	 glitch	 I	 cite	within	my	preliminary	 taxonomy	 is	 the	 ‘Unruly’	 glitch.	An	















walls	 of	 a	 world	 breaking	 apart,	 code	 appearing	within	 the	 headset	 interface,	 or	 the	
environment	glitching	away	 from	the	user’s	body.	All	of	 these	examples	of	 the	unruly	
glitch	absolutely	challenge	the	autonomy	of	both	the	player	and	the	producer	alike,	 in	









explicitly,	 both	 in	 development	 for	 the	medium	 and	 use	 of	 it,	 such	 instances	 provide	
chasms	of	experience	where	user	agency	 is	challenged.	This	does	not	only	encompass	






















producing	 novel	 forms	 of	 contact	 between	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 actors.	 In	 order	 to	
spend	more	 time	 thinking	about	how	glitches	and	noise	align	with	 the	weird,	and	 the	
ways	 we	 might	 conceptualise	 a	 form	 of	 immersion	 which	 is	 not	 defined	 through	
seamlessness	and	neatness,	I	turn	back	to	the	text	Annihilation.		








of	 technological	 error	 in	 order	 to	 represent	 the	 weird	 entities	 that	 it	 presents	 to	 its	
audiences;	Garland	toys	with	the	visual	landscape	of	‘Area	X,’	referring	instead	only	to	its	
borders	which	are	termed	‘the	shimmer.’	To	bring	this	chapter	to	a	close,	and	to	cement	
















to	 the	 weird,	 including	 mutation,	 the	 uncanny,	 and	 otherworldliness.	 Garland	 notes	
during	 the	documentary	 that	 he	wished	 to	 reflect	 the	 journey	of	 the	protagonist	 (the	
biologist,	played	by	Natalie	Portman)	as	a	journey	from	suburbia	to	psychedelia.	The	film	
spends	more	time	relaying	the	backstory	of	the	biologist,	who	is	more	humanised	than	







Lee,	 Tuva	Nuvotney	 in	 addition	 to	 Portman)	 embark	 on	 the	 expedition,	 the	 viewer	 is	
initially	 exposed	 to	 the	 space	 through	 distorted	 perceptions:	 things	 move	 uncannily;	
objects	 and	 creatures	 unsettlingly	 appear	 and	 disappear;	 the	 sky	 appears	 to	 be	 in	 a	
constant	 state	 of	 rupture.	 The	 film	 amalgamates	 natural	 landscape	 with	 layers	 of	
computer-generated	imagery	(CGI)	–	layering	things	not	of	this	world	onto	recognisable	








movements	 and	 mutations	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 visual	 design	 of	 the	 area	 and	 its	











human	 embodiment	 and	 recognisable	 objects	 and	 uncannily	 reshape	 them:	 they	 are	
impossible	 to	 frame	 via	 human	 cognition	 because	 of	 their	 fluctuation	 and	 mutation	
between	 human	 and	 nonhuman	 forms.	 As	 the	 image	 below	 shows,	 the	 weird	 logics	










the	 film	 adaptation	 of	Annihilation.	 In	 taking	 organic	 lifeforms	 and	 allowing	 them	 to	




referred	 to	 as	 intra-action,	 as	 weird	 entities	 are	 designed	 around	 the	 congealing	 of	
agencies	in	their	consistent	state	of	becoming.	In	their	mimicry	of	the	human	body,	the	
nonhuman	 lifeforms	 pull	 agency	 away	 from	 the	 human	 subject	 by	 revealing	 the	





characters,	 and	 through	 the	 mimicry	 of	 abstracted	 bodily	 structures,	 reveals	 the	
unframed	world	 that	 exists	 beyond	 human	 cognition.	 These	 images	 constitute	what	 I	




















The	 bear,	 along	 with	 all	 of	 the	 other	 assemblage-beings	 present	 in	 the	 text	 offer	
visualisations	 of	 the	weird	 components	 of	 human	biology	when	 combined	with	 other	
lifeforms.	The	film	production	places	particular	emphasis	on	the	erratic,	glitchy	makeup	
of	 the	weird	beings	 it	represents.	 It	marks	a	truly	ecological	system	where	each	being	
congeals	on	an	elemental	level;	the	human	is	not	the	sole	agent,	but	forms	just	one	part	
of	the	microbiological	basis	of	a	weird	system	of	multiple	nonhuman	agencies.		
One	 of	 the	 central	 visual	 depictions	 which	 marks	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 weird	
ecosystem,	 is	what	 is	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 film	as	 ‘the	 shimmer.’	 In	 the	written	 text,	 the	
borders	of	Area	X	are	narrated	as	being	 invisible	 to	 the	naked	eye;	 the	characters	are	
unable	to	acknowledge	it	when	they	cross	the	boundary	into	the	new	realm	governed	by	






















fractal	 mandelbulbs.88	 The	 mandlebulb	 dictates	 its	 own	 movement;	 though	 it	 is	 a	
mathematical	structure,	 it	 is	visually	organic.	The	use	of	 the	mandelbulb	 to	create	 the	
walls	of	Area	X	in	the	film	places	emphasis	on	nonhuman	agency,	as	the	walls	of	the	area	
dictate	 themselves,	 marking	 a	 surface	 of	 constantly	 mutating	 materiality.	 The	 visual	
depictions	of	the	shimmer,	and	the	ecology	housed	within	it,	are	particularly	immersive	
because	 of	 their	 affectivity.	 The	 contours	 of	 the	 space	 are	 represented	 through	 the	




The	 term	 ‘shimmer’	 evokes	 an	 affectivity	 associated	 with	 awe,	 fright,	 and	 fleeting	
temporality.		
The	shimmer,	outside	of	the	filmic	landscape,	is	the	central	basis	of	Susan	Kozel’s	
work	 on	 affect	 theory	 in	 the	 virtual	 reality	 space	 specifically.	 As	 introduced	 in	 the	






understanding	 of	 rupturing	 affects,	 we	 can	 better	 understand	 how	 mediated	 and	




















between	 this	 world	 and	 the	 virtual	 world,	 an	 interface	 that	 emerges	 through	
unanticipated	encounters	that	see	the	two	worlds	comingle	phenomenologically.	Kozel	




body	 in	 a	 shudder	or	 a	 jolt.	Disorientation	and	delight	 converge,	 together	 they	
reflect	the	appeal	and	controversy	of	VR.91	
	
We	 might	 then	 take	 the	 visual	 representation	 of	 ‘the	 shimmer’	 in	 Annihilation	 as	 a	
visualisation	 of	 the	 disorientation	 and	 delight	 posed	 by	 the	 weird.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	
throughout	 both	 the	 narratives	 of	 weirdness,	 and	 the	 weird	 affects	 associated	 with	




becomes	 a	 perceptual	 experience	where	 an	 encounter	with	 the	 digital	 interrupts	 our	



























	 The	 chapter	 began	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 neat	 definitions	 of	 immersion	 that	 have	
become	embedded	in	the	VR	space.	Such	definitions	do	little	to	account	for	the	nuanced	
affects	 that	 VR	 produces,	 including	 disorientation	 and	 compromised	 agency.	 Rather,	
immersion	is	often	conflated	with	realism,	or	the	capacity	for	VR	to	produce	worlds	that	
are	 as	 real	 as	 the	 world	 we	 move	 through	 every	 day.	 In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	
counternarrative	 to	 immersion	and	 the	 immersive	potential	of	VR,	 the	chapter	 looked	
closely	at	Eugene	Thacker’s	theorisation	of	the	inherent	unknowability	of	the	world,	and	
the	ways	we	might	reconceptualise	the	world	as	not	being,	and	never	being,	solely	for	the	
human.	 Thacker’s	 writings	 expose	 the	 world	 when	 it	 is	 not	 enframed	 within	 human	
understanding.	 Rather,	 his	 work	 pays	 attention	 to	 that	 which	 is	 Outside	 human	
comprehension	and	understanding.	Such	an	understanding	of	the	world	evokes	certain	
forms	 of	 unsettling	 affects,	 which	 I	 have	 argued	 could	 be	 incorporated	 into	 a	
reconceptualization	of	VR	immersion	as	a	means	of	disrupting	the	valorisation	of	human	
agency	and	access	in	frameless,	mediated	worlds.	
	 Following	on	 from	the	establishment	of	 the	world-not-for-us	as,	 a	new	 form	of	
Outside,	the	chapter	turned	to	The	Weird	in	order	to	look	at	examples	of	the	narration	of	






works	 of	 weird	 fiction,	 as	 Mark	 Fisher	 articulates,	 the	 world	 Outside	 human	
understanding	 “encroaches”	 upon	 the	human	body	 and,	 in	 so	doing,	 reveals	 its	 “alien	




Vandermeer’s	 Annihilation	 and	 considered	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 text’s	 protagonists	
encountered,	and	affectively	responded	to,	the	weird	Outsides	presented	in	the	novel.	It	
argued	 that	 such	 encounters	 were	 narrated	 as	 ‘experiential	 glitches,’	 where	 the	
encounters	exceeded	expectation	and	revealed	 the	nonhuman	workings	of	 the	novel’s	
central	setting,	Area	X.	
	 In	 order	 to	 align	 the	 weird’s	 approach	 to	 worlds	 Outside	 with	 virtual	












of	 the	 human	 subject	 with	 nonhuman	 elements	 in	 VR	 experiences,	 the	 chapter	
established	 a	 taxonomy	 of	 VR	 glitches,	 followed	 by	 Alex	 Garland’s	 adaptation	 of	
Vandermeer’s	novel	in	order	to	further	explore	the	visual	depiction	of	the	weird,	as	it	has	
been	 inspired	by	 forms	of	mediated	error	and	mutation.	 It	ended	by	considering	how	










have	 linked	 VR	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 weird	 here	 because	 of	 the	 unique	 affects	 and	
ontological	 collisions	 it	 produces.	 The	 genre	 of	 the	 weird	 initiates	 new	 insights	 into	
collisions	 with	 other	 worlds,	 offering	 rich	 discourses	 that	 extend	 beyond	 individuals	
entering	 new	 realities	 and	maintaining	 a	 sense	 of	 unlimited	 access	 to	 them;	 there	 is	
always	an	embodied	limit.	VR	highlights	the	weird	contours	of	this	reality	by	affectively	
evoking	 the	 weirdness	 of	 entering	 another.	 By	 untangling	 VR	 from	 predetermined	
expectations	 of	 absolute	 immersion,	 there	 can	 be	 more	 active	 awareness	 of	 the	
unravelling	sensations	of	interacting	with	virtual	worlds.	Its	‘dualistic’	ontological	model	
must	 be	 reconsidered:	 the	 chaotic,	 messy	 and	 material	 potential	 of	 VR	 persists.	The	
affordances,	and	dis-affordances	of	the	medium	should	be	utilised	by	developers	to	do	
something	different	than	simply	looking	at	the	world-for-us;	the	advantage	of	an	interface	





















	 	 	 	 	 Jacques	Derrida,	Spectres	of	Marx	
	
In	Spectres	of	Marx	(1993),	Jacques	Derrida	poses	an	alternative	form	of	ontology,	
which	 he	 calls	 hauntology.	 He	 describes	 hauntology	 as	 being	 applied	 to	 the	 logic	 of	
haunting	–	as	being	beyond	a	thinking	of	Being.1	Hauntology,	he	argues,	is	dedicated	to	
the	 element	 that	 is	 “neither	 living	 nor	 dead,	 present	 nor	 absent:	 it	 spectralises.”2	
Hauntology	 encompasses	 being	 and	 all	 of	 its	 potentials—that	 which	 is	 ontologically	




aligned	with	 the	 thematics	of	 ghosts,	 entities,	 and	events	 that	 remain	on	 the	 verge	of	
existence.	Derrida’s	philosophy	of	hauntology	exists	on	the	limits	of	binary	states—	of	
that	which	is	dead	and	alive,	present	and	absent,	being	and	unbeing.	So	far	in	this	thesis,	







present	 and	absent	 simultaneously,	 the	horrors	of	 ontological	porosity,	 and	 the	novel	

























the	 horror	 genre	 mediates	 presence	 through	 specific	 bodily	 affects.	 Specifically,	 this	
chapter	 argues	 that	 horror	 provides	 the	 most	 successful	 implementation	 of	
framelessness	 in	 the	 contemporary	VR	 space,	 both	 in	how	 framelessness	 is	 used	 as	 a	





strange	 sensations	 and	 unique	 affects	 VR	 technologies	 produce,	 such	 as	 jarring	
sensations	of	materiality	 and	weird	 spectrality.	 Chapter	1	 gave	 some	examples	of	 the	
horrors	of	neoliberalist	discourse	in	the	VR	space	(what	is	more	frightening	than	Mark	
Zuckerberg	masking	 an	 audience	 in	 headsets?),	 but	 also	 the	 horrors	 of	 depictions	 of	
compromised	agency	when	using	VR	hardware	(think	back	to	the	image	of	Palmer	Luckey	
as	 free-floating	 flesh).	 Chapter	 2,	 whilst	 considering	 the	 potentials	 for	 the	
phenomenology	of	the	flesh,	also	considered	the	horrors	of	fleshy	substance	and	body-









worlds,	 and	 the	 potentials	 of	 acknowledging	 these	 limits.	 Both	 Chapters	 2	 and	 3	
considered	 where	 critical	 and	 theoretical	 works	 aligned	 to	 unhumanity,	 the	
phenomenology	 of	 the	 flesh,	 and	 the	 weird	 might	 inspire	 new	 thinking	 about	 VR	
experiences	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 some	 of	 the	 grammars	 and	 language	 to	
communicate	discomfort,	disorientation,	and	unsettling	affect.	
Indeed,	Chapter	3	showcased	the	beautiful	and	awe-inspiring	horror	of	the	weird,	
and	 the	 philosophical	 horrors	 of	 worlds	 beyond	 the	 human;	 the	 previous	 chapter	
highlighted	two	variations	of	‘horror,’	both	of	which	play	an	important	role	in	the	thesis	
as	 a	whole.	 There	was	 first	 the	 horror	 as	 related	 to	 generic	 tropes	 that	 elicit	 certain	
feelings	upon	their	audiences	–	those	associated	with	artworks	that	have	recognisable	
tropes	 that	allude	 to	horror	 including	otherworldly	creatures,	unfamiliar	settings,	and	
potential	threat.	On	the	other	hand,	there	was	the	kind	of	philosophical	Horror	forwarded	
by	thinkers	 like	Trigg	and	Thacker,	as	that	which	entails	coming-into-contact	with	the	
limits	 of	 the	 human,5	 where	 we	 are	 forced	 to	 confront	 that	 which	 exceeds	 human	





















at	 the	 ways	 the	 genre	 promotes	 the	 transgression	 of	 frames	 to	 account	 for	 their	
permeable	 borders,	 and	 consequently	 muddies	 the	 separation	 of	 the	 human	 and	
nonhuman,	 inside	 and	 outside,	 alive	 and	 undead.	 The	 co-emerging	 materiality	 and	
virtuality	present	within	both	horror	and	VR	comingle	via	weird	affects	and	interactions	
with	the	beyond-human	and	the	unthinkable	world.7		
This	 chapter	 will	 unite	 the	 phenomenological	 approaches	 that	 have	 been	
premised	 in	 the	 thesis’	previous	chapters	 to	argue	 that	 the	horror	genre	can	 teach	us	
about	 how	 these	 theoretical	 ideas	 tie	 into,	 and	 play	 out	 in,	 specific	 experiences	 and	
interactions	 for	 VR.	 The	 reference	 to	 an	 ‘us’	 here	 encapsulates	 all	 thinkers,	 do-ers,	
makers,	users,	and	producers	who	are	part	of	the	landscape	of	immersive	technologies.	
By	 ‘teaching,’	 I	 mean	 to	 suggest	 that	 horror	 already	 has	 an	 established	 grammar	 of	




with	 emerging	 VR	 practices,	 but	 have	 not	 yet	 become	 expectations	 in	 this	 particular	
space.	 As	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 VR	 has	 newly	 re-emerged	 in	 the	
contemporary	consumer	market,	and	does	not	yet	have	an	established	grammar	of	use.	
Horror,	however,	might	provide	some	facets	of	such	a	grammar,	for	use	and	engagement,	
in	 the	 way	 it	 pays	 particular	 attention	 to	 embodiment:	 horror	 maintains	 a	 visceral	
connection	with	embodied	affectivity	and	practice,	 in	 some	of	 the	 same	ways	 that	VR	
does.		
I	will	consider	horror’s	unique	affects,	particularly	in	terms	of	how	they	shape	our	
relationship	 to	 media	 devices	 and	 disrupt	 expectation	 of	 seamlessness	 and	 fixed	
ontologies.	Horror’s	tie	to	the	corporeal	does	not	just	involve	bodily	movement,	but	the	
affective	modalities	of	feeling,	sensation,	and	anticipation.	Affects	disrupt	the	imagined	








Steven	 Shaviro,	 for	 instance,	 considers	 affect	 as	 irreducible	 to	 representation,	 rather	
manifesting	 as	 an	 aesthetic	 bodily	 experience	 which	 eludes	 capture	 and	 definition,8	
whilst	Vivian	 Sobchack’s	work	 re-evaluates	 spectatorship	 in	 cinema	 as	 “carnal,”	 or	 as	










a	 currently	 under-explored	 affective	 compatibility	 between	 horror	 and	 VR,	 and	 this	
compatibility	will	form	the	premise	of	this	chapter.	There	is,	however,	a	small	repository	
of	work	on	VR	horror	simulations.	For	example,	Adam	Daniel	has	written	about	the	use	



































kinds	 of	 compatibility	 that	 emerge	 when	 experiencing	 error	 in	 a	 horror	 simulation.	
Similar	 short	 samples	 have	 also	 been	 released	 cross-platform,	 including	 360-degree	
YouTube	 videos	 which	 can	 be	 played	 on	 mobile-compatible	 headsets;	 film	 and	
entertainment	companies	have	promoted	the	release	of	new	horror	films	in	this	format,	





VR	 space.	 These	 include	 user	 agency,	 expectation,	 anticipation,	 fright,	 glitch,	 and	
intimacy.	I	argue	that	horror	at	present,	perhaps	somewhat	ironically,	provides	one	of	the	
more	ethical	modes	of	interacting	with	VR	technologies	for	a	number	of	reasons;	most	
prominently,	 audiences	have	some	sense	of	what	 they	will	 experience	when	engaging	
with	a	horror	artwork.	The	establishment	of	an	‘ethical	approach’	here	may	seem	like	a	
contradiction	 when	 discussing	 a	 genre	 which	 can	 in	 cases	 rely	 too	 heavily	 on	 brute	
violence,	 jump	scares,	and	unanticipated	encounters	with	demonic	ghouls	and	undead	
entities.	 Yet,	 horror	 is	 already	 rooted	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 disruption,	 error,	 and	



















done,	 frequently	 reflecting	 societal	 concerns	 about	 the	 use	 of	 new	 technologies	 by	














Horror	 films,	Reyes	 goes	on	 to	 argue,	 “hold	 an	uncomfortable	mirror	up	 to	 society	 in	
order	 to	 examine	 the	 representational	 limits	 of	 violence	 and	 the	 spectator’s	













phenomenon	 in	 the	 co-emergence	 of	 horror	 and	 VR.	 I	 also	 consider	 the	 ways	
framelessness	 plays	 out	 through	 specific	 aesthetic	 encounters	 with	 error	 and	 glitch,	
encounters	which	acknowledge	the	existence	of	that	which	always-already	exists	beyond	
human	 enframing.	 Firstly,	 this	 chapter	 will	 explore	 horror’s	 affectivity	 across	 the	
mediums	of	films	and	games	to	establish	the	chapter’s	theoretical	approach	to	horror-as-
affect.	 It	 will	 then	 consider	 the	ways	 framelessness	 is	 already	 established	within	 the	













an	 ecological	 disaster.	 All	 of	 these	 familiar	 horror	 narratives	 realise	 and	 represent	
intermingling	insides	and	outsides.	Where	one	side	is	a	realm	familiar	to	the	human,	the	
other	is	a	world	or	entity	that	exists	beyond	human	agency.	All	of	these	examples	produce	
specific	 affects:	 they	 are	 unnerving	 combinations	 that	 entice	 viewers	 and/or	 players	
because	 they	 illustrate	 the	 familiar	 interfacing	with	 fearful	outsides.	Horror,	both	as	a	
mode	of	experience	and	a	specific	genre,	is	not	simply	an	externalisation	of	our	all-too-
human	fears,	but	produces	embedded,	entangled,	and	embodied	affective	states	which	










there,	 but	 not	 quite.	 Derrida’s	 hauntological	 framework	 outlines	 a	 post-ontological	
approach,	 where	 self-identical	 presence	 is	 seemingly	 impossible.	 This	 leads	 Mark	
Hagglund	to	liken	the	figure	of	the	spectre	to	a	state	of	being	that	cannot	be	fully	present	
which	“has	no	being	in	itself	but	marks	a	relation	to	what	is	no	longer	or	not	yet.’18	VR,	in	
particular,	 requires	 our	 cognitive	 and	 perceptual	 systems	 to	 negotiate	 ‘in-between’	
experiences,	 moments	 where	 we	 embody	 ourselves	 as	 being-in-the-world,	 whilst	
simultaneously	traversing	virtual	space	as	a	mediated	‘other’.	As	we	have	seen	in	Chapter	
3,	 experiences	 where	 insides	 and	 outsides	 intermingle	 cause	 the	 body	 to	 experience	
particular	feelings	and	sensations.	




non-humanity	 inhabiting	 the	 same	 body”19	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 unhuman.	 His	
approach	to	the	philosophy	of	unhumanity	appeals	to	the	body	as	a	site	for	experiencing	
otherness.	 The	 phenomenology	 of	 horror	 gives	 voice	 to	 this	 materiality	 of	 the	 body	
beyond	 subjectivity.	 Though	 Trigg	 emphasises	 the	 existence	 of	 “another”	
phenomenology,	 one	 which	 exceeds	 humanist	 phenomenological	 approaches,	 this	 is	
precisely	enabled	through	a	newly	informed	focus	on	the	body,	its	messy	materiality,	and	
its	limitations.	Trigg’s	approach	to	horror	formulates	an	alternative	to	enframing;	rather	
than	 regarding	 the	 empowerment	 of	 the	 human	 body,	 ‘body-horror’	 becomes	
representative	of	the	human	becoming	unhuman.	These	jarring	conceptualisations	see	
the	body’s	affective	relationship	to	forms	of	horror.	It	is	precisely	this	relationship	that	
marks	 horror’s	 framelessness,	 because	 it	 exists	 beyond	 human	 capture	 –	 instead	
translating	into	strange	affect.		
So,	what	can	horror	do?	How	does	the	genre	speak	to	its	audiences,	and	what	do	
audiences	of	horror	expect?	What	does,	and	what	can,	horror	 feel	 like?	 I	want	 to	 look	
away	 from	VR	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 in	 order	 to	 establish	what	 the	 horror	 genre	more	
broadly	is	capable	of,	before	returning	to	its	specific	realisations	in	virtual	environments.	
I	 want	 to	 argue,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 that	 horror	 critically	 engages	 audiences	 through	














use,	 and	 this	 should	 be	 made	 apparent	 in	 VR	 (something	 horror	 can	 give	 further	
understanding	of).		
In	 this	 regard,	we	might	 consider	 horror	 as	 an	 overtly	 leaky	 genre	 and	 affect.	
Wendy	Hui	Kyong	Chun	explores	the	phenomenon	of	leakiness	in	relation	to	new	media	
technologies	 in	her	2016	Updating	to	Remain	the	Same.20	 	 In	 the	work’s	preface,	Chun	
describes	new	media	as	being	“wonderfully	creepy”21	as	they	unsettle	the	oppositional	
positions	of	the	new	and	old,	banal	and	exciting,	but	also	in	the	ways	that	they	are	sold	to	
us	 in	 such	 a	 way	 where	 their	 being	 eerily	 present	 in	 our	 day-to-day	 lives	 becomes	
commonplace.	Wendy	Chun	describes	the	leakiness	of	networks,	and	asks	how	we	take	































exists	 a	 rich	 corpus	 of	 scholarship	 dedicated	 to	 horror	 films	 and	 the	 embodied	
implications	 for	 spectating	 horror.	 To	 introduce	 the	 phenomenological	 approach	 to	
spectatorship	 in	this	chapter,	 I	am	focusing	on	what	 film	philosopher	Vivian	Sobchack	
refers	to	as	carnal	viewing,	“vision	in	the	flesh,”	or	the	ways	the	body	feels	the	moving	
images	 present	 to	 the	 viewer.25	 Embodiment	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 all	 experiences	 of	
horror.	When	we	watch	fictions,	we	engage	with	them	with	our	flesh;	words	and	images	
evoke	 sensory	 experiences	 which	 capture	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 embodied.	 The	 rich	
academic	 discourse	 around	 horror,	 body,	 and	 technology	 attests	 to	 the	 affective	
potentials	of	the	horror	genre	and	the	ways	our	bodies	become	implicated	in	horror	texts.	
VR	brings	us	that	one	step	closer	to	the	horror	on	the	other	side.	
Noël	 Carroll’s	 Philosophy	 of	 Horror	 is	 often	 cited	 in	 work	 which	 attempts	 to	
understand	horror’s	relationship	to	the	body	and	the	world.	Carroll’s	work	marked	an	
early	interjection	where	horror	artworks	were	considered	alongside	affect,	whilst	horror	
is	 described	 as	 being	 an	 affect	 in	 and	 of	 itself.	 Published	 in	 1990,	 Carroll’s	 research	
explores	 the	endurance	of	horror	across	 the	ages,	precisely	because	of	 the	effect,	 and	
affect,	it	has	on	its	audiences.	Carroll	formulates	what	he	refers	to	as	“art-horror,”	i.e.	the	
ways	works	of	horror	“elicit	a	certain	kind	of	affect…	an	emotional	state,	which	emotion	




























Is	 there	 something	 special	 about	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 protagonists	 in	 horror	
fictions?	 Do	 we,	 for	 example,	 identify	 with	 these	 characters—is	 our	 fear	 of	
monsters	 their	 fear	 of	 monsters?—or	 is	 the	 relation	 one	 other	 than	
identification?28		
	
Part	 of	 the	 process	 of	 engaging	with	 characters	 in	 horror	 plots	 is	 their	 dictating	 the	
movement	 and	 action	 of	 the	 viewer	 throughout	 the	 world,	 direction	 which	 viewers	
willingly	follow,	but	do	not	have	to	make	decisions	about	and	therefore	cannot	affect	the	















underpin	 the	 history	 of	 horror	 as	 a	 genre	 are	 broken;	 the	 frame	 is	 shattered	 and	

























translated	 for	 transnational	 audiences,	 Och	 and	 Strayer	 suggest	 that	 the	 body’s	







across	 cultures,	 arguing	 that	 the	 “core	 identification	 process	 with	 the	 body	 remains	
intact,	 even	 as	 the	 body	 mutates,	 transforms,	 becomes-animal,	 or	 fractures.”31	 They	
continue:	
	
Through	 remakes	 and	 transformations,	 regional	 tales	 of	 vengeful	 ghosts	 and	














technologies	we	 have	 come	 to	 interact	with.	 This	 is	 precisely	what	makes	 VR	 horror	
particularly	affective;	immersive	horror	environments,	 in	particular,	take	advantage	of	
the	body	as	 a	habitus	 for	horror	 to	 take	place	within.33	 	The	embeddedness	of	digital	



















thesis	 thus	 far,	 these	 ontological	 ambivalences	 emerge	 in	 specific	 ways	 in	 VR.	 The	
particularities	 of	 VR	 horror	 texts	will	 be	 considered	 later	 in	 this	 chapter.	 It	 is	worth	
exploring	the	types	of	horror	texts	that	appeal	to	forms	of	framelessness,	and	the	ways	
mediation	 and	media	 are	 incorporated	 into	 frameless	 horror	 fictions.	 As	 an	 example,	
Kjetil	Rødje	discusses	the	“stylistic	framing”	of	the	found	footage	horror	film.34	The	style	
of	found	footage	films35	encourages	the	visibility	of	the	technologies	which	produce	them,	
including	cameras,	 computers,	and	mobile	phones.	Whilst	 illustrating	certain	 forms	of	
authenticity,	 i.e.	 the	 viewer	 finds	 the	 footage	 along	with	 the	 characters	 in	 the	 films,36		
these	 artworks	 oftentimes	 simultaneously	 promote	 their	 inauthenticity	 by	 creating	 a	
very	 specific	 form	 of	watching	 for	 the	 viewer.	 The	 visibility	 of	 the	 technology,	 Rødje	
contests,	creates	spatiotemporal	limitations	and	rigid	constraints;	this	means	that	though	
the	 genre	 implies	 that	 something	 beyond	 the	 human	 will	 emerge	 and	 threaten	 the	
characters	in	the	film,	the	spatiotemporal	limit	posed	by	the	technological	frame	means	
that	the	viewer	is	also	limited	in	what	they	can	perceive	and	be	made	aware	of	at	any	
given	 time.	Rødje	argues	 that	 this	produces	an	 intradiegetic	 role	 for	 the	 camera	 “as	a	



















of	 “assemblages,”38	 Rødje	 argues	 that	 the	 found-footage	 mode	 relies	 on	 the	
interrelationships	of	body	and	movement	as	a	dynamic	collective.	The	medium-frame	in	
this	instance	both	limits	the	viewers	way	of	seeing,	but	also	enables	the	spectator	to	view	
the	 events	 via	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 nonhuman	 technology,	 as	 it	 jolts	 and	 trembles,	
moving	 with	 the	 body	 of	 the	 character	 who	 holds	 it.	 Though	 the	 mode	 of	 seeing	 is	





Horror	 ultimately	 relies	 on	 technology	 and	 bodies	 in	 order	 to	 exist.	 Special	 effects,	
uncanny	and	photorealistic	gameplay,	the	capacity	to	layer	virtual	images	onto	the	real	
world,	 all	 of	 these	 evolutions	 across	mediums	 enable	 horror,	 and	 our	 experiences	 of	
horror,	 to	 evolve.	 As	 technologies	 and	 our	 expectations	 of	 them	 begin	 to	 change	 and	
evolve,	so	too	does	horror	and	its	ability	to	shed	light	on	the	horrific.		
The	 found-footage	 genre	 is	 just	 one	 example	 in	 a	 large	 repertoire	 of	 horrific	
modes.	 In	 his	 work	 Limits	 of	 Horror:	 Technology,	 Bodies,	 Gothic	 (2008),	 Fred	 Botting	
explores	 the	 ways	 horror	 and	 technology	 are	 intertwined.	 Botting	 argues	 that	 the	
evolution	 of	 technological	 effects	 ultimately	 enhances	 horror’s	 affects,	 further	
“engag[ing]	 and	 repuls[ing]	 audiences	 in	 the	 staging	 of	 often	 overwhelming	 and	
unbearable	images.”39	He	explores	the	potentials	of	technology	to	enhance	the	sensory	




















































Cinefantastic	 horror,	 in	 short,	 succeeds	 in	 incorporating	 its	 spectators	 as	
“feminine”	 and	 then	 violating	 that	 body—which	 recoils,	 shudders,	 cries	 out	
collectively—in	ways	otherwise	imaginable,	for	males,	only	in	nightmare.46	
	
Clover’s	 writing	 of	 the	 gendered	 violation	 of	 the	 body	 in	 the	 slasher	 film	 actualises	
horror’s	 unique	 alignment	 with	 agency	 and	 the	 affective,	 and	 affecting,	 body.	 The	
threatened	 body	 on	 screen	 creates	 vulnerability	 for	 the	 audience	 of	 viewers	 in	 this	















existential,	 or	 relating	 to	 being	 and	 experience.	 Don	 Ihde	 defines	 existential	











therefore,	 also	 accounts	 for	 the	 always-already	 unknown	both	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	
sensing	 subject,	 our	 strange	 bodies,	 and	 wandering	 minds.	 There	 are,	 at	 the	 core	 of	
horror,	certain	questions	of	agency	and	access,	a	number	of	which	I	have	introduced	in	
each	of	the	previous	chapters.	Yet,	horror	can	provide	us	with	some	of	the	language	and	
embodied	 grammars	 associated	 with	 compromised	 agency	 and	 access	 that	 also	 look	
beyond	 the	 human.	 Existential	 phenomenology	 places	 emphasis	 on	 subjective	
experience,	whilst	horror	challenges	human	agency	by	enabling	certain	kinds	of	access	to	
that	which	 is	beyond	 the	human,	or	beyond	 the	 limits	of	human	 framing.	Horror,	 too,	
complicates	human	access	by	the	suggestion	that	we	will	truly	never	know	that	thing	we	
have	come	into	contact	with.	In	this	light.	Stephen	Asma	considers	the	potentials	of	the	














wholly	 unintentional	 and	 emergent.	 In	 his	 essay	 on	 ‘Silent	 Hill	 and	 the	 Aesthetic	
Economies	of	Fear’	 (2015),	William	Cheng	notes	 that,	 in	 the	development	of	 survival-














over	 the	 environment	 is	 seemingly	 stripped	 away,	 and	 technological	 limits	 and	
consequential	errors	enact	the	agency	of	that	which	is	other	than	human.		 	
Angela	Ndalianis’	work	The	Horror	Sensorium:	Media	and	the	Senses	(2012)	further	






In	 the	 fictional	 expansion	 that	 occurs	 across	 media,	 the	 sensorium	 turns	 its	
attention	to	an	intensive	cognitive	and	sensorial	immersion	into	fictions	that	are	





that	 the	 affective	 power	 of	 horror	 encourages	 our	 engagement	 in	 the	 social	 critiques	
works	of	horror	showcase	to	their	audiences,	in	the	ways	they	expose	the	instability	of	
social	 systems	and	muddy	social	orders.	She	states:	 “the	horror	 film	 is	about	crossing	
boundaries.	 One	 side	 of	 the	 border	 constitutes	 order;	 the	 other	 chaos:	 the	 horrific	
manifests	 itself	 where	 meaning,	 which	 is	 established	 by	 civilisation,	 collapses.”54	














human	 agency	 primarily	manifests	when	we	 are	 exposed	 to	 arduous	 and	 unexpected	
affects.	 In	 these	 instances,	 the	borders	of	 chaos	 and	order	 collapse	 and	 the	 two	 sides	






art-horror.	They	have	 also	been	 considered	 through	writings	 that	 explore	 the	 genre’s	
entanglement	 with	 human	 bodies,	 and	 the	 ways	 horror	 narratives	 translate	 from	
representation	 to	 affect	 by	 interfacing	 closely	 with	 the	 body.	 I	 argue	 that	 we	 might	
consider	framelessness	as	a	certain	affective	experience	in	VR	specifically,	considering	
the	ways	cognition	and	embodiment	in	VR	can	be	captured	through	an	approach	which	
leaves	 borders,	 frames,	 inside/outside	 dichotomies,	 and	 ontological	 division	 behind.	








Watts)	 as	 she	 attempts	 to	 find	 the	 source	 of	 a	 ‘killer	 video	 tape’	 which,	 upon	 being	
watched,	will	kill	the	viewer,	following	a	telephoned	warning	that	they	will	die	in	seven	
days.	 Upon	 tracing	 its	 origins,	 Rachel	 discovers	 the	 backstory	 of	 Samara	Morgan,	 the	























the	 supernatural	 and	 the	natural	 in	The	Ring	 sees	 the	human	body	 threatened	by	 the	
unknowable	unhuman	whose	existence	goes	beyond	the	rules	and	experiential	capacity	
of	the	human	world.		
The	transgression	of	 the	 frame,	 in	this	case	a	 television,	 is	 initially	signified	by	the	



















































she	 evokes	 horror-as-affect.	 The	 film	marks	 a	 frameless	 orientation,	 where	 Samara’s	
presence	marks	the	inversion	of	ontological	categories,	as	well	as	the	inversion	of	human	














the	 other-than-human.	 When	 mediation	 is	 unruly,	 such	 as	 the	 tape	 playing	 without	
consent,	 this	 unruliness	 signals	 the	 conjuring	 of	 a	 supernatural	 apparition.	 These	






attention	 is	 drawn	 to	 the	 frameless	 bodies	 that	 defy	 ontological	 categorisation:	 an	
interruption,	such	as	Samara’s	emergence	from	the	screen,	implicates	the	mediation	of	
unruly	 presence.	The	 Ring	 has	 become	 a	 well-known	 horror	 narrative	 because	 of	 its	
visualisation	of	the	porous	interface.	Horrific	encounters	like	that	within	The	Ring	mark	
an	unfixed	phenomenology	of	that	which	exists	beyond	the	realm	of	the	human	subject.	








of	 fictions:	 entities	 escape	 containment,	 crossing	diegetic	 and	non-diegetic	 borders	 to	












In	 the	 case	 of	 VR	 horror,	 other	 dimensions	 become	 part	 of	 the	 experience,	
including	 the	 intimate	 interaction	 with	 the	 technological	 hardware	 and	 the	 specific	
engagements	we	have	with	the	virtual	worlds	of	elsewhere.	Developments	in	immersive	
VR	 simulations	 are	 continually	 battling	 the	 cognitive,	 embodied,	 and	 epistemological	
challenges	of	the	technology’s	interactions	with	our	bodies.	VR	development	constantly	
strives	 to	 avoid	 negative	 affects	 associated	 with	 the	 technology,	 including	 motion	
sickness,	 uncanny	 movements,	 glitches,	 and	 breakdowns—all	 of	 which	 are	 seen	 to	




reality,	 but	 reveals	 other	 elements	 which	 exist	 beyond	 immediate	 human	
comprehension,	agency,	and	access.	These	elements	are	important	to	consider,	because	
where	 unruly	 interactions	 and	 error	 are	 inevitable,	 they	 should	 be	 embraced.	Horror	
invites	a	new	approach	to	error	which	is	not	negative,	but	that	overtly	muddies	VR’s	neat	
narrations	 in	popular	culture	and	asks	users	to	acknowledge	the	 limits	of	 interactions	
between	the	hardware	and	the	body.	
As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 through	 explorations	 of	 ‘The	
Phenomenology	 Implications	 of	 VR,’	 ‘Presence	 and	 the	 Phenomenology	 of	 the	 Flesh,’	
‘Glitch/Noise/Immersion,’	 and	 here	 ‘Horror,	 Embodiment,	 and	 the	 Horror	 of	
Embodiment,’	 experiences	 such	 as	 uncanny	 movements	 and	 perceptual	 errors	 in	 VR	
escape	the	technologies	perceptual	framings;	they	produce	weird	kinds	of	affect	which	
root	 the	body	 in	 its	 fleshy	presence,	whilst	simultaneously	hinting	at	 the	coming-into-
contact	with	the	world-without-us.	Both	works	of	horror	and	VR	independently,	but	also	






does	 this	 primarily	 through	 enabling	 unruly	 encounters	 between	 the	 human	 and	 the	
nonhuman.	 Horror	 initiates	 new	 critical	 understandings	 of	 VR	 as	 the	 technology	 and	
content	produced	for	the	medium	sees	its	users	experiencing	instances	where	hardware	
does	not	work	seamlessly	with	the	body,	and	the	ways	these	experiences	mimic	the	weird	
sensations	most	 commonly	 associated	with	 horror.	 Though	 VR	 development,	 at	 least	
currently,	overwhelmingly	seeks	to	replicate	human	(or	human-seeming)	embodiment	
and	 interaction	 in	 alternative	 virtual	worlds,	 the	 feeling	 of	 ontological	 inbetweenness	
doesn’t	 see	 this	happen,	 and	 this	 can	be	arduous,	 frustrating,	 and	uncomfortable.	The	
compatibility	of	horror	and	VR	is	further	accentuated	through	questions	of	agency	and	
potential	 affective	 discomfort	 and	 disorientation.	 Experiences	 of	 unruly	movement	 in	









in	 fact,	 be	 reconsidered	 as	 a	 radical	 new	 aesthetic	 of/for	 VR	 experiences,	 bridging	





























of	 total	 agency.	And	 it	 is	 this	 surrendering	of	 agency	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 intended	
effects/affects	of	the	game.	
	 The	 general	 plot	 of	A	 Chair	 in	 a	 Room	 explores	 a	 number	 of	 themes	 including	





Beneath	 the	 surface,	 a	 selection	 of	 clues	 scattered	 throughout	 the	 plot	 reveal	 that	
institutional	 corruption	 is	 part	 of	 the	 reason	 you	 have	 been	 detained,	 and	 that	 the	
Greenwater	 Institute	 is	 not	 a	 safe	 haven	 for	 you/your	 avatar.	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	
experience,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 institute	 is	 controlling	 and	 dictating	 artificial	
memories,	relaying	fake	information	in	order	to	convince	you	that	you	have	committed	a	














hitting	 the	 wall,	 or	 coming	 into	 contact	 with	 something	 that	 could	 match	 up	 with	
something	horrific	in	the	simulation,	made	the	game	even	more	intense	to	play.	 	Upon	
entering	the	game’s	virtual	environment,	it	begins	in	a	clinical,	whitewashed	room	with	





use	 handset	 triggers	 to	 move	 the	 character’s	 photorealistic	 hands,	 interact	 with	 the	
objects,	 and	 look	 and	 move	 around	 the	 room.	 This	 introductory	 setting,	 though	 it	
functions	to	accustom	the	user	to	the	virtual	environment	and	game	mechanics,	also	hints	
at	what	might	be	future	experiences	of	weird	affectation	within	the	space.	Indeed,	Chair	













































suggestion	 that	 the	 diegetic	 drug	 usage	 is	 affecting	 the	 character’s	 movement;	 the	




of	 displacement,	 which	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 embraced	 by	 horror	 narratives.	 By	
explicitly	 linking	 together	 the	 intermittent	 errors	 of	 the	 game	 system	mechanics	 and	
registering	the	calibration	of	the	player’s	movement,	 the	game	links	the	consequential	
affects	to	genre	specific	tropes,	particularly	the	loss	of	control.	Upon	completion	of	the	
game,	 it	 is	 revealed	 that	 the	 drug	 has	 actually	 been	 the	 means	 through	 which	 the	
Greenwater	 Institute	 has	 manipulated	 your	 memories,	 forming	 part	 of	 a	 larger	
experiential	scheme	coordinated	by	the	institute	to	recruit	subjects	for	the	testing	of	the	
perception-altering	drug.	
	It	 is	 this	 kind	 of	 fine-tuned	 detail	 that	 makes	 this	 particular	 horror	 game	
successful:	 it	not	only	ties	together	the	intentional	horrific	components	presented,	but	
also	accounts	for	your	strange	and	glitching	movement	through	the	game’s	spaces.	These	
instances	 of	 glitch	 inevitably	 produce	 weird	 affects	 for	 the	 player,	 including	
displacement,	motion	sickness,	and	a	sense	of	control	and	rootedness	being	pulled	away.	
Indeed,	the	strangest	feeling	is	watching	the	world	around	you	sporadically	break	down	
and	 experiencing	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 your	 own	 body	 as	 it	 feels	 so	 part	 of	 the	 virtual	



















These	 factors	 mark	 the	 innate	 affinities	 between	 horror	 narratives	 and	 VR,	 not	 as	 a	
wholly	orderly	medium,	but	instead	as	a	still	emerging	and	unruly	technology	which	is	
both	 unreliable	 and	 intimately	 tied	 to	 our	 embodiment.	 VR	 continues	 to	 bring	







outlined	 in	Chapter	2,	Trigg’s	description	of	 a	body	whose	agency	exceeds	 that	of	 the	






sensations	 that	 are	 triggered	 by	 the	 medium	 implicate	 the	 presence	 of	 emergent	




the	 unhuman	 visible	 through	 bodily	 affect.	 The	 uncomfortable	 jolts	 of	 a	 virtual	 body	
moving	of	its	own	accord	is	rendered	intimately	to	the	VR	user,	allowing	them	to	see	glitch	
and	error	as	direct	perceptual	and	embodied	encounters	with	virtual	environments.		












Ring,	 the	 medium	 highlights	 the	 impropriety	 of	 the	 frame	 as	 a	 distinctly	 human	
ontological	category,	as	the	boundaries	dividing	the	real	and	the	mediated,	the	human	
and	 the	unhuman,	alive	and	dead,	 inside	and	outside,	 all	become	 increasingly	porous.	




and	 limits	of	human	experience;	acknowledging	 this	phenomenology,	as	 it	necessarily	
moves	away	from	VR’s	grand	illusions	of	empowerment	and	neatness,	will	enable	new	












transcendence.	 Eugene	 Thacker	 formulates	 the	 term	 ‘dark	media’	 in	 his	 essay	 in	 the	
collection,	 Excommunication	 (2014).64	 This	 collection	 illustrates	 excommunication	 as	
that	 which	 involves	 a	 “contentious	 and	 often	 confrontational	 testing	 of	 the	 limits	 of	










humanist	 thought.	 Thacker’s	 focus	 on	 ‘dark	 media’	 considers	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
communication	 is	 in	 some	 ways	 presupposed	 by	 excommunication—that	 somehow	












be	 no	 relation	 between	 object	 and	 thing.	 This	 is	 the	 “relation”	 of	 object-thing.	
While	objects	are	always	objects	as	they	appear	to	us	as	subjects,	things	occupy	a	
dark,	 nebulous	 zone	 outside	 of	 subject-object	 relations	 altogether	 (including	
object-object	relations).	If	objects	are	always	objects	for	a	subject,	then	things	are	








media	 pose	 as	material	 reminders	 of	 the	 potentials	 of	 nonhuman,	 object	 agency,	 and	
horror	allows	for	a	particularly	metaphorical	conceptualisation	of	these	agencies	through	
the	 representations	 of	 the	mediated	 supernatural,	 recognisable	 horrific	 figures	which	
make	apparent	the	aspects	of	our	media	which	dwell	beyond	the	interfaces	that	we	never	
physically	interact	with,	but	lay	beneath	our	visual,	auditory,	and	tactile	interactions.		
The	 horror	 genre	 opens	 these	 ideas	 up	 and	 lays	 down	 its	 own	 limits:	 horror	




nature	 of	 communication,	 and	 ultimately	 poses	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 expectations	 of	
noiseless,	 seamless	 and	 obedient	 communication	mediums.	 As	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 representation	 of	 the	 frameless	mediated	 content	 in	The	Ring	and	 the	
unruly	body	calibration	in	Chair	in	a	Room,	intersections	of	horror	and	communications	
mediums	 reveal	 new	 kinds	 of	 unfamiliarity	 in	 our	media	 objects	which	 invite	 critical	
interpretation	 and	 break	 away	 from	 our	 uncritical	 usage	 of	 them	when	 they	 become	
readily	engrained	 into	our	daily	routines	 through	 familiar	 functionality.	 Instead,	 these	
horror	 artworks	 allow	 a	 communication	with	 the	nonhuman,	 or	 reveal	 the	 unhuman.	
Thacker’s	 work	 ultimately	 challenges	 the	 drive	 towards	 seamless	 communicative	




VR	 development	 that	 it	 is	 worth	 pulling	 it	 away	 from,	 on	 one	 hand,	 its	 pre-existing	
spectacular	discourses	of	seamlessness,	and	on	the	other,	its	risk	of	uncritical	banality.	If	
VR	is	to	be	considered	a	form	of	‘dark	media,’	it	is	to	be	considered	as	a	technology	that	
during	 use,	 actively	 withdraws	 itself	 from	 human	 subjectivity:	 VR	 calls	 for	 more	
experimentation	with	its	nonhuman	systems,	a	call	to	embrace	the	weird	crevices	that	
emerge	between	human	perception	and	its	technological	infrastructures.	
Thacker	 references	 Shannon	 and	 Weaver’s	 cybernetic	 communication	 model,	

















these	 technologies	 up.	 This	 is	 potentially	what	 is	 to	 offer	 here	 in	 terms	of	VR	 and	 its	











I	would	 go	 further	with	Thacker’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘infusion’	 of	media	 objects	with	 the	
supernatural	and	paranormal	here:	what	horror	does	is	pose	the	question	as	to	how	long	
such	objects	have	been	 containers	of	 the	 supernatural	 and/or	paranormal.	There	 is	 a	
temporality	at	work,	which	forces	the	users	of	the	possessed	technologies	to	ask	whether	










Thacker	 notes	 that	 dark	 media	 is	 also,	 therefore,	 antihumanist,	 as	 a	 “form	 of	











dark	media	 reach	 a	 point	 of	 “anti-humanism,”	 that	 the	 nonhuman	 “is	 not	 necessarily	
outside	 the	 human	 or	 separated	 from	 it.”71	 This	 form	 of	 mediation	 enacts	 similar	
interactions	between	human	and	nonhuman	counterparts	to	those	explored	in	Chapter	
2.	As	we	saw	with	both	P	Burke	in	The	Girl	Who	Was	Plugged	In	and	the	young	boy	in	














embedded	 into	 the	world	here	and	now,	manifest	via	a	paradoxical	 immediacy	
that	constantly	withdraws	itself	and	cloaks	itself.	The	supernatural	seems	to	be	as	
immanent	 as	 our	 media	 are—distributed,	 ubiquitous,	 in	 the	 “cloud”	 and	
enveloping	us	in	its	invisible,	ethereal	bath	of	information	and	noise.	(p.95).	
	
As	 the	 supernatural	 emerges	 within	 our	 immanent	 media	 objects,	 it	 disrupts	 these	
systems	 through	 the	 production	 of	 error	 and	 noise.	 This	 call	 for	 the	 simultaneity	 of	
immanence	and	the	beyond	 is	 important	 for	VR.	The	unruly	 is	embedded	and	not	 far-
fetched,	 it	 implicates	 the	 human	 user	 through	 common	 interactions	 that	 push	 them	
beyond	the	realms	of	complete	knowledge	of	our	media	objects	which	otherwise	seem	so	







ways,	 VR’s	 unique	 position	 at	 the	 verge	 of	 commercial	 success	 means	 that	 its	 true	
potentials	 remain	 vaguely	 mysterious	 to	 larger	 audiences.	 Alluding	 back	 to	 the	 first	
chapter’s	 call	 to	 explore	 the	 true	givenness	of	 VR,	 the	 occurrences	 through	which	 VR	
systems	withdraw	 themselves	 from	 their	users	 remains	 somewhat	hidden	behind	 the	
language	of	access	and	immediacy	that	continue	to	cloak’s	VR’s	darkened	spaces	of	glitch,	











different	 ontological	 orders.	 Beyond	 the	 configurations	 of	 the	 Shannon	 and	 Weaver	
model,	Haunted	media	see	mediation	not	as	“between	two	points	in	a	single	reality,	but	
between	two	realities”	(p.131).	Finally,	Weird	media	are	those	media	which	emphasise	




































possible.	Horror	 is	 the	most	well-established	genre	 in	the	VR	space	for	actualising	the	
potentials	of	nonhuman	forces	and	posing	a	challenge	to	the	humanist	tendencies	of	the	









haptic	 input,	 or	 a	 maintains	 a	 dependence	 on	 touch,	 ultimately	 forges	 new	 affective	
relations	 to	 the	 bodies	 of	 its	 users.	 In	 the	 first	 chapter,	 this	 was	 tied	 to	 new	 ethical	




toward	 a	 non-unitary	 approach	 to	 ethical	 subjectivity,	 where	 the	 human	 subject	 is	
regarded	as	one	of	many	actors	 in	 the	generation	of	multiple	becomings	with	objects,	




















With	 this	 newfound	proximity	between	 the	human	and	multitudinous	 “others”	
(hardware;	software;	unhuman	subjectivity;	objects;	voids	of	error)	comes	new	ethical	
challenges.	Indeed,	as	we	saw	in	Chapter	1,	traditional	notions	of	the	ethical	surfaces	of	
‘the	 face’	 and	 ‘skin’	 face	 radical	 new	 formations.	 The	 thesis	 at	 large	 has	 explored	 the	










new	 forms	 of	 touching,	 but	 actually	 touches	 us	 in	ways	 that	 go	 beyond	 surface	 level	
contact.		
In	a	paper	written	in	2009,	Dave	Boothroyd	acknowledges	the	need	to	reconsider	
potential	 routes	 into	 the	 ethical	 encounter	 to	 account	 for	 the	 development	 of	 haptic	
technologies.	 Boothroyd	 defines	 his	 approach	 to	 the	 haptic	 as	 that	 which	 references	
touch	technology	and	affectivity	and	how	the	haptic	“bears	on	the	notion	of	the	ethical	by	
virtue	of	 the	part	 it	plays	 in	 the	production	of	ethical	subjectivity.”72	He	considers	 the	
ways	 in	which	 technologies	 like	 VR	 produce	 new	 forms	 of	 sensory	 extension	 that	 go	
beyond	imaginings	of	mediated	environments	as	free-floating	spaces	of	representation,	






traditional	notions	of	 the	ethical	encounter	and	what	 it	means	to	 forge	ethical	contact	
with	 someone,	 or	 something,	 else.	This,	 I	would	 add	 to	Boothroyd’s	 approach,	 should	






of	 data,	 inputs/outputs,	 feedback)	 bear	 upon	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 ethical,	






















narration	 of	 ethical	 contacts	 with	 the	 Other,	 Boothroyd	 argues	 that	 haptic	
communications	are	“consistent	with,	rather	than	reductive	of,	the	ethical	relation	to	the	






This	 is	 particularly	 important	 as	 VR	 technologies	 push	 further	 the	 tracking	 (seeing)	
capacities	of	new	media	 technologies—seeing	users	 come	 into	more	proximal	 contact	
with	nonhuman	actors	and	 forces	 that	 still	 remain	relatively	underexplored.	Horror,	 I	





unhuman	 agencies	 visualise	 and	 exacerbate	 the	 invisible	 forces	 that	 articulate	 the	
digitally	 mediated	 spaces,	 allowing	 audiences	 to	 affectively	 respond	 to	 the	 very	 real	
implications	they	pose.	Take	the	example	of	The	Ring,	and	the	questions	 it	asks	of	 the	






























as	 gameplay.	 The	 genre	 highlights	 the	ways	 in	which	 failure,	 error,	 and	 glitch	 can	 be	
inherently	immersive	elements	of	engaging	with	a	narrative.	
As	has	been	discussed	 from	the	 introduction	 to	 this	chapter,	horror	unites	and	
puts	 into	 action	 the	 concerns	displayed	 throughout	 this	 thesis,	 and	 this,	 in	particular,	











This	 thesis	 has	 demonstrated	 how	we	might	 reconfigure	 popular	 framings	 of	 Virtual	
Reality	(VR)	technology	by	considering	the	weird,	wonderful,	and	specifically	embodied	
and	affective	potentials	of	frameless	mediated	realities	which	are	ontologically	complex	





some	 of	 these	 grammars	 in	 literary	 and	 critical,	 theoretical	 texts	 that	 enable	 us	 to	
understand	more	fully	the	potentials	of	VR	to	produce	nuanced	affects	which	implicate	
the	body	in	a	variety	of	ways.	To	this	end,	the	thesis	has	explored	VR	technologies	through	
a	number	of	different	 lenses,	 including	(but	not	 limited	to)	disorientation	(Chapter	3),	
body-horror,	 the	 flesh,	 and	 the	unhuman	 (chapter	2),	 the	weird,	 and	proximal	horror	
(Chapters	3	&	4).	In	so	doing,	it	has	argued	that	VR	offers	new	ways	of	experiencing	and	
understanding	embodied	relations	with	contemporary	new	media.	




for	 interaction,	 more	 specifically	 those	 that	 are	 unruly	 and	 ambivalent,	 are	 largely	
ignored	in	favour	of	neat	narratives	of	perfect	immersion	and	bodily	transcendence.	In	
response	to	these	narratives,	the	thesis	has	coined	what	it	terms	Frameless	Fictions	as	a	
means	 for	 considering	hybrid	 experiences	where	VR	 sees	 the	human	body	 affectively	
encounter	 that	 which	 exists	 moderately	 outside	 our	 (human)	 comprehension,	 our	
capacity	to	frame	and	cognise.	These	encounters	make	our	bodies	feel	strange,	producing	
crevices	 where	 experience	 oscillates	 between	 an	 ontological	 here	 and	 there.	 Such	
experiences	have	been	further	located	in	narratives	of	extended	realities,	where	the	body	
and	 technological	 system	 simultaneously	 pull	 away	 from	 each	 other,	 yet	 produce	







Overall,	 this	 thesis	 has	 provided	 a	 critical	 starting	 point	 for	 understanding	 VR	
through	 the	 lenses	of	 affectivity,	 embodiment,	 and	unruliness.	 Speaking	 to	experts,	 as	
well	as	new	audiences	who	are	 interested	 in	 learning	more	about	 this	novel	 (and	still	
relatively	 inaccessible)	 technology,	 it	 has	 provided	 some	 key	 examples	 where	 the	
predominant	language	used	to	describe	VR	falls	short	of	its	true	potentials.	The	thesis	has	
aimed	to	reconfigure	what	 ‘presence’	and	 ‘immersion’	can	mean,	and	how	they	can	be	
applied	 in	 new	 ways	 that	 account	 for	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 VR	 in	 the	 contemporary	




relied	 on	 well-worn	 terms	 that	 centralise	 human	 agency	 and	 access.	 This	 work	 has	





consumer	market.	 It	 argued	 that	many	 of	 these	 representational	 framings	 do	 little	 to	
account	for	the	ambivalent	experiences	that	can	be	forged	between	the	technology	and	






experiences	 with	 worlds	 and	 beings	 beyond	 realism	 and	 distinctly	 human	
subjectivity/ies.		







smearing	produces	 unhuman	 subjectivities,	where	 bodily	 presence	 takes	 on	 an	 “alien	
materiality”	 cohabited	 by	 the	 human	 and	 nonhuman.1	 The	 Girl	 Who	 Was	 Plugged	 In	
(1973)	 illustrated	 where	 illusions	 of	 transparency	 and	 transcendence	 are	 shattered,	
particularly	through	Tiptree	Jnr’s	evocative	discourses	of	flesh	and	its	melding	with	the	
dystopian	technological	infrastructure	imagined	within	the	novella.	In	a	similar	vein,	the	
videogame	 Inside	 (2016)	 illustrated	 the	 ways	 virtual	 environments	 produce	
subjectivities	beyond	the	human	(the	unhuman),	and	the	affective	implications	for	player	
interaction.	Both	of	these	texts,	I	argued,	illustrate	grammars	for	thinking	through	flesh,	
agency,	 and	 access	 that	 VR	 should	 attend	 to,	 grammars	 which	 emphasise	 affectivity,	
materiality,	 and	 the	 disruptive	 potentials	 of	 unruly	 encounters	 with	 immersive	
technologies.	
	 Chapter	 3	 argued	 for	 the	 co-emergence	 of	 glitch,	 noise,	 and	 immersion.	 It	
considered	 the	 ways	 immersion	 is	 possible	 in	 unruly	 landscapes	 that	 are	 forged	 by	
mediated	error,	and	that	are	neither	seamless	nor	wholly	accessible.	In	order	to	illustrate	
this,	 it	 turned	to	accounts	of	the	weird	and	the	ways	 immersion	in	worlds	beyond	the	
human	are	narrated	through	bodily	affect.	The	chapter	also	looked	at	writings	on	glitch	
and	 error	 in	 contemporary	 technoculture,	 arguing	 that	 both	 glitch	 and	 noise	 can	 be	
considered	 to	 be	 weird	 encounters,	 as	 users	 are	 exposed	 to	 the	 inner	 workings	 of	
technological	systems.		Looking	at	the	novel	and	film	adaptation	of	Annihilation	(2014;	
2018)	as	case	studies,	 it	 looked	at	the	ways	encounters	with	the	weird	share	common	
ground	 with	 experiences	 of	 unruly	 mediation,	 where	 the	 limits	 of	 human	 logic	 and	
understanding	 are	 revealed.	 Following	 out	 of	 Chapter	 2,	 it	 again	 emphasised	 the	
importance	of	materiality	and	 the	 intra-action2	of	human	and	nonhuman	actors	 in	VR	
experiences,	 and	 established	 a	 glitch	 ecology	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 the	 weird,	 unruly	
encounters	that	VR	makes	possible.	
	 Chapter	4	 located	 the	concerns	of	all	of	 the	previous	chapters	within	examples	
from	the	horror	genre,	attesting	to	its	popularity	in	the	VR	space.	Uniting	the	themes	of	












of	 frameless	 fictions,	 as	 its	 preestablished	 grammars	 concerned	 with	 ontological	






might	also	 frame	 them	 in	 turn.	As	we	have	seen	 in	narratives	of	 the	weird	and	of	 the	
horrific,	 the	body	accepts	that	 it	 is	not	able	to	truly	know	the	forces	that	exist	beyond	
human	 subjectivity,	 but	 narrates	 them	 through	 bodily	 affects	 that	 emerge	 when	 the	
human	 interacts	with	 that	which	 exists	moderately	beyond	 them.	With	 these	 ideas	 in	
mind,	the	thesis	argues	that	the	perpetual	narratives	of	transcendence,	disembodiment,	
and	limitlessness	in	the	VR	space	are	wholly	insufficient.	Bodily	affectivity	is	the	locus	for	
understanding	 VR’s	 unique	 potentials,	 including	 unruly	moments	 of	 glitch,	 error,	 and	
disorientation.		
	 VR	 experiences	 are	 hard	 to	 narrate,	 and	 maybe	 that	 is	 something	 we	 should	
embrace.	Like	the	prose	of	Lovecraft,	we	might	find	the	most	generative	descriptions	of	
VR	if	we	attempt	to	narrate	the	ways	it	interacts	with	our	embodiment,	rather	than	simply	








What’s	 the	point	 of	 having	 a	 body	 if	 I	 could	 theoretically	make	or	 step	 into	 so	
many?	The	self	has	been	made	malleable	by	the	opportunity	to	become	a	form	of	
language.	Does	the	language	form	a	version	of	code	of	the	self?	If	I	want	to	fly,	I	





have.	 When	 I	 look	 down	 in	 these	 scenarios,	 I	 do	 not	 often	 have	 a	 body	 that	
resembles	what	I	look	down	and	see	without	a	headset	on.	Sometimes,	I	see	the	




to	 need	 a	 body,	 whilst	 simultaneously	 always	 being	 reminded	 of	 its	 presence.	 He	






become	 another	 body.	 Such	 chasms	 of	 experience,	 this	 thesis	 has	 argued,	 provide	
“experiential	crevices”4	where	we	can,	for	a	moment,	critically	consider	what	it	means	to	
embody	 someone	or	 something	 else.	These	moments	 realise	 that	 the	 transparency	or	
immateriality	of	media	technologies	are	simply	illusory,	and	that	VR,	more	than	anything	


































has	 analysed	 VR	 away	 from	 its	 humanist	 framings,	 and	 opened	 up	 new	 avenues	 for	
thinking	through	VR	as	an	assemblage	technology	which	comprises	the	body,	hardware,	
software,	and	physical	environment.	It	has	utilised	a	range	of	frameless	fictions	to	provide	
examples	 where	 human	 agency	 and	 access	 are	 challenged,	 and	 where	 virtual	
environments	break	away	 from	 their	 intended	 functionality.	 	 It	has	 sought	 to	provide	
robust	theoretical	framework	for	analysing	unanticipated	and	unexpected	interactions	
with	virtual	environments	and	VR,	aiming	to	provide	thinkers,	makers,	producers,	and	
those	interested	in	learning	more	about	this	novel	technology,	with	a	set	of	experiential	
grammars	that	better	capture	its	potential	affects	and	implications	for	embodiment.	
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